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Since 2006, the US Air Force Academy’s 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense 
Studies has sponsored an annual workshop 
examining the strategic impact and 
implications of China’s space program. This 
workshop series has blossomed into a Track-II 
process, with participants from the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), and unofficial US 
government presence.  
 
A key focus of many of the discussions during 
these workshops has been the prospects for 
Sino-US cooperation in space. This issue has 
gained prominence since the 2007 PRC ASAT 
test, and the US subsequent 2008 American 
destruction of a malfunctioning satellite. Sino-
US space cooperation is seen as potentially 
serving a confidence-building function, 
allowing the two sides to familiarize 
themselves with each other.  
 
This paper will examine some of the proposals 
laid out in these workshops for proposal, and 
discuss the potential pitfalls that confront 
them. It will then make some suggestions 
about how cooperation might be fostered.  
 
Approaches to  Cooperation 
 
In the most general terms, there are four levels 
of cooperation: sharing data; establishing 
common standards; planning missions jointly; 
and undertaking missions jointly. Each of 
these involves measures that might be 
undertaken either bilaterally, between the PRC 
and the United States, or multilaterally, as part 
of larger, multinational efforts.  
 
Neither the levels nor the approaches are 
mutually exclusive. That is, there is significant 
room for overlap between levels, just as there 
may be instances of both bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation for each level. 
 
Levels of Cooperation 
 
The four levels of cooperation involve a 
steadily greater level of interaction between 
the two sides. At the same time, each 
subsequent level of cooperation also entails 
greater disclosure, and increasingly involves 
not only revealing types of data, but also 
decision-making processes.   
 
Sharing data. Most promising may be the 
possibility of sharing the data derived from 
space. With the increasing quantity and 
quality of data derived from space that is 
available commercially, it was suggested by 
some of the participants in the Eisenhower 
Center workshops that data-sharing may be a 
means of facilitating cooperation between the 
US and the PRC.  
 
Indeed, there is already some degree of data 
sharing already, in both bilateral and 
multilateral contexts. For example, the United 
States is on record as sharing debris data with 
the PRC prior to any manned Chinese 
launches. Some of this already occurs. The 
US, for example, has provided collision 
avoidance analysis to the PRC prior to several 
of its manned launches, including the 
Shenzhou-VI.1   
 
In a more multilateral context, there are 
already several venues where the US and the 
PRC are both members. These include the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  “Chinese Experts Welcome US Offer of Warning 
Datum for Spacecraft Launch,” Xinhua (October 16, 
2005). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200510/ 
16/eng20051016_214641.html.	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World Meteorological Organization (WMO), 
to which both nations provide data from their 
respective meteorological satellites. In 
addition, the United States, the PRC, and the 
European Space Agency have all decided to 
allow unrestricted access to their respective 
Earth observation data and archives.2 Thus, 
the US can now examine Chinese data from 
its CBERS (China-Brazil Earth Resources 
Satellite) system, while the PRC may examine 
the range of LANDSAT data. While this may 
not constitute direct sharing of data, each state 
can access the information that the other 
provides.  
 
Similarly, the United States decided years ago 
to make the GPS signal readily accessible. 
While it initially only provided a downgraded 
signal, today, the more accurate signal is made 
available. While not specifically aimed at 
China (or any other nation), this again 
suggests that there is ample room for sharing 
data.  
 
Less sanguine observers would not, however, 
that such cooperation is nonetheless extremely 
limited. Both nations, for example, are also 
party to the UN Convention on the 
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space, as well as the Outer Space Treaty.3 
Compliance by both states (as well as others) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Group on Earth Observations, “GEO Announces Free 
and Unrestricted Access to Full LANDSAT Archive,” 
Press Release (November 20, 2008). 
http://www.earthobservations.com/documents/pressrele
ases/pr_0811_bucharest_landsat.pdf.  
3 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, United 
Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space and 
Related General Assembly Resolutions, Addendum 
“Status of International Agreements Relating to 
Activities in Outer Space as at [sic] 1 January 2008 
(Vienna, Austria: Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2008), 
pp. 9, 15.  
to the UN Registration, however, has been 
described in the past as “spotty.”4 
 
Establishing common standards and 
baselines. A potentially deeper level of 
interaction would be cooperation in the 
creation of common technical standards or 
baselines. This level of cooperation would 
create not only equipment and procedures that 
were compatible, but would also begin to 
expose scientists, technical staff, and 
administrators from each side to the other.  
 
To some extent, this has occurred in some 
areas of satellite services. Companies 
manufacturing GPS receivers, for example, 
are all accessing the same GPS signal; 
therefore, to some extent they must work to a 
common standard (at least in terms of their 
receivers). That does not mean, however, that 
the receivers are mutually compatible, only 
that they rely upon a common signal source 
and format. Cooperation at this level would, in 
fact, encourage not just accessibility but 
compatibility.  
 
Establishing common standards and baselines, 
however, would require each side providing 
the other with information on how each side 
designs their systems, and, to some extent, 
how those systems operate. Greater 
cooperation might require more detailed 
discussion of operating procedures. All of this 
may be seen as offering a potential venue for 
espionage. 
 
It was this type of concern in the Loral and 
Hughes scandals that ultimately ended 
American use of Chinese commercial space 
launchers. In the wake of two launch failures 
involving APSTAR II atop a Long March-2E 
and Intelsat 708 aboard a Long March-3B, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Christopher Noble, “US, China, G7 Countries Flout 
Satellite Registry,” Space.com (August 16, 2001). 
http://www.space.com/news/satellite_orbits_010816.ht
ml.  
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American partners, Hughes Space and 
Communications International, Inc., and 
Space Systems/Loral respectively, assisted in 
the subsequent investigations. In each case, 
the companies helped identify shortcomings, 
involving both design flaws as well as failures 
in analytical methodology. This assistance 
was seen as contributing significantly to 
improvements in not only China’s space 
systems, but China’s nuclear missile forces.5  
 
These worries have likely escalated in the 
intervening decade. Recent concerns about 
cybernetic intrusions, especially American 
fears about Chinese electronic espionage, 
might well discourage the creation of common 
standards and baselines, since it would 
disclose aspects of the data formats and codes 
that operate equipment.    
 
Joint mission planning. This level of 
cooperation would involve establishing a 
common objective for the two (or more) 
parties, with each side contributing its own 
spacecraft. The best example is probably the 
Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC). 
The DMC is comprised of satellites from five 
nations (Algeria, Nigeria, PRC, Turkey, the 
UK). These operate together as a single 
constellation. Thus, it constitutes more than 
simply a matter of sharing information, but 
instead involves operating together in order to 
provide prompt support to international 
disaster monitoring.  
 
Another example of joint mission planning, 
this time in a bilateral sense, is the Apollo-
Soyuz Test Project (ASTP). The ASTP was 
cited at the Eisenhower Center workshops as a 
possible model for Sino-US space 
cooperation, with some suggesting a Shuttle-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 US House of Representatives, Report of the Select 
Committee on US National Security and Military 
Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of 
China (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1999), 
pp. 219-279.  
Shenzhou mission.  In the ASTP, the US and 
USSR agreed to a mission involving a 
rendezvous and docking, with each nation 
using its own spacecraft. To undertake the 
mission required not only making sure that the 
docking systems were compatible, but that 
each side understood the other’s flight 
procedures. Consequently, not only were there 
repeated exchanges of flight crews, but there 
were also repeated sessions involving both 
nations’ flight controllers mission control 
centers and their respective communications 
links.6 It should be noted that the ASTP 
ultimately involved nearly four years of 
planning and exchanges, suggesting that joint 
mission planning will be an extensive, and 
extended, process.  
 
Joint missions. There are several different 
ways in which one could conduct joint 
missions. The use of components from one 
nation, placed aboard the bus of another 
nation, might be one means. The deployment 
of European instruments aboard a Chinese 
bus, as occurred with the “Doublestar” 
program, would be an example of a 
multilateral joint mission.7 The creation of 
common standards and baselines would 
facilitate the process of creating such joint 
missions, by making equipment compatible 
without requiring extensive modification.  
 
Joint cooperation in human space activities is 
seen by many as non-zero-sum in nature, 
providing mutual benefits to all the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Charles Redmond, “The History of Apollo-Soyuz.” 
http://history.nasa.gov/apollo/apsoyhist.html, and 
Edward Ezell and Linda Ezell, The Partnership: A 
History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (Washington, 
DC: NASA, 1978). Electronic Table of Contents can be 
found at: http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office 
/pao/History/SP-4209/toc.htm.  
7 “Doublestar Summary,” European Space Agency 
(January 25, 2005). http://sci.esa.int/science-
e/www/object/index.cfm?fobjectid=31490, and British 
National Space Centre, “Double Star” (March 17, 
2008). http://www.bnsc.gov.uk/5620.aspx.  
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cooperating states. This is usually envisioned 
as joint crewing of a spacecraft, drawing 
astronauts from different nations. The current 
situation aboard the International Space 
Station could be characterized as a form of 
joint mission, conducted multilaterally. The 
prospect of manned missions conducted 
jointly by the US and the PRC has been of 
particular interest to the workshop 
participants.  
 
This is by no means an exhaustive survey of 
potential levels of cooperation. Indeed, recent 
developments suggest that there may be a host 
of new potential venues for cooperation. The 
growth, for example, of “new space,” in the 
form of non-government space efforts, poses 
intriguing new challenges to both the 
American and Chinese space programs. The 
“new” space sector, including space tourism, 
is less subject to governmental intervention or 
restrictions. At the same time, at least 
theoretically, it may well be focused wholly 
on the capitalization. With the growing 
Chinese economy, it is not clear what impact 
non-governmental Chinese funding might 
have on the prospects for “new space.”  
 
Obstacles to Cooperation 
 
In considering the potential for cooperation, 
the discussions undertaken at the three 
workshops have served to highlight the very 
real obstacles to cooperation that exist 
between the PRC and the United States. At its 
most basic, cooperation between the two sides 
has to operate within the political realities that 
mark the Sino-American relationship. There 
are a number of outstanding issues that 
separate the two, from their respective 
political ideologies, to such issues as human 
rights, trade policy, and the status of Taiwan 
that make any improvements in relations a 
delicate process.  
 
An especially prominent obstacle to greater 
cooperation of any sort are the mutual 
suspicions over security issues. US-Chinese 
military-to-military contacts, for example, 
have varied greatly, reflecting the vagaries in 
the general tenor of Sino-American 
relations—and space was no exception. In 
October 2006, the commander of the US 
Strategic Command (STRATCOM), Marine 
General James Cartwright, expressed interest 
in engaging the PLA on such space issues as 
collision avoidance and perceptions of attacks 
on satellites. He hoped to raise these topics in 
discussions with his counterpart, General Jing 
Zhiyuan, commander of the Chinese Second 
Artillery force (which is responsible for 
China’s nuclear forces). Indeed, Jing’s visit 
had been discussed as part of the same April 
2006 Hu-Bush summit that had led to NASA 
Administrator Griffin’s visit.8  As of the end 
of 2008, however, Jing had still not visited the 
United States, despite repeated invitations.  
 
The security issue is especially prominent in 
the multilateral arena, which directly affects 
prospects for space cooperation. Although 
both the US and the PRC are members of the 
UN Outer Space Committee (also known as 
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space or COPUOS) and the Ad Hoc 
Committee for Preventing an Arms Race in 
Outer Space (PAROS) within the UN 
Conference on Disarmament, little movement 
has occurred in either body. Significant 
differences of opinion on the utility of a new 
arms control agreement (proposed by the PRC 
and Russia, and opposed by the United 
States), coupled with complicating linkages to 
such issues as limits on new fissile materials, 
have led to few new space-related 
developments in these multilateral security 
arenas.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Shirley Kan, US-China Military Contacts: Issues for 
Congress, RL-32496 (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2008), p. 25.  
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Beyond these broad strategic political 
concerns that affect all aspects of relations 
between Beijing and Washington, are a 
number of factors that are specifically likely to 
affect US Chinese space cooperation. These 
include issues of technological disparities and 
non-parallel government structures and space 
organizations, as well as deeper differences 
rooted in fundamental approaches to 
negotiations, as well as cultural and historical 
differences that color both sides’ views.  
 
Organizational and Technical 
Asymmetries 
 
At the most basic level, one of the key 
obstacles to increased Sino-American space 
cooperation is the disparity in space-related 
experience. The United States has placed over 
a thousand objects into orbit; by contrast, the 
PRC has only orbited a hundred. In the realm 
of human spaceflight, the disparity is even 
greater. The United States has nearly fifty 
years of experience with manned missions; the 
PRC, as of 2008, had thus far engaged in only 
three actual crewed flights.  
 
Paralleling the differences in experience, there 
are also differences in technological 
capability. Chinese systems often have a 
shorter lifespan than their Western 
counterparts. The Chinese Fengyun-2 
geostationary weather satellites, for example, 
had projected lifespans of only two years; by 
contrast, the US GOES (Geostationary 
Operational Environmental Satellite) has a 
projected lifespan of 5 years, but often 
exceeds that (GOES-10, for example, was 
launched in 1997, and exhausted its fuel in 
2006). Chinese literature does suggest that the 
latest generation Fengyun weather satellite 
and Dongfanghong-4 communications satellite 
will have life-spans approaching those of their 
Western counterparts.  
 
These differences complicate any effort at 
cooperation, since it is not clear what the 
United States would necessarily gain from 
cooperating with the PRC, at least in terms of 
technology and experience. 
 
This is further complicated by the integrated 
nature of the Chinese space program. Any 
cooperation between the two states, from the 
American perspective, should not result in a 
transfer of militarily significant technology to 
the PRC. Indeed, it was precisely charges to 
this effect, leveled against the Loral and 
Hughes Aerospace corporations, which 
brought a halt to US use of Chinese launchers 
for commercial and civilian purposes. As the 
Cox Commission Report notes, “the guidance 
system used on the Long March-2C, Long 
March-2E, and Long March-3 rockets is also 
used on the CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic 
missile.”9 The commonality of systems 
between Chinese civilian space launch 
vehicles and current Chinese missile systems 
means that any cooperation between the two 
nations’ space programs, even in ostensibly 
civilian or commercial areas, could well lead 
to improvements in China’s offensive missile 
capabilities. According to some of the Chinese 
participants in the Eisenhower Center 
workshops, they had been unaware of this 
concern.  
 
Nor is the integration of Chinese civilian and 
military space capabilities limited to issues of 
dual-use systems. Broadly speaking, there is 
no bright dividing line between Chinese 
military and civilian space authorities, either. 
That the Chinese should have a closely 
integrated civilian and military space sector is 
not surprising. When Deng Xiaoping came to 
power in 1978, he set forth the general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 US House of Representatives, Report of the Select 
Committee on US National Security and Military 
Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of 
China (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1999), p. 
215.  
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Chinese guideline (zong fangzhen) of “civil-
military combined, wartime-peacetime 
combined, give preference to military goods, 
have the civilian nurture the military” 
[(junmin jiehe, pingzhan jiehe, junpin 
youxiang, yi min yiang jun)]. This general 
guideline remains a cornerstone in China’s 
efforts to foster broad national development.  
 
Deng’s call for close civil-military integration 
is echoed in the PRC’s 2006 space white 
paper. This paper (and its 2000 predecessor) 
issued by China’s State Council, the highest 
governmental body in the People’s PRC, was 
specifically cited by Chinese delegates to the 
2008 workshop as essential for understanding 
China’s space program. The paper notes that a 
key principle underlying the development of 
China’s space industry is that it is “a strategic 
way to enhance its economic, scientific, 
technological, and national defense strength, 
as well as a cohesive force for the unity of the 
Chinese people.”10 
 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
management of the Chinese space 
infrastructure. On the one hand, the Chinese 
claim that their space facilities are managed 
by yet another subordinate organization to 
COSTIND, the China Satellite Launch and 
Tracking Control General (CLTC). This is the 
entity that has generally contracted with 
foreign space organizations for commercial or 
civilian space launches, such as the Brazilian 
space agency for the launch of CBERS-2. 11  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Emphasis added. PRC State Council, China’s Space 
Activities in 2006, “Aims and Principles of 
Development,” (Beijing, PRC: State Council 
Information Office, 2006).  
11 Valcir Orlando, Helio Koiti Kuga, Jun Tominaga, 
“CBERS-2 LEOP Orbit Analysis,” Proceedings of the 
18th International Symposium on Space Flight 
Dynamics, ESA SP-548. (Munich, Germany: October 
2004), p. 1. http://www2.dem.inpe.br/hkk/2004/ 
Orlando&Kuga&Tominaga-P1062.pdf 
Other Chinese reporting, however, suggests 
that it is the military, in the form of the 
General Armaments Department (GAD), that 
has authority over China’s launch facilities 
and mission control centers. The GAD is one 
of the four General Departments that 
administers the Chinese People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA). Established in April 1998, it is 
responsible for development of military 
equipment for the entire PLA.12 Moreover, the 
GAD also controls the military academy that, 
according to PLA writings, is the main 
institution responsible for training the 
personnel that staffs China’s space-related 
facilities, including launch sites and mission 
control centers.13  
 
Based on available data, it seems that the 
GAD actually controls the various Chinese 
space launch and mission control facilities. 
The facilities are generally identified as being 
designed and constructed by units of the 
GAD.14 Moreover, Chinese reporting suggests 
that GAD has ultimate responsibility over 
missions conducted at these facilities. 
According to one Chinese news report, the 
launch of the 20th Fanhui Shi Weixing (FSW) 
from Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center 
encountered difficulties with an instrument. 
The director of the JSLC debated whether to 
proceed with the launch, recognizing that any 
failure to do so might disrupt the subsequent 
Shenzhou-VI space launch. The JSLC director 
decided to proceed with the FSW launch, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Phrase Dictionary Committee, Large Phrase 
Dictionary, Military Volume (Shanghai, China: 
Shanghai Dictionary Publishing House, 2003), p. 98.  
13 “Academy of Command Equipment and 
Technology,” in An Overview of Chinese Military 
Academic Institutions, ed. by Jin Peng and Dong Ming 
(Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Science 
Publishing House, 2003), pp. 163-164.  
14 “A Development History of China’s Aerospace 
Launch Facilities,” Jiefangjun Bao (November 2, 
2005). www.jingning.gov.cn/zhxx/zhxx/ 
t20051102_114819.htm 
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only after receiving permission from the GAD 
(dedaole zongzhuangbei bu de pizhun).15 
 
While this integration of civilian and military 
organizations and systems may be 
understandable, especially in light of 
constrained Chinese human, financial, and 
technological resources, it nonetheless 
complicates any effort at Sino-American 
cooperation.  
 
The opacity and uncertainty regarding the 
organization of China’s space efforts, beyond 
the role of the PLA, adds yet another layer of 
complication. The United States and the PRC 
have almost no parallels in how each has 
organized its overall space organizations and 
political infrastructure. This makes 
establishing counterparts for even discussing 
space cooperation much more difficult.  
 
For the United States, there are four major 
sectors of space activity: 16 
 
Civil. The activities in this sector are 
conducted by the US Government (USG), in 
order to “explore the universe and advance 
human knowledge.” This sector is mostly 
under the direction of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA). It includes exploration of other 
planets and space bodies, scientific missions 
relating to Earth observation, and human 
spaceflight.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 “Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center Director Zhang 
Yuling Chases Dreams of Flight,” China National 
Space Agency (October 26, 2005). www.cnsa.gov.cn/ 
n615708/n942529/n942861/70240.html.  
16 This section draws from Peter L. Hays, James M. 
Smith, et. al., “Spacepower for a New Millennium: 
Examining Current US Capabilities and Policies,” in 
Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space and US 
National Security, ed. by Peter L. Hays, James M. 
Smith, et. al. (NY: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2000), pp. 
2-3. All quotes are drawn from this section.   
Commercial. These activities are performed 
by the private sector, as a means of making 
money. Commercial space activities used to 
mainly involve the launch and operation of 
communications satellites, but there has now 
developed a commercial remote sensing sector 
as well. The space services sector, including 
satellite positioning and navigation, is one of 
the fastest growing areas of space activity, in 
terms of revenue.  
 
Intelligence. The collection of information 
through the use of a variety of surveillance 
and reconnaissance satellites is part of the 
intelligence space sector. Previously referred 
to as “national technical means,” this sector is 
under the joint purview of both the US 
military and the US intelligence community.  
 
Military space. This sector supports the 
military directly, including communications, 
meteorology, missile early warning, and a 
variety of other roles. It also includes the use 
of force to, in, and from space. It is largely 
administered by the US Department of 
Defense, operating through Strategic 
Command (STRATCOM) and the US Air 
Force Space Command (AFSPC).  
 
While there are inter-relationships among the 
four sectors, each is also relatively 
autonomous from the others. By contrast, the 
fundamental organization of the PRC space 
program is shrouded in mystery, with few 
reliable sources of information on whether it 
has distinctive sectors and communities 
comparable to those in the American system.  
 
Based upon the limited available evidence, it 
would appear that in the PRC the space sector 
as a whole, and not just the space launch 
facilities and mission control centers, is deeply 
embedded within the military industrial 
complex, with very close ties between the 
military and civilian sides. Indeed, it is not 
clear whether there is a meaningful distinction 
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between the civilian and military in the 
Chinese space arena.  
 
Thus, until March 2008, for example, China’s 
space program was part of the Commission on 
Science, Technology, and Industry for 
National Defense (COSTIND). Indeed, the 
China National Space Agency (CNSA), 
ostensibly responsible for all civilian space 
activities, was a subordinate entity within 
COSTIND (or State-COSTIND, as Western 
China scholars commonly refer to it).  
 
State-COSTIND was itself an outgrowth of 
the National Defense Science and Technology 
Commission (NDSTC), which was established 
in 1958 in order to oversee China’s strategic 
weapons development and was also given 
authority over the space program. The 
NDSTC reported directly to the Central 
Military Commission, the highest military 
authority, and therefore “could lay nearly 
automatic claim to extensive proprietary rights 
throughout the Chinese bureaucracy…. [and 
gave it] the ability to mobilize resources and 
to command compliance virtually at will.”17  
 
Over time, the NDSTC underwent 
bureaucratic evolution, merging with several 
other bureaucracies focused on science and 
technology in 1982, to become the 
Commission on Science, Technology, and 
Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). It 
retained responsibility for the space program, 
along with other key high-technology areas of 
interest to the military. In 1999, COSTIND in 
turn underwent further bureaucratic 
reorganization, calving off a new General 
Department (the General Armaments 
Department or GAD) to oversee military 
weapons development, while retaining a 
quasi-civilianized COSTIND (often referred 
to in Western writings as State-COSTIND, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Evan Feigenbaum, China’s Techno-Warriors 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 54.  
distinguish it from its predecessor) to serve as 
an administrative oversight of defense 
industries.  
 
The situation is further confused by 
uncertainties of how recent reorganizations 
have affected the Chinese space program. In 
March 2008, several ministries were 
consolidated into super-ministries. COSTIND, 
previously a ministerial-level government 
entity, was subsumed under the newly 
established Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT). At the same 
time, it was ostensibly downgraded to become 
the State Administration for Science, 
Technology, and Industry for National 
Defense (SASTIND). This would have made 
it the equivalent of CNSA in terms of 
bureaucratic power.  
 
It remains unclear, nearly a year later, 
however, whether CNSA is a component of 
SASTIND (i.e., was itself also downgraded), 
or separated from SASTIND to become a 
stand-alone agency, and if so, at what level of 
authority. For example, the release of several 
hundred hours of data from the Chang’e-1 
lunar mission (a CNSA mission area) was 
announced by SASTIND.18 Meanwhile, Sun 
Laiyan, the director of CNSA, has been 
described as a Deputy Director of SASTIND, 
while Chen Qiufa, the director of SASTIND, 
is described as a deputy minister of MIIT.19 
This would suggest that CNSA remains 
subordinate to SASTIND, within the larger 
context of MIIT.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 “China to Release 700 Hours of Chang’e-1 Data,” 
Xinhua (August 4, 2008).  
19 “SASTIND to Study and Implement National IP 
Strategy Outline,” Intellectual Property Protection in 
China (July 22, 2008), http://english.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/ 
en/info/Article.jsp?a_no=225422&col_no=925&dir=20
0807,  and “China Reveals Its First Full Map of Moon 
Surface,” Xinhua (November 12, 2008), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/ 2008-
11/12/content_10347379.htm.  
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Even Chinese officials appear uncertain at this 
time about exactly how the various pieces of 
the Chinese space bureaucracy will fit 
together, noting that the reorganization 
remains “a work in progress.” Nonetheless, 
the uncertainty associated with the basic 
organization of the Chinese space 
bureaucracy, including who is subordinate to 
whom, underscores the potential difficulties 
confronting more extended negotiations 
between the two sides, as well as more 
extensive cooperation.  
 
Different Approaches to Negotiations 
 
Should the US and the PRC actively seek to 
cooperate, any ventures will first require 
extensive negotiations. As noted earlier, there 
has been only minimal interaction between 
American and Chinese space authorities. This 
means that there is not an extensive 
foundation of personal relationships or even 
negotiating experience on space issues 
between the two countries upon which to 
build. With neither institutional nor personal 
relations, the process is likely to be extremely 
lengthy.  
 
In particular, the absence of a legacy of 
interactions goes to the heart of the Chinese 
approach to negotiations. President Richard 
Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and the 
subsequent establishment of diplomatic 
relations in 1979, for example, was the 
culmination of nearly twenty years of 
meetings in Geneva and Warsaw.20 “From the 
Chinese perspective, these [Ambassadorial] 
Talks and the events leading to the Talks 
established the boundaries within which the 
ultimate solutions were found. Like building a 
stone house, a solid foundation for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For further details on the Ambassadorial Talks, see 
Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese 
Communists (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1968).  
relationship had to be laid, if the relationship 
was to endure.”21  
 
The absence of such a foundation means that 
any effort to foster cooperation in space arena, 
which touches on sensitive issues of national 
capabilities as well as being potentially highly 
technical, will also have to reconcile very 
different approaches to the process of 
negotiation.  
 
“Top-Down” versus “Bottom-Up” 
 
In this regard, American and Chinese 
negotiators tend to take very different 
approaches. Chinese negotiators in general 
seek first to establish sets of principles that 
will then govern all subsequent interactions.22 
For example, in many international 
negotiations, the Chinese emphasize the 
importance of both sides starting from the 
“five principles of peaceful co-existence”:  
 
• Mutual respect for territorial integrity 
and sovereignty 
• Mutual non-aggression 
• Mutual non-interference in internal 
affairs 
• Equality and mutual benefit 
• Peaceful coexistence23 
 
This is in direct contrast to the American 
approach, in which negotiations begin by 
establishing specifics, “avoiding debates about 
generalities which can easily become 
entangled in political or philosophical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Alfred D. Wilhelm, The Chinese at the Negotiating 
Table (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1994), p. 201.   
22 For more discussion about the role of principles in 
Chinese negotiating style, see Alfred D. Wilhelm, The 
Chinese at the Negotiating Table (Washington, DC: 
NDU Press, 1994), pp. 51-52.  
23 Samuel S. Kim, “China and the Third World,” in 
China and the World, 3rd Edition, ed. by Samuel S. Kim 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 131.  
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differences.”24 In essence, Chinese negotiators 
tend to adopt a “top-down” approach, with 
senior leaders focusing on broad principles, 
whereas American negotiators more 
frequently adopt a “bottom-up” approach, 
with working level officials focusing on 
concrete measures.  
 
The Chinese focus on principles, as one 
Japanese diplomat has noted, is rooted in a 
number of factors.  
 
• It establishes the essence of the 
Chinese position. This is in keeping 
with what the Chinese are seeking to 
determine about their counterpart, i.e., 
their counterpart’s essential “bottom 
lines.”  
 
• The negotiating process for the 
principles also provides an opportunity 
for the Chinese to take their measure 
of their counterparts. Are they a 
cohesive group? Or are they internally 
fragmented, presenting opportunities 
for division and exploitation?  
 
• The creation of principles are also a 
means of establishing internal support 
among various Chinese stakeholders. 
The establishment of the Chinese 
position in any given negotiation is 
likely to require extensive internal 
negotiation within the Chinese 
bureaucracy (and may explain why 
getting the Chinese to shift away from 
their own principles can often be so 
difficult). Along these lines, the 
principles serve as a short-hand, easily 
understood at a glance (yi mu liao 
ran).25  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Lucian Pye, Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style, 
R-2837-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1982), p. 40.  
25 Ambassador Kagechika Matano, “Chinese 
Negotiating Styles: Japan’s Experience,” Center 
 
• Once principles are established, they 
become the starting point for 
subsequent negotiations. For this 
reason, the Chinese will strive to 
establish said principles on their own 
terms. If a negotiating partner will 
accept the principle that “the weak 
need not reveal to the strong,” or that 
“knowledge should not be limited,” 
that position will then be exploited in 
subsequent rounds.  
 
The first two factors listed by Ambassador 
Matano indicate, again, that American and 
Chinese negotiators hold very different 
perceptions of the significance of negotiations. 
In general, the Chinese, unlike their American 
counterparts, do not see political negotiations 
as “a highly technical process of haggling over 
details in which the two sides move to a point 
of convergence from their original positions 
through incremental compromises.”26 Instead, 
they are viewed an attempt to reconcile (or 
impose) “principles and objectives of the two 
sides and the testing of their interlocutor’s 
commitment to a relationship with the PRC.”27 
Rather than “getting to ‘Yes,’” for the Chinese 
“the purpose…is to size the opposition to 
draw out the US position with minimum 
exposure of China’s.”28  
 
Under such circumstances, an opening 
position is unlikely to have “give,” since the 
aim is not so much to gain reciprocal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Occasional Paper, Asia Pacific Center for Security 
Studies (Honolulu, HI: Asia Pacific Center for Security 
Studies, December 1998). http://www.apcss.org/ 
Publications/Ocasional%20Papers/OPChinese.htm.  
26 Richard H. Solomon, “Friendship and Obligation in 
Chinese Negotiating Style,” in National Negotiating 
Styles, ed. by Hans Binnendijk (Washington, DC: 
Foreign Service Institute, 1987),  p. 6.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Alfred D. Wilhelm, The Chinese at the Negotiating 
Table (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1994), p. 46.  
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concessions, but to address a counterpart’s 
bottom line requirements without 
compromising one’s own. This, again, is in 
contrast with most American negotiating 
styles. “Flexibility, by indicating the softness 
of the US position, may impede and not 
facilitate agreement.”29 The resulting 
disconnect may well hamper negotiations.   
 
Another consideration is that the Chinese 
usually appear at the negotiating table with 
their own position already formulated. If they 
are seeking to determine their counterpart’s 
bottom lines, the Chinese negotiators are well 
aware of their own. “Before negotiations at 
any level begin, the central leadership will 
have assessed the ‘objective reality’ and 
determined its objectives vis-à-vis the 
principal ‘contradictions as well as the 
strategy for achieving those objectives.”30 
Such assessments are likely to have been 
arrived at only after significant internal 
bargaining within the Chinese system, in order 
to create the necessary consensus among 
competing bureaucracies, stakeholders, and 
leadership groupings. They are therefore 
unlikely to be lightly modified, much less 
altered or abandoned.  
 
In order to shift the Chinese, then, it is 
essential to be able to traverse the labyrinthine 
bureaucracy of China. As one observer notes, 
“The first stage of wisdom in negotiating with 
the Chinese is to grasp that one is confronted 
with the world’s oldest bureaucracy.”31 
Apparent gains at the negotiating table are 
insubstantial unless they can garner support 
from the actual Chinese leadership. As one 
Japanese diplomat has observed, “In order for 
a point to be accepted by the Chinese side, it is 
important that our presentation is formulated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures 
(Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1991), p. 93.  
30 Wilhelm, p. 40.  
31 Cohen, p. 101. 
in such a way that it would reach the top strata 
of the Chinese decision-making machinery.”32 
Conversely, “pragmatism is displayed amply 
when there is positive political will in the top 
leadership of China to conclude an 
accord….”33 
 
The key leaders and decision-makers, 
however, are not located in the state 
bureaucracy, but within the Chinese 
Communist Party, specifically, the Chinese 
Politburo. This is because policy decisions are 
the purview of the Party’s leadership, whereas 
policy implementation is the responsibility of 
the state’s bureaucracy. It is arguably for this 
reason that the Chinese are extremely opaque 
about the details of their space policy 
decision-making process. The process of 
determining policy occurs, not in the 
government, but in the Party. Allowing 
outsiders to gain an understanding of said 
processes would also provide them with the 
ability to detect and exploit potential 
vulnerabilities.  
 
Different Views of Each Party’s 
Responsibilities 
 
A more fundamental issue rests in the 
perception of roles and responsibilities. In 
particular, in seeking to establish “common 
principles,” the Chinese are often seeking to 
establish that both sides agree upon “mutual 
interests” being at stake. In the Chinese 
perception, however, once such mutual 
interests are established, it is the responsibility 
of the better off, more powerful, or more well-
to-do to sustain said interests. “For the 
Chinese, the acknowledgement that both sides 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ambassador Kagechika Matano, “Chinese 
Negotiating Styles: Japan’s Experience,” Center 
Occasional Paper, Asia Pacific Center for Security 
Studies (Honolulu, HI: Asia Pacific Center for Security 
Studies, December 1998). http://www.apcss.org/ 
Publications/Ocasional%20Papers/OPChinese.htm.  
33 Ambassador Matano 
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have common interests is only a first step in a 
continuous process of trying to get the other 
party to do more for the common interest.”34  
 
Thus, from the Chinese perspective, it is not 
incumbent upon the weaker party to disclose 
information, or indeed, to even reciprocate 
concessions. This message was sounded by 
one Chinese delegate who attended the 2007 
Eisenhower Center China conference, who 
noted that the weak are not obliged to reveal 
their secrets to the strong. A variation of this 
asymmetric view of obligations was sounded 
by the three Chinese delegates who attended 
the 2008 China conference. One specifically 
stated that the purpose of space arms control 
was to constrain the strong, by which she 
meant the United States. 
 
Such an attitude is deeply problematic under 
most circumstances. Coupled with some 
discussions about whether the very concept of 
transparency isn’t analogous to espionage, and 
it soon raises questions about whether 
cooperation with China would involve 
symmetric or asymmetric concessions and 
reciprocity. Where the issues are dual-use 
technologies, however, many of which are 
considered essential for national security, it 
dims the prospects for cooperation.  
 
Broader International Implications 
 
Beyond the bilateral difficulties of cooperating 
with the PRC, it is also important to consider 
potential ramifications of Sino-US 
cooperation in space on the Asian political 
landscape. In particular, cooperation between 
Washington and Beijing on space issues may 
well arouse concerns in Tokyo and Delhi. 
Both of these nations have their own space 
programs, and while they are arguably not 
engaged in a “space race” with China (or each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Lucian Pye, p. 77.  
other), they are certainly keeping a close eye 
on developments regarding China.  
 
Of particular importance is Japan. The United 
States relationship with Japan is arguably its 
most important in East Asia.  
 
US interest in Japan should be self-
evident. Japan hosts 47,000 US troops 
and is the linchpin for forward US 
presence in that hemisphere. Japan is 
the second largest contributor to all 
major international organizations that 
buttress US foreign policy…. Japan is 
the bulwark for US deterrence and 
engagement of China and North 
Korea—the reason why those 
countries cannot assume that the 
United States will eventually withdraw 
from the region.35 
 
For Japan, whose “peace constitution” forbids 
it from using war as an instrument of state 
policy, the United States is an essential 
guarantor of its security. Any move by the US 
that might undermine this view raises not only 
the prospect of weakening US-Japanese ties, 
but also potentially affecting Japan’s security 
policies.  
 
In this regard, then, it is essential not to 
engage in activities that would undercut 
perceptions of American reliability. Such 
moves, it should be noted, are not limited to 
those in the security realm. For example, the 
Nixon administration undertook several 
initiatives in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
that rocked Tokyo-Washington relations, and 
are still remembered as the “Nixon shocks.” 
While some of these were in the realm of 
security (including Nixon’s opening to China 
and the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine), 
the others were in the trade area. These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (NY: 
Palgrave, 2003), p. 9.  
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included a ten percent surcharge on all imports 
entering the US and suspended the 
convertibility of the dollar (i.e., removed the 
US from the gold standard).36  
 
Part of the “shock” was the fundamental 
nature of these shifts. Even more damaging, 
however, was the failure of the Nixon 
Administration to consult their Japanese 
counterparts, catching them wholly off-guard. 
It took several years for the effects of these 
shocks to wear off. If the United States is 
intent upon expanding space relations with the 
PRC, then it would behoove it to consult 
Japan, in order to minimize the prospect of a 
“space shock.”  
 
Failing to do so may well incur a Japanese 
reaction. The decision on the part of Japan to 
build an explicitly intelligence-focused 
satellite was in response to the North Korean 
missile test of 1999, suggesting that Tokyo is 
fully capable of undertaking space-oriented 
responses when it is concerned.37 That, in 
turn, would potentially arouse the ire of China. 
The tragic history of Sino-Japanese relations 
continues to cast a baleful influence upon 
current interactions between the two states. If 
there is not a “space race” currently underway 
between Beijing and Tokyo, it would be most 
unfortunate if American actions were to 
precipitate one.   
 
Potentially further complicating this situation 
is India. With a burgeoning space program, 
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India constitutes yet another participant in a 
potential Asian space race. Fueled by a 
growing economy, India has steadily 
improved its space capabilities, launching the 
Chandrayaan-1 lunar probe in 2008, soon after 
the Japanese Kaguya and Chinese Chang’e-1 
probes. Again, this is not to suggest that there 
is a space race underway, but it would be hard 
to deny that the major Asian powers are each 
watching the others carefully (or, more 
accurately, that China is being watched 
carefully by its neighbors).  
 
That space is a major potential arena for 
competition among these states is highlighted 
by the Joint Declaration on Security 
Cooperation Between Japan and India, 
initialed by the Japanese and Indian Prime 
Ministers on October 22, 2008 in Tokyo. The 
final “mechanism of cooperation” listed in the 
agreement was for cooperation between the 
two nations’ space programs. “Cooperation 
will be conducted between the Japan 
Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and 
the Indian Space Research Organisation 
(ISRO) in the field of disaster management.”38   
 
For the United States, cooperating with China 
on space issues, when it is not yet doing so 
with India, could well send mixed messages to 
Delhi. In particular, there is a perception in 
many quarters that the United States is intent 
upon balancing China through India.39 US 
space cooperation with China might allay such 
concerns and signal that the US is not seeking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation Between 
Japan and India, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/india/pmv0810/joint_d.html.  
39 Paul Richter, “In Deal with India, Bush Has Eye on 
China,” Los Angles Times (March 4, 2006). 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/mar/04/world/fg-
usindia4, and Leonard S. Spector, “US Nuclear 
Cooperation with India,” Testimony before House 
Committee on Foreign Relations (October 26, 2005),   
p. VII., http://cns.miis.edu/research/ congress/ 
testim/spe102605.pdf.  
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to counter China through India. It might, 
however, be seen as “double-dealing” by the 
Indian government, which has its own 
concerns about China stemming to at least the 
1962 Sino-Indian War.  
 
Prospects for Cooperation 
 
In light of these difficulties, what are the 
prospects for Sino-American cooperation in 
space?  
 
As noted previously, there is already some 
degree of cooperation, at least at the level of 
data-sharing. Both multilateral and bilateral 
data sharing might therefore be expanded, 
with minimal staffing or negotiations required. 
The Chinese, for example, have donated 
ground stations that can access its Fengyun 
weather satellites to nearly a dozen nations, as 
part of its FENGYUNCast network. 40 It might 
choose to provide the United States with 
comparable ground stations (or information on 
how to access the data from the satellite).   
 
At the same time, however, such sharing of 
data constitutes only a minimal level of 
interaction between the two states and their 
respective space programs. If it is relatively 
easy, it is also relatively low-level.  
 
The political situation in the United States, 
unfortunately, suggests that there may be 
significant obstacles to implementing a more 
extensive bilateral cooperative approach. In 
particular, there was little optimism among 
attendees to the various workshops that ITAR 
would be changed anytime soon—although 
there was broad agreement that the ITAR 
system needed significant overhauling and 
revamping. Similarly, longstanding 
restrictions on technology transfer to the PRC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 “CMA’s Satellite Based Data Services,” Undated 
presentation to the World Meteorological Organization, 
www.wmo.int/pages/prog/www/ISS/Meetings/ET-
CTS_Toulouse2008/documents/pCMASat.ppt 
(for reasons of not only national security but 
also intellectual property rights and questions 
of competitiveness), as well as concerns about 
human rights and other aspects of the Chinese 
situation suggest that there would be 
significant political opposition to any effort to 
radically upgrade Sino-US bilateral 
cooperation in space. It remains to be seen 
how the incoming Obama administration 
might deal with these concerns.  
 
While the US has not engaged the PRC in 
negotiations over cooperating in space, it has 
engaged in a variety of other cooperative 
efforts, both commercial and political. From 
these past instances, it is clear that, should 
there be an effort to expand cooperation in 
space, there are certain essential preconditions 
that need to be met, if one is to be successful 
when working with the PRC.  
 
First and foremost, it is essential to not make 
space cooperation an end unto itself. Rather, it 
is essential to consider it in the larger context 
of Sino-American relations. What is the 
purpose of this cooperation, not only in terms 
of scientific or technical data, but in terms of 
broader national ends? Is it primarily intended 
to presage further, substantive cooperation in 
other fields? Is it intended to build mutual 
confidence in space? Is it to allay security 
concerns?  
 
Then, the American side needs to do a great 
deal of homework. Past experience with the 
Chinese in negotiations makes clear that the 
following rules need to be followed:  
 
• Know the substantive issues 
thoroughly  
• Master the past negotiating record 
• Know your own bottom line 
• Present your position in a broad 
framework  
• Understand the PRC’s political context  
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• Be patient, avoiding deadlines or being 
rushed  
• Minimize media pressures41 
 
One of the key findings of the Eisenhower 
Center workshops has been that both sides 
would like to see more “clarity of intent.” For 
the Chinese, gaining that clarity from the 
United States requires that the American side 
actually know its own positions, and that it be 
pursued consistently and with support from 
above.  
 
At this point, it is not clear that the American 
side has done this. Nor is it clear that the 
groundwork necessary for negotiations, as 
noted above, has begun. To balance this, 
however, it is unlikely that Sino-American 
space cooperation will be a “front-burner” 
topic for the new administration. 
Consequently, even the initiation of 
discussions for cooperation is likely to be 
delayed. This means that the American side 
has been granted a reprieve to learn the record, 
understand the issues, and arrive at an 
American bottom line, to which it can then 
adhere.  
 
What the Eisenhower Center workshop 
experience suggests, however, is that the 
Chinese are unlikely to be helpful in gaining 
an understanding of the PRC’s political 
context. Judging from their comments, there is 
an apparent indifference towards, if not 
rejection of, transparency. This is complicated 
by the lack of American analysts on Chinese 
space policy. It remains to be seen whether the 
Chinese will value providing clarity of intent 
to the American side. 
 
Options for the Future 
 
Given the lack of a bilateral track record in 
negotiating cooperation in space, much less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Solomon, pp. 14-16.  
actually engaging in joint efforts, this would 
suggest that a series of lower profile options 
might well be more productive as a starting 
point for Sino-American space cooperation. 
Such steps would provide both sides with an 
opportunity to understand their counterpart’s 
negotiating behavior, and in particular would 
help the American side to understand the 
“bottom lines” that the Chinese are likely to 
be pursuing. At the same time, achieving some 
lower profile cooperative ventures would also 
reassure the US, building confidence in, and 
support for, the process.  
 
In particular, it is worth considering the 
consequences of potential failure—that is, if a 
given initiative were to fail, either due to 
internal political pressures from either side or 
external political developments (e.g., an EP-3 
type incident), how would this affect the 
overall course of Sino-US cooperation in 
space and in other areas?  
 
The perceived failure of high-profile projects 
would likely generate a long-term adverse 
effect on US-Chinese cooperation in space 
and elsewhere. Conversely, while successes in 
small projects may not create as much benefit, 
they would provide additional data for 
subsequent cooperative efforts. In this regard, 
it is useful to consider that the Apollo-Soyuz 
mission occurred after the negotiation of the 
SALT I Accords, and in the midst of SALT II, 
as well as a variety of negotiations (e.g., 
Helsinki).   
 
The pressures of today’s media environment 
also would militate against high-visibility 
projects. On the one hand, news that the US 
was negotiating with China to cooperate on 
space issues would generate correspondingly 
heightened expectations from the American 
mass media—which the Chinese media would 
happily abet. The push to initial some kind of 
agreement would run counter to the need for 
patience when negotiating with Beijing.  
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Ironically, these same pressures might also 
undermine Sino-American cooperation. 
Beijing’s release of a “transcript” of 
conversations between the Beijing mission 
control center and the Shenzhou VII even 
before the mission had begun suggests that the 
PRC retains a skeptical view of free reporting. 
Conversely, Western coverage of the 2008 
Beijing Olympics aroused some indignation 
despite its generally positive tenor, as the 
press noted the lip-synching by Lin Miaoke 
and the age controversy of the Chinese 
women’s gymnastics team.42  
 
This mutual suspicion (if not antagonism) 
would likely be exacerbated in the event of a 
high-profile mission such as a Sino-American 
counterpart to Apollo-Soyuz. While such a 
mission would likely provide moments of high 
drama, as well as significant public relations 
value, the reality is that the media pressures 
would be far greater in today’s media 
environment than thirty years ago.  
 
All this suggests that there should be an effort 
to first establish precedents for cooperation at 
lower levels, before striving for such 
approaches as a joint mission, or even joint 
mission planning. It should be possible, for 
example, to foster common standards and 
procedures between the two sides, as the 
logical next step in deepening cooperation 
between the two space powers. If coupled 
with an overhaul of the ITAR system, this 
would allow for the possibility of commercial 
as well as civilian space cooperation. Even 
without addressing ITAR, however, working 
together towards common standards and 
techniques would lay the groundwork for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 “Chinese Defense Olympic Ceremony Lip-Synch,” 
AP (August 13, 2008). http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ 
id/26182056/, “IOC Seeks to Settle Furor Over Age of 
Chinese Gymnasts,” AP (August 22, 2008). 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,408541,00.html.   
eventually building a common spacecraft, as 
well as mounting a joint mission together.
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SPACE AND SINO-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS 
 
PETER L. HAYS 
 
China’s emphasis on space exploration and its 
development and use of space capabilities are 
prominent and tangible expressions of its 
emergence as a great power and make space 
an increasingly important dimension of Sino-
American relations.  In October 2003 China 
independently launched and recovered its first 
taikonaut, becoming just the third member of 
an elite spacefaring club with Russia and the 
United States.  Then in January 2007 China 
first successfully tested a kinetic energy anti-
satellite (ASAT) weapon and again joined 
Russia and the United States as one of only 
three states known to have demonstrated this 
capability.  China’s growing power and space 
emphasis may become manifest in mostly 
peaceful and cooperative ways or may lead to 
increasing competition and perhaps even 
conflict with the United States.   
 
Addressing four issue areas can help provide 
context and focus for these concerns: 
contrasting Chinese and American views of 
space and comparing the place of space during 
the Cold War with its role in the current global 
security environment; reviewing the evolution 
of security space capabilities and superpower 
space arms control; evaluating the role of 
space capabilities in Sino-American security 
interrelationships, particularly with respect to 
a potential conflict over Taiwan; and assessing 
the prospects for a range of possible 
cooperative ventures and transparency- and 
confidence-building measures (TCBMs).  
Defusing space apprehensions will be difficult 
and there are currently several worrisome 
trends, but space holds unique potential to 
help define the Sino-American security 
relationship and shape the very future of 
humanity.  If Beijing and Washington can 
work towards resolving or at least lessening 
space tensions they will not only better 
manage their overall relationship but also 
open more opportunities to use space for the 
benefit of all humanity through pursuit of 
genuinely cooperative spacepower objectives 
such as joint science and exploration missions, 
generating wealth in space, harvesting energy 
from space, and, ultimately, improving the 
odds for humanity’s survival by better 
protecting Earth and creating capabilities to 
become a multi-planetary species. 
 
Cold War Baggage and Differing 
Perspectives 
 
Although each is far from monolithic, China 
and the United States often view the costs and 
benefits of exploring and using space in 
different ways; their perspectives reflect the 
times and environments in which their space 
capabilities developed and the challenges they 
were designed to address.  Sometimes it can 
also be difficult to synthesize the statements 
and actions of China and the United States 
into a single perspective about space since 
each has a number of powerful domestic space 
actors and these organizations at times speak 
and act in conflicting ways.  In addition, their 
perspectives about space have evolved due to 
shifts in the relative power of China and the 
United States and other changes in the global 
environment.  Despite these challenges, it is 
now more important than ever to continue 
synthesizing these space perspectives and 
building a better foundation of shared 
perceptions and understanding for future 
dialogue and actions about space security and 
other issues. 
 
China and the United States started their space 
activities in very different ways.  The United 
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States first articulated its highest priorities for 
space in a then-classified policy document, 
National Security Council (NSC)-5520, signed 
by President Dwight Eisenhower in May 
1955.  NSC-5520 indicated that the primary 
U.S. rationale for going to space was to 
attempt to open up the closed Soviet state via 
secret reconnaissance satellites and laid out a 
process for the United States to help establish 
a new legal regime for space that would 
legitimize their overflight of the Soviet 
Union.1  Although secret, this policy was an 
important factor in shaping the opening of the 
space age and, in retrospect, helps explain the 
structuring of United States space activities 
both then and now.  For example, it sheds 
light on issues such as why the United States: 
did not race the Soviets into space, used its 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) 
scientific satellite program as a “stalking 
horse” to test the acceptability of 
reconnaissance satellite overflight, is not 
interested in drawing a clear demarcation line 
between air and space, and in public 
diplomacy strongly emphasizes separate civil 
and military space sectors and the use of space 
for “peaceful purposes.”2  The United States 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1The best and most comprehensive analysis of the 
complex maneuvering by the superpowers at the 
opening of the space age remains Walter A. 
McDougall’s Pulitzer Prize-winning  . . . the Heavens 
and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age 
(New York: Basic Books, 1985).  NSC-5520 is 
reprinted in John M. Logsdon, ed. Exploring the 
Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the 
U.S. Civil Space Program, Vol. I, Organizing for 
Exploration (Washington, D.C.: NASA History Office, 
1995), 308-313.  McDougall in Heavens and Earth and 
R. Cargill Hall’s introductory essay, “Origins of U.S. 
Space Policy: Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of 
Space,” in Exploring the Unknown masterfully develop 
the context and purposes of NSC-5520. 
 
2Hall uses the term stalking horse to describe the 
purpose of the IGY satellite in relation to the WS-117L 
(America’s first reconnaissance satellite program).  
Peaceful purposes for space activity are often 
referenced and cited but never authoritatively defined.  
For a revisionist analysis of the IGY program see Rip 
first successfully recovered satellite imagery 
of the Soviet Union in August 1960 and 
created the National Reconnaissance Office 
(NRO) a year later.  Collecting intelligence 
data has been a primary U.S. space mission 
ever since. 
 
Intelligence collection from space soon also 
developed an essential, enabling, and 
symbiotic relationship with superpower arms 
control.  This role began with the Vela Hotel 
nuclear detonation detection satellite system 
that allowed the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty 
to extend the prohibited area for nuclear 
testing into space, was first codified as 
“National Technical Means” (NTM) of 
verification in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty, and remains the most 
important verification mechanism for several 
arms control regimes.  The NTM language in 
Article XII of the ABM Treaty was repeated 
in many subsequent treaties and remains a part 
of the international legal regime for space 
despite U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty 
in 2002.  This language helps indicate that 
NTM are a peaceful use of space, highlights 
direct interrelationships between NTM 
capabilities and the units of limitation in arms 
control agreements, establishes some degree of 
protection for space-based intelligence 
collection in international law, but clearly 
stops well short of being a blanket ban on 
ASAT weapons or even an explicit approval 
of all spying from space. 
 
China, by contrast, was not involved in 
structuring the legal regime at the opening of 
the space age, has never made collecting 
intelligence data from space its highest 
priority space mission, is wary of the role of 
NTM in TCBMs, and has only limited 
experience with strategic arms control.  Like 
many other major spacefaring states around 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bulkeley, The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States 
Space Policy: A Critique of the Historiography of 
Space (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). 
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the world, China does not make clear 
distinctions between its civil and military 
space activities, pursuing instead many 
advanced capabilities with military 
applications, sometimes even with foreign 
partners such as on the China-Brazil Earth 
Resources Satellite (CBERS) program.  In 
1956 Chairman Mao Zedong set China on a 
path towards strategic modernization by 
urging development of “two bombs, one 
satellite.” After developing atomic and 
thermonuclear bombs, China launched its first 
satellite, the Dong Fang Hong I, in April 
1970; this system combined a radio 
transmitter with tests of satellite technology 
and science experiments to take readings of 
the ionosphere and atmosphere.  Today China 
operates a number of dual-use remote sensing 
satellites but they do not constitute a separate 
sector of Chinese space activity and they have 
no organization apparent to western analysts 
that is equivalent to the NRO.   
 
China’s position on NTM during negotiations 
on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is 
perhaps the best example of how differently 
Chinese and Americans view this capability.  
Although it eventually signed the treaty, China 
has not yet ratified it and also submitted a 
signing declaration objecting to the use of 
NTM as an adequate basis for inspections and 
opposing “the abuse of verification rights by 
any country, including the use of espionage or 
human intelligence to infringe on the 
sovereignty of China.”3  Even more 
importantly, China and the United States have 
no shared experience with strategic arms 
control, a process that arguably provided the 
most important channel for maintaining 
United States-Soviet communications and 
developing shared understanding of key 
strategic concepts throughout the Cold War.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3“China’s Attitude Toward National Technical Means 
(NTM) of Verification,” available from Nuclear Threat 
Initiative (NTI) website at http://www.nti.org/db/china/ 
ntmpos.htm; downloaded on 16 January 2009. 
Using space or some other key dimension of 
their relationship to build a broader foundation 
for subsequent strategic dialogue needs to 
become a high priority for Beijing and 
Washington since it is very unlikely shared 
understanding can be developed in real-time 
during a crisis. 
 
United States and Chinese civil space 
activities align more closely but are more than 
forty years out of phase.  Following the Soviet 
triumphs with the first satellite and the first 
manned orbital flight, the United States 
reprioritized its objectives in space and 
publicly emphasized human spaceflight and 
the civil space sector much more than 
intelligence or military space missions.  The 
United States shaped the Moon Race as a high 
technology and ideological contest for 
prestige, betting that space successes would 
translate into increased allegiance from the 
developed and developing worlds.  The 
superpowers also made some effort to pursue 
cooperative civil space activities but the 
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project of 1975 proved to 
be the high water mark for these efforts during 
the Cold War.   
 
The end of the Cold War removed one 
important motivation for prestige-based civil 
space activities and strengthened incentives to 
pursue cooperative ventures such as the 
International Space Station (ISS).  The United 
States also had important counterproliferation 
objectives in employing Russian space 
scientists in the civil sector as major partners 
on the ISS effort and lessening their potential 
to contribute to the weapons market.  In 
addition, development and use of the 
aerospace workers and industrial base that 
supports civil and all other space activities are 
significantly out of phase in the United States 
and China.  The United States has lost 
750,000 scientific and technical workers since 
the end of the Cold War, 60 percent of 
aerospace industry workers are over age 45, 
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and 25 percent are eligible to retire; by 
contrast, a large percentage of the Chinese 
aerospace industry workforce is under age 45 
and the Chinese graduate some 351,500 
engineers each year, versus about 137,400 
engineers graduated from four year 
engineering programs in the United States.4 
China’s civil space effort began in earnest in 
the post-Cold War era; it pursues human 
spaceflight and exploration for prestige and to 
set China apart as a great power.  From the 
beginning, however, all Chinese space 
activity, including its civil space activity, has 
been either directly or indirectly controlled by 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  
Although some Chinese civil space efforts 
began in the 1950s and the China National 
Space Agency (CNSA) was established in 
1993, ostensibly to direct China’s civil space 
program, under the current bureaucratic 
structure and for “most of its existence CNSA 
was embedded within the Commission for 
Science, Technology, and Industry for 
National Defense (COSTIND), a higher 
ministerial entity that oversaw many of 
China’s defense industries.”5  Moreover, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Kevin Pollpeter, Building for the Future: China’s 
Progress in Space Technology During the Tenth 5-Year 
Plan and the U.S. Response, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2008), 38-9; 
and Aerospace Industries Association, The Role of 
Space in Addressing America’s National Priorities, 
(Washington: Aerospace Industries Association, 
January 2009), 11.  Complicating comparisons, there is 
considerable controversy about the accuracy of reported 
numbers of engineering graduates as well as questions 
about the consistency of criteria and accreditation for 
engineering degrees, see Gerald W. Bracey, “Heard the 
One about the 600,000 Chinese Engineers?” 
Washington Post, 21 May 2006, p. B3.    
 
5Dean Cheng, “Beginning the Journey of a Thousand 
Miles?  Prospects and Pitfalls of US-China Space 
Cooperation,” The Space Review, 23 March 2009.  
Cheng explains that COSTIND “was downgraded in a 
March 2008 Chinese governmental reorganization, 
which saw many parts of the space bureaucracy 
subsumed under, after several iterations, what is now 
called the Ministry of Industry and Information 
CNSA appears to have little decision-making 
authority; its main function seems to be to 
interface with foreign space agencies, a role 
similar to that played by the Ministry of 
Defense and other organizations within the 
Chinese government that present this type of 
façade as the way the outside world is to 
interact with the Middle Kingdom.  The U.S. 
Department of Defense believes that “the 
majority of the technology used in China’s 
manned space program is derived from 
Russian equipment, and China receives 
significant help from Russia with specific 
satellite payloads and applications.”6  China 
launched its first lunar orbiter, the Chang’e-1, 
in October 2007; “successful completion of 
this mission demonstrated China’s ability to 
conduct complicated space maneuvers – a 
capability which has broad implications for 
military counterspace operations.”7 
 
Now that it has achieved its major initial 
prestige goals, China may become more 
interested in partnering on cooperative efforts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Technology (MIIT). Yet, there has yet been little 
indication of whether CNSA remains subordinate to 
this lower entity (the State Administration for Science, 
Technology, and Industry for National Defense or 
SASTIND), is its bureaucratic equivalent, or is now 
independent of the military-industrial bureaucracy.  
More troubling is the lack of explanation on how 
CNSA relates to the PLA, and specifically the General 
Armaments Department (GAD)—one of the four 
General Departments that manages the PLA. The GAD 
is apparently responsible for managing all of China’s 
space infrastructure, i.e., its launch facilities and 
mission control centers. It will also, according to press 
reports, be responsible for the new Chinese space lab 
(the Tiangong). Yet, despite its importance, the GAD is 
rarely mentioned in official Chinese documents on their 
space program.”  Downloaded from 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1335/1 on 18 
June 2009. 
 
6Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the 
People’s Republic of China 2008 (Washington: Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 
April 2008), p. 3.    
 
7Ibid.  
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such as the ISS or other joint projects to 
pursue the ambitious exploration goals it has 
espoused that include a permanently inhabited 
space station and a lunar landing by 2020.  It 
is not clear, however, whether China will 
continue to pursue civil space objectives 
primarily unilaterally, will work increasingly 
with the very diverse members of the Asia-
Pacific Space Cooperation Organization 
(APSCO) it has established,8 or partner with 
other major space actors.  If China is 
interested in pursuing cooperative civil space 
efforts with the United States, it will need to 
make that more clear than it did to Michael 
Griffin in September 2006 when he made the 
first visit by a NASA Administrator to China 
yet was granted only limited access to his 
counterpart space decision makers and other 
space personnel and facilities.  The rhetoric 
during the October 2009 visit of the second-
highest ranking PLA member, General Xu 
Caihou, vice chairman of the Chinese Central 
Military Commission, to a number of 
important U.S. locations including the 
headquarters of Strategic Command, as well 
as the dialogue between Presidents Hu Jintao 
and Barak Obama during Obama’s November 
2009 visit to Beijing offer an opportunity to 
begin building cooperative space efforts and 
developing better space and security 
relationships. 
 
United States and Chinese commercial space 
objectives probably align most closely but 
they are also out of sync and face considerable 
friction due to economic competition, 
protectionist policies, and export controls.  
The United States was first to develop space 
services such as communications, remote 
sensing, launch, and positioning, navigation, 
and timing capabilities but did so within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8APSCO is headquartered in Beijing and began formal 
operations in December 2008.  China, Bangladesh, Iran, 
Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand are member 
states and Indonesia and Turkey also signed the 
APSCO convention  
public sector.  This approach began to change 
in the 1980s, first with the November 1984 
Presidential Determination to allow some 
private sector communication services to 
compete with Intelsat, and continued with 
subsequent policies designed to foster 
development of a commercial space sector.  
By the late 1990s commercial space activity 
worldwide had outpaced government activity 
and although government space investments 
remain very important, they are likely to 
become increasingly overshadowed by 
commercial activity.  Other clear commercial 
and economic distinctions with the Cold War 
era have even more significant implications: 
whereas the Soviet Union was only a military 
superpower, China is a major U.S. trading 
partner and an economic superpower that 
recently passed Germany to became the 
world’s third largest economy, is poised to 
pass Japan soon, and is on a path to become 
larger than the U.S. economy, perhaps within 
only ten years.  Because of its economic 
muscle, China can afford to devote 
commensurately more resources to its military 
capabilities and will play a more significant 
role in shaping the global economic system.  
For example, China holds an estimated $1.4 
trillion in foreign assets (mainly U.S. treasury 
notes), an amount that gives it great leverage 
in the structure of the system.9 
 
Beginning in the 1990s, China made major 
efforts to break into commercial space 
markets, especially with launch vehicles, but 
this progress significantly slowed after U.S. 
aerospace firms Hughes and Loral worked 
with insurance companies to analyze Chinese 
launch failures in January 1995 and February 
1996.  A congressional review completed in 
1998 (Cox Report) determined these analyses 
violated the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) by communicating 
technical information to the Chinese.  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9James Fallows, “The $1.4 Trillion Question,” The 
Atlantic, January/February 2008.  
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1999 National Defense Authorization Act 
transferred export controls for all satellites and 
related items from the Commerce Department 
to the Munitions List administered by the 
State Department.10  The stringent Munitions 
List controls contributed to a severe downturn 
in both U.S. satellite exports and in China’s 
share of the worldwide launch services 
market.11  To avoid these restrictions, foreign 
satellite manufacturers, beginning in 2002 
with Alcatel Space (now Thales) and followed 
by European Aeronautic Defense and Space 
(EADS), Surrey Satellite Company, and others 
replaced all U.S.-built components on their 
satellites to make them “ITAR-free” and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
   10The January 1995 failure was a Long March 2E 
rocket carrying Hughes-built Apstar 2 spacecraft and 
the February 1996 failure was a Long March 3B rocket 
carrying Space Systems/Loral-built Intelsat 708 
spacecraft.  Representative Christopher Cox (R.-
California) led a six-month long House Select 
Committee investigation that produced the “U.S. 
National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns 
with the People’s Republic of China” Report released 
on 25 May 1999.  The report is available from 
http://www.house.gov/coxreport.  In January of 2002, 
Loral agreed to pay the U.S. government $20 million to 
settle the charges of the illegal technology transfer and 
in March of 2003, Boeing agreed to pay $32 million for 
the role of Hughes (which Boeing acquired in 2000).  
Requirements for transferring controls back to state are 
in Sections 1513 and 1516 of the Fiscal Year 1999 
National Defense Authorization Act.  Related items are 
defined as “satellite fuel, ground support equipment, 
test equipment, payload adapter or interface hardware, 
replacement parts, and non-embedded solid propellant 
orbit transfer engines.”  
    
11Satellite builders claim that their exports dropped 59 
percent in 2000 and that since March 1999 their share 
of the global market declined sharply (from 75 percent 
to 45 percent).  Evelyn Iritani and Peter Pae, “U.S. 
Satellite Industry Reeling Under New Export Controls,” 
Los Angeles Times, 11 December 2000, p. 1.  
According to Space News, 2000 marked the first time 
that U.S. firms were awarded fewer contracts for GEO 
communications satellites than their European 
competitors (the Europeans were ahead 15 to 13).  Peter 
B. de Selding and Sam Silverstein, “Europe Bests U.S. 
in Satellite Contracts in 2000,” Space News, 15 January 
2001, pp. 1 and 20. 
Russia now dominates the commercial space 
launch market.12  The ITAR irritant in Sino-
American commercial space relations can be 
salved if U.S. export control policy can find a 
better way to balance the conflicting 
objectives of developing mechanisms to keep 
dual-use technologies thought to be dangerous 
out of the wrong hands while promoting 
exports of benign commercial space 
technology.  Congress and the Obama 
Administration should make it a priority to 
reevaluate current U.S. export controls and 
adjust policies and regulations accordingly.  
Excellent starting points are the recently 
released recommendations for rebalancing 
overall U.S. export control priorities in the 
congressionally mandated National 
Academies of Science (NAS) study.13  In 
addition, the United States should implement 
key recommendations from the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
study on the space industrial base such as 
removing from the Munitions List commercial 
communications satellite systems, dedicated 
subsystems, and components specifically 
designed for commercial use.14 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 12Peter B. de Selding, “European Satellite Component 
Maker Says it is Dropping U.S. Components Because 
of ITAR,” Space News Business Report, 13 June 2005; 
and Douglas Barrie and Michael A. Taverna, “Specious 
Relationship,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 17 
July 2006, pp. 93-96. 
 
13National Research Council, Beyond “Fortress 
America:” National Security Controls on Science and 
Technology in a Globalized World (Washington: 
National Academies Press, 2009).  With the new 
administration and Congress as well as former 
Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher now confirmed in the 
key position of Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security, conditions for 
changing the space export control law are the most 
favorable they have been for the last decade. 
 
14“Briefing of the Working Group on the Health of the 
U.S. Space Industrial Base and the Impact of Export 
Controls,” (Washington: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, February 2008). 
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Cold War Evolution of Security Space 
Capabilities and Space Arms Control 
 
Understanding the evolution of space 
capabilities and negotiations during the Cold 
War provides an essential foundation for 
assessing current Sino-American space 
security issues and evaluating the prospects 
for space TCBMs.  Three major lessons stand 
out from superpower space security 
developments during the Cold War:  First, the 
superpowers used space to bolster their strategic 
warning, communications, and nuclear force 
structure in significant ways and also conducted 
extensive testing and limited deployments of 
ASATs, but both sides chose to end their ASAT 
deployments without reaching a formal space 
arms control agreement.  Second, the 
superpowers devoted considerable effort 
towards negotiations on ASAT arms control 
and on the Defense and Space Talks but were 
unable to come close to signing any treaties, 
agreeing to space “rules-of-the-road,” or even 
defining what constitute offensive or defensive 
space systems.  Finally, all the ASAT testing, 
deployments, and deactivations show that some 
level of arms control and stability can be 
achieved without a formal treaty.  For open, 
pluralist democracies like the United States, 
arms are always controlled as a part of normal 
debates over guns versus butter and open 
dialogue about the strategic utility of specific 
weapons systems.  These mechanisms for 
controlling arms hold the potential to become 
increasingly important for China if it chooses to 
embrace democratic processes, publicly debate 
guns versus butter issues, and engage in 
transparent dialogue over the strategic utility of 
space weapons. 
 
The United States began very limited testing of 
ASAT capabilities in the late 1950s and both 
superpowers tested and deployed a small 
number of ASAT systems from the 1960s 
through the 1980s.  From 1963 to 1975, the 
United States tested and deployed two types of 
nuclear armed, direct ascent ASAT systems: 
Program 505, modified Army Nike Zeus 
missiles stationed at Kwajalein Atoll in the 
Pacific Missile Range; and Program 437, Air 
Force Thor missiles on Johnson Island in the 
Pacific.15  Between October 1968 and June 
1982 the Soviets conducted at least 20 tests of 
their co orbital ASAT system that employed a 
warhead with explosively-propelled metal 
pellets and launched atop a Tsyklon-2 booster 
from Tyuratam (now Baikonur Cosmodrome in 
Kazakhstan).  By the mid-1970s these ASAT 
deployments as well as employment of other 
increasingly comprehensive and mature space 
capabilities began to reveal basic truths about 
the attributes of military space systems and the 
strategic balance in space—many of which 
remain valid today.  A 1976 study for the NSC 
concluded that a U.S. ASAT would not enhance 
the survivability of U.S. satellites by deterring 
use of the Soviet ASAT because the U.S. was 
more dependent on space than the Soviets.16  
The report also concluded, however, that a U.S. 
ASAT could be used to counter the threat to 
U.S. forces posed by Soviet space-based 
targeting systems such as Radar Ocean 
Reconnaissance Satellites (RORSATs) and 
Electronic Intelligence Ocean Reconnaissance 
Satellites (EORSATs) and that the development 
of a U.S. system could serve as a “bargaining 
chip” in possible U.S.-U.S.S.R. ASAT arms 
control negotiations.  In one of the final acts of 
his presidency, on 18 January 1977 President 
Gerald Ford signed National Security Decision 
Memorandum (NSDM)-345, directing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15Paul B. Stares, The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy 
1945-84 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985),  p. 121. 
 
16Ibid., 170.  The vulnerability of U.S. Defense Support 
Program ballistic missile launch detection satellites in 
Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) to being “blinded” by 
Soviet ground-based lasers was apparently first 
demonstrated in September and October 1975, adding 
to U.S. concerns about the survivability and utility of its 
military space assets.  See Stares, Militarization of 
Space, 169; and U.S. Military Uses of Space, 1945-199: 
Guide and Index (Washington: National Security 
Archive, 1991), “Chronology,” p. 41. 
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Department of Defense to develop an 
operational ASAT system.17  This initiated the 
air-launched miniature homing vehicle (MHV) 
ASAT program and set the stage for two-track 
ASAT negotiations during the Carter 
Administration. 
 
U.S. and Soviet negotiators met for three 
rounds of ASAT talks: 8-16 June 1978 in 
Helsinki, 23 January-16 February 1979 in Bern, 
and 23 April-17 June 1979 in Vienna.  The two 
sides apparently were far apart on most issues 
during the first two sessions and by the third 
session had drawn closer together but only by 
limiting the depth and scope of the original 
objectives.  Some of the controversies that have 
publicly emerged include debates over: an 
ASAT ban versus limitations or rules of the 
road; the degree of protection afforded to third-
party satellites; long versus short testing 
moratoria; and how to deal with systems having 
latent ASAT capabilities—for example, the 
Soviets insisted that the U.S. Space Shuttle then 
under development be included as an ASAT 
system.18  By the third session, both sides 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17Stares, Militarization of Space, p. 171.  President Ford 
apparently was “very upset and concerned about the 
relaxed approach of the Defense Department” towards 
developing a new ASAT system and felt “the only thing 
to do was to issue a formal directive.”  According to 
Donald Hafner, an analyst with the NSC ASAT 
Working Group during 1977-78,: “Secretary of State 
Kissinger argued that the U.S. should redress any 
asymmetry in ASAT capabilities between the two sides 
before any arms control restraints were considered.  
The directive [NSDM-345] by the Ford Administration 
to go ahead with the MHV system did call for a study 
of arms control options, but it did not include any 
concrete proposal for inviting the Soviets to ASAT 
talks.  Kissinger may have felt it was premature to 
make such a proposal; or indeed, he may not have 
favored negotiations at all.”  See Donald L. Hafner, 
“Averting a Brobdingnagian Skeet Shoot: Arms Control 
Measures for Anti-Satellite Weapons,” International 
Security 5 (Winter 1980/81), pp. 50-51.  
 
18 Stares, Militarization of Space, p. 197; and John 
Wertheimer, “The Antisatellite Negotiations,” in 
Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight, 
eds. Albert Carnesale, and Richard N. Haass, (Cambridge, 
reportedly tabled draft agreements that only 
covered provisions on “no use” of ASAT 
weapons but even at this longest negotiating 
session they were unable to reach closure on 
this most basic issue.19  Carter Administration 
focus on attempting to get the second Strategic 
Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) ratified, the 
breakdown of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations following 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the 
arrival of the Reagan Administration with its 
initial lack of enthusiasm for arms control 
spelled the end of the ASAT negotiations. 
 
The 1978-79 ASAT negotiations were the most 
militarily focused space-related arms control 
effort of the Cold War era and offers important 
specific lessons.  Failure to reach any 
agreement at these negotiations underscores 
significant conceptual and operational 
difficulties involved in developing meaningful 
ASAT arms control agreements including 
strategic and doctrinal conflicts regarding the 
military utility of space; unavoidable overlaps 
and dual-use issues with respect to civil, 
commercial, and military space capabilities; and 
a lack of clarity regarding foundational 
definitions as well as the proper scope and 
object of ASAT arms control.  Unresolved 
ASAT arms control issues at the time included: 
whether the primary objective should be to ban 
the development and testing of dedicated ASAT 
systems or to create TCBMs such as no use 
pledges, rules of the road, and keep out zones; 
conceptual and verification problems related to 
the growing number of systems with significant 
residual ASAT capability and the considerable 
military potential of even a few covert ASAT 
systems; and questions concerning whether the 
scope of the negotiations should cover some 
superpower satellites, all military satellites, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Mass.: Ballinger Publishers, 1987), pp. 145-46.  The 
ASAT talks, like all serious international negotiations, 
were conducted in secret in order to encourage candor 
and flexibility; the negotiation record remains 
classified.  
 
19Stares, Militarization of Space, pp. 198-99. 
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all (including third-party) satellites.  Breakdown 
of these negotiations also highlights 
difficulties with two-track approaches to arms 
control.  Two-track approaches are seemingly 
attractive for dealing with divergent positions 
within an administration but they may actually 
impede progress towards eventual resolution 
of policy differences by creating committed 
constituencies behind each track that oppose 
the compromises that may be required to 
create coherent policy.  Paul Stares argues that 
the U.S. two-track approach to ASAT arms 
control legitimized and perpetuated the MHV 
ASAT system—a system he believes had 
value only as a bargaining chip.  Finally, 
failure to reach agreement also highlights 
what Ashton Carter refers to as the “basic 
paradox of ASAT arms control:” the inverse 
relationship between ASATs and incentives to 
place very threatening military systems in 
space.20  This paradox emphasizes that space 
weapons cannot be divorced from terrestrial 
security considerations, the natural offense-
defense dialectic, and the trade-offs inherent 
in all strategic thinking.  Accordingly, any 
benefits ASAT arms control may provide in 
limiting space debris or protecting stabilizing 
space systems such as those that provide 
hotlines, early warning, or NTM must be 
balanced against the role of ASATs in 
discouraging potentially destabilizing space 
missions such as space-to-Earth force 
application.  This basic paradox, together with 
the major conceptual difficulties outlined 
above call into question the overall 
desirability of ASAT arms control. 
During the 1980s the United States and 
Soviet Union tested kinetic energy ASAT 
systems, negotiated, and eventually stopped 
most testing and deployments.  Congress 
imposed various restrictions on ASAT 
development and testing in response to the 
unilateral Soviet ASAT test moratorium 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20Ashton B. Carter, “Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The 
Limits of the Possible,” International Security 10 
(Spring 1986), p. 68. 
announced in August 1983 and questions 
about the commitment of the Reagan 
Administration to pursuing ASAT arms 
control.  The timing of the Soviet moratorium 
was no accident, coming shortly after 
President Reagan’s “Star Wars” speech, a 
pivotal event which reopened continuing 
debates over the utility of strategic defenses 
that overshadow discussions about ASATs 
and space weapons.  In order to justify 
continuing development and testing, the 
administration was required to submit to 
Congress a report, “U.S. Policy on ASAT 
Arms Control” in March 1984.21  The report 
detailed more than four pages of “Problems 
Facing ASAT Arms Control” and reached the 
following conclusions with respect to 
deterrence and ASAT arms control: 
 
Deterrence provided by a U.S. ASAT 
capability would inhibit Soviet attacks 
against U.S. satellites, but deterrence is 
not sufficient to protect U.S. satellites.  
Because of the potential for covert 
development of ASAT capabilities and 
because of the existence of non-
specialized weapons which also have 
ASAT capability, no arms control 
measures have been identified which 
can fully protect U.S. satellites.  
Hence, we must continue to pursue 
satellite survivability measures to cope 
with both known and technologically 
possible, yet undetected, threats.22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21Executive Office of the President, “Report to Congress: 
U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control,” 31 March 1984; 
microfiche document 00075 in Military Uses of Space.  
This is the unclassified version of the report; a more 
detailed classified version was also delivered to Congress 
at the same time. 
 
22Ibid., p. 9.  The ASAT arms control problem areas listed 
included: verification, breakout, disclosure of 
information, definitions, vulnerability of satellite support 
systems, and the Soviet non-weapon military space threat.  
Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, Dr. Henry F. Cooper, and Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear 
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Following this report, the administration was 
successful in preventing further limitations on 
ASAT testing and also managed to water 
down previous restrictions.23  This allowed the 
most complete test of the MHV ASAT on 13 
September 1985 when it successfully 
intercepted and destroyed Air Force satellite 
P78-1 at an altitude of approximately 330 
miles.24  Although just the start of a planned 
test series, this proved to be the MHV’s only 
test against a satellite in space.  A December 
1985 congressional amendment banned testing 
against objects in space unless the President 
certified the Soviets violated their moratorium 
by conducting a dedicated ASAT test, 
effectively giving the Soviets a veto over 
further U.S. testing.25  The United States and 
Soviet Union also conducted years of 
apparently fruitless negotiations about 
strategic defenses and space weapons in the 
Defense and Space Talks begun in 1985.  It 
should be instructive that this was the only 
category of superpower arms control 
negotiations started in the 1980s that did not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Forces, T.K. Jones, did most of the drafting of the report.  
The Services were not principle participants in any of the 
discussions leading to this report but they did, along with 
the Central Intelligence Agency, draft the appendices in 
the classified version of the report. 
 
23Stares, Militarization of Space, p. 233. 
 
24The Air Force Space Test Program satellite P78-1 was 
an experimental system launched in February 1979 that 
was designed to study the sun’s corona.  P78-1 was still 
operational in a LEO between 319 to 335 nautical miles 
in altitude when it was destroyed by the MHV.  The last 
piece of tracked debris from this test did not decay out of 
orbit until 2002. 
 
25On 12 December 1985, immediately prior to this new 
and much more serious restriction, the Air Force had 
placed two instrumented target vehicle (ITV) satellites 
into LEO of approximately 200 by 480 nautical mile 
orbits.  See “Launch Listing” in Military Uses of Space, 
118-19.  These ITVs cost $20 million, had a limited 
lifetime, and were specifically designed to minimize 
debris while providing data on MHV intercepts, see 
Michael R. Gordon, “Air Force to Test a Weapon in 
Space,” New York Times, 20 February 1986, p. A18. 
produce a treaty; the Intermediate Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed in 
December 1987 and the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty was signed in July 1991.  
Finally, strategic defenses had become the 
central issue in strategic relations between the 
superpowers and a catalyst for the end of the 
Cold War as shown, among other things, by 
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
rejection of U.S. proposals at the Reykjavik 
Summit of October 1986 for continued testing 
of missile defenses while proceeding over ten 
years to eliminate all ballistic missiles and 
thereafter abolish all offensive nuclear 
weapons, and the end of the Cold War just 
five years later. 
 
Space in the Sino-American Security 
Relationship and in a Taiwan Conflict 
Scenario 
 
Strategic analysts debate whether modern 
technology can change the basic nature of 
warfare and how much it has modified 
fundamental precepts such as mass and the fog 
of war, but most agree that modern 
technologies including space capabilities have 
radically altered the tactics and conduct of 
war.  The evolution of warfare through World 
Wars I and II showed that coupling the 
increasingly lethal products of the industrial 
revolution with improved military 
organizations and doctrine created a fearsome 
attrition-based war machine.  Modern attrition 
warfare also necessitated development of what 
Stephen Biddle calls the modern system: a 
complex combined arms approach to fire, 
maneuver, and concealment that enables 
survival and military effectiveness but 
requires an adaptive and well trained military 
to produce the skills required for success in 
the modern battlespace.26  The modern system 
exacerbates disparities in military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory 
and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004).  
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effectiveness because militaries that lack the 
resources to adopt a complex combined arms 
approach or fail to adapt are punished severely 
in conventional warfare.  These factors have 
also created incentives for development of 
“hybrid warfare,” an approach that attempts to 
exploit sanctuaries associated with traditional 
legal constructs for warfare and other 
vulnerabilities by employing all forms of war 
and tactics (conventional, irregular, and 
terrorist), perhaps even simultaneously.27 
 
The United States has been at the forefront of 
employing the modern system and developing 
a space-enabled global reconnaissance, long-
range precision strike complex.  Operation 
Desert Storm in 1991 marked the emergence 
of space-enabled warfare when a wide range 
of space systems including those designed for 
Cold War strategic missions such as the 
Defense Support Program (DSP) missile 
launch detection satellites and other 
constellations that were not yet completed 
such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) 
produced transformational effects from the 
lowest tactical level, for instance guiding 
individual vehicles across trackless deserts, up 
through the highest strategic level, including 
helping to keep Israel out of the conflict.  In 
Operation Desert Storm less than eight percent 
of air-delivered munitions were precision-
guided (none by GPS) and satellites provided 
only one megabit per second (Mbps) 
communications connectivity to battalion-
sized units deployed in theater; by the time of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
27Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats: 
Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern 
Conflict,” Strategic Forum, no. 240 (April 2009), 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National 
Defense University; and Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid 
Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st 
Quarter 2009): 34-39.  For a more theoretical 
perspective on the evolving nature of modern conflict, 
see Thomas A. Drohan, “Clausewitz for Complex 
Warfare,” The Wright Stuff, vol. 4, no. 5 (5 March 
2009).  
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 
Freedom in 2001 and 2003, almost 70 percent 
of air-delivered munitions were precision-
guided (mostly by GPS) and satellites 
provided communications at speeds over 50 
Mbps to deployed battalions.28  This 
acceleration of space enabled capabilities 
today allows U.S. commanders to draw from 
worldwide intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) and analysis, 
communicate faster, strike more accurately, 
and assess operational effectiveness in real 
time.  Space capabilities have become so 
seamlessly integrated into the overall U.S. 
military structure that commanders can remain 
focused on strategic objectives instead of 
making tactical decisions on how to prosecute 
specific targets.  For example, during 
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 
Freedom the majority of aircraft took off on 
their combat sorties without assigned targets; 
they were dynamically tasked in flight onto 
targets that emerged during their sortie or 
attacked remaining targets assessed as most 
important after their arrival on station.  The 
United States continues to develop lighter and 
more easily deployable forces that are better 
able to leverage space and network-enabled 
operations and strike more precisely from 
greater distances to achieve full spectrum 
dominance over adversaries that may range 
from emerging military peers to insurgents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Data on Precision-guided munitions and 
communications are derived from Central Air Forces, 
“Operation Iraqi Freedom: By the Numbers,” Prince 
Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, 30 April 2003; 
Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American 
Airpower (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); and 
Eliot A. Cohen, director, Gulf War Air Power Survey, 
Summary Report (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1993).  For viewpoints that deemphasize the 
role of technological factors in modern warfare see: 
Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the 
Gulf War tells us about the Future of Conflict,” 
International Security 21 no. 2 (Fall1996), pp. 139-79; 
and Darrell Press, “The Myth of Air Power in the 
Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare,” 
International Security 26 no. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 5-44. 
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and terrorists.  Space-enabled warfare can 
deliver highly precise effects, minimize 
collateral damage, and shorten the duration of 
conflict, but should be part of a balanced 
portfolio of capabilities that encourages 
pursuit of political objectives using all 
appropriate tools of statecraft and reduces 
temptations to overuse or inappropriately use 
the military instrument of power. 
 
Of course, it has not escaped notice worldwide 
that the United States has already employed 
and continues to develop network-enabled 
warfare or that space capabilities often 
provide the best and sometimes the only way 
to make these kinds of operations possible.  
The Chinese, in particular, have been among 
the most careful students of the modern 
system and U.S. space-enabled military 
operations over the last generation.  They have 
concluded that information operations and 
space capabilities are required to fight and win 
what it refers to as “local wars under 
conditions of informatization” and are 
following their own unique path toward 
improved military potential while making 
significant efforts both to emulate and counter 
U.S. space capabilities.29   
 
In the past, PLA authors acknowledged that its 
information systems were incapable of 
enabling it to act more quickly than the U.S. 
military and their writings focused more on 
denying space to potential adversaries. 
However, as the PLA begins to contemplate 
using space, it recognizes that it must not only 
deny the use of information to its opponents 
but also use space to facilitate its own 
operations.30 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the 
People’s Republic of China 2009 (Washington: Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 
March 2009), p. I.    
 
30Pollpeter, China’s Progress in Space Technology, p. 
26. 
Leveraging its latecomer’s advantage during 
its 10th (2001-05) and 11th (2006-10) Five 
Year Plans,31 China has moved more quickly 
in developing a wider range of space 
capabilities than any previous spacefaring 
state and today has deployed comprehensive 
space systems that are less capable but parallel 
those of the United States in all mission areas 
except for space-based missile launch 
detection.  China’s array of space 
reconnaissance systems offer increasingly 
precise visible, infrared, multi-spectral, and 
synthetic aperture radar imaging and include 
the Ziyuan-2 series, the Yaogan-1 through -8, 
the Haiyang-1B, the CBERS-2 and -2B 
satellites, and the Huanjing disaster and 
environmental monitoring satellite 
constellation.32  “In the next decade, Beijing 
most likely will field radar, ocean 
surveillance, and high-resolution 
photoreconnaissance satellites.  In the interim, 
China probably will rely on commercial 
satellite imagery to supplement existing 
coverage.”33  For navigation and timing, the 
Chinese have launched five Beidou satellites 
that provide signals with 20 meter accuracy 
over China and surrounding areas.  China also 
plans to deploy a more advanced, accurate, 
and global PNT system known as Beidou-2 or 
Compass comprised of five Geostationary-
Earth Orbit (GEO) satellites and 30 Medium-
Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites; the Compass-
M1 experimental satellite was launched in 
April 2007.  In addition, China has “a very 
advanced indigenous microsatellite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31Parts of China’s space goals for its 10th and 11th Five 
Year Plans were announced publicly; see ibid., pp. 3-5 
and pp. 19-22.  
 
32Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2008, 27; Military Power of the People’s Republic of 
China 2009, 26.  Resolution on Ziyuan satellites, for 
example, has improved from 20 to three meters; see 
Pollpeter, China’s Progress in Space Technology, p. 26. 
 
33Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2008, p. 27. 
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program”34 with microsatellites currently 
deployed for technology development, 
imagery, remote sensing, and communications 
missions.  Finally, China uses a wide range of 
foreign and domestic communications 
satellites, is increasing its military 
employment of these communications 
capabilities, and is moving to replace all 
foreign communications satellites with 
indigenous satellites by 2010.  With launch in 
April 2008 of its first tracking and data relay 
satellite (Tianlian I) the Chinese have 
demonstrated the potential to develop a 
nascent real-time, global reconnaissance strike 
complex.  
 
China is moving more secretly but probably 
even more quickly and comprehensively in 
developing “a multi-dimensional program to 
limit or prevent the use of space-based assets 
by its potential adversaries during times of 
crisis or conflict.”35  The PLA has deployed a 
variety of kinetic and non-kinetic weapons 
and terrestrial jammers and is also exploring 
other counterspace capabilities including in-
space jammers, high-energy lasers, high-
powered microwave weapons, particle beam 
weapons, and electromagnetic pulse weapons.  
In addition, China is “researching and 
deploying capabilities intended to disrupt 
satellite operations or functionality without 
inflicting physical damage.”36  The successful 
Chinese ASAT test of January 2007 was 
perhaps most notorious for its dangerous 
irresponsibility in creating a persistent debris 
cloud that now accounts for more than 25 
percent of all catalogued objects in Low-Earth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34Steven A. Smith, “Chinese Space Superiority? 
China’s Military Space Capabilities and the Impact of 
their use in a Taiwan Conflict,” (Maxwell AFB, Ala: 
Air War College, 17 February 2006), p. 15.  
 
35Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2009, p. 27.   
 
36Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2008, p. 21.  
Orbit (LEO),37 but the debris the test created 
should not obfuscate the system’s very 
significant strategic implications given the 
high-value U.S. assets it can hold at risk in 
LEO, difficulties in finding and tracking the 
road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher 
(TEL) for the Dong Feng (DF)-21 (or SC-19) 
intermediate-range missile that launches the 
ASAT, and the extremely limited protection 
measures the United States currently has 
against this capability.  Moreover, the direct 
ascent ASAT is just one of the many types of 
counterspace capabilities the Chinese are 
developing or have already fielded; it may not 
even be their most threatening or pervasive 
capability.  It is more important to consider 
the synergistic and tailored benefits China is 
likely to obtain by employing many 
counterspace capabilities that operate in 
different ways against different orbital 
regimes and mission areas including hundreds 
if not thousands of high-power mobile 
terrestrial jammers, high-energy lasers with 
precision tracking capabilities at multiple 
sites, and potentially sophisticated in-space 
jamming and negation capabilities.   
 
Tensions between the United States and China 
and between Taiwan and China have been 
easing in a number of ways and this article is 
not suggesting that conflict over Taiwan is 
imminent.  However, many seemingly 
irreconcilable issues remain, including the 
“sacred responsibility” of the PLA in stopping 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37“Fengyun 1-C Debris: Two Years Later,” Orbital 
Debris Quarterly News, Johnson Spaceflight Center: 
NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, vol. 13, no. 1 
(January 2009): 2.  As a result of the 11 January 2007 
Chinese ASAT test, the U.S. Space Surveillance 
Network has catalogued 2378 pieces of debris with 
diameters greater than five centimeters, is tracking 400 
additional debris objects that are not yet catalogued, 
and estimates the test created more that 150,000 pieces 
of debris larger than one square centimeter.  
Unfortunately, less than two percent of this debris has 
reentered the atmosphere so far and it is estimated that 
many pieces will remain in orbit for decades and some 
for more than a century.    
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independence and the “anti-succession” law 
passed by China’s National People’s Congress 
in March 2005; U.S. commitments under the 
1979 U.S. Taiwan Relations Act to resist any 
force or other coercion that threatens Taiwan; 
and Taiwanese independence aspirations.  
Taiwan is still clearly the most likely 
flashpoint for any conflict between the United 
States and China.  Because the PLA is 
continuously improving the quality and 
effectiveness of its overall military capabilities 
and “China’s space activities and capabilities, 
including ASAT programs, have significant 
implications for anti-access/area denial in 
Taiwan Strait contingencies and beyond”38 
military analysts must continually assess the 
correlation of forces in this scenario and 
statesmen must remain aware of its 
implications.  Michael O’Hanlon’s 2004 
assessment is both reassuring and sobering, 
especially given the continuing and 
accelerating progress of PLA modernization 
and the considerable stresses placed on U.S. 
forces by ongoing operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan: 
It is doubtful that trends in space 
capabilities or other aspects of defense 
modernization will radically alter the 
military balance in the next decade or 
so.  The size and caliber of the U.S. 
military is sufficient that, even if China 
were able to close the technological 
gap and have the potential to cause 
substantial losses to the United States 
in a war over Taiwan, the American 
armed forces would surely prevail.  
The United States could lose a carrier 
or two and still maintain 
overwhelming military superiority in 
the region.39 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2009, p. 25.  
 
39Michael E. O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars Nor 
Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of Space 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 2004), p. 97. 
In a presentation at the Naval War College in 
April 2009 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
found adversary development of anti-
access/area denial capabilities more troubling 
and noteda particular concern with aircraft 
carriers and other large, multi-billion dollar 
blue-water surface combatants – where the 
loss of even one ship would be a national 
catastrophe. We know other nations are 
working on ways to thwart the reach and 
striking power of the U.S. battle fleet – 
whether by producing stealthy submarines in 
quantity or developing anti-ship missiles with 
increasing range and accuracy. We ignore 
these developments at our peril.40 
 
A large number of factors and complex 
interrelationships are involved, but all Taiwan 
scenarios are fundamentally shaped by a small 
number of geopolitical factors including the 
very close proximity of the theater of 
operations to China and its extreme distance 
from the United States, very limited basing 
options for U.S. forces in this region, and the 
increasing vulnerability of all fixed and even 
some mobile targets to attack from a growing 
number of long-range precision strike forces.  
These factors combine to make the 
effectiveness of U.S. aircraft carrier battle 
groups a most important variable in any 
Taiwan scenario.  A key objective for China is 
to find and strike carrier battle groups as far 
away from Taiwan as possible; keeping them 
out of the main fight or at least primarily 
focused on self-defense.  For the United States 
and Taiwan key objectives include finding and 
striking a large percentage of landing craft and 
transport aircraft before they can lodge and 
sustain an overwhelming number of ground 
forces on Taiwan.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40Presentation by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates 
at Naval War College, Newport RI, 17 April 2009, 
available from  http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/ 
speech.aspx?speechid=1346 
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Space and counterspace capabilities play an 
increasingly important role for both sides in 
this scenario.  For China, space forces, and 
space ISR in particular, are needed to find, fix, 
track, target, engage, and assess strikes on 
carrier battle groups in near real time.  Space 
links considered necessary for day-night, 
inclement weather, and near real time 
operation of this kill chain include high-
resolution imagery, tracking and data relay, 
synthetic aperture radar, wake tracking, and 
electronic intelligence—all capabilities the 
Chinese appear to have increasingly 
emphasized.  It is not yet clear that China has 
networked together all the capabilities 
required for long-range precision strikes 
against carrier battle groups let alone what the 
effectiveness of Chinese forces so employed 
might be, even before they are attrited by the 
concentric layers of defenses around carrier 
battle groups.41   
 
Nonetheless, it is apparent that Chinese 
capabilities for long-range precision strikes 
against ships have improved significantly; 
U.S. forces are threatened as they approach 
what the Chinese call the second island chain 
that includes Guam, and operate at growing 
peril the closer they come to Taiwan and the 
first island chain.  The increasingly potent 
anti-access strike forces the Chinese have 
deployed or are developing include large 
numbers of highly accurate cruise missiles, 
such as domestically produced ground-
launched DH-10 land attack cruise missiles, 
SS-N-22/Sunburn and SS-N-27B/Sizzler 
supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles mounted 
on Sovremennyy-class guided missile 
destroyers and Kilo-class diesel electric 
submarines acquired from Russia, as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41The Chinese demonstrated an ability to find carrier 
battle groups and penetrate their defenses in 2006 when 
a Chinese submarine surfaced within the perimeter of 
the Kitty Hawk (CV-63) carrier battle group.  See 
Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, “The Contested 
Commons,” Proceedings Magazine Vol. 135 (July 
2009).   
an anti-ship ballistic missile based on a variant 
of the DF-21 that has a range in excess of 
1,500 km and highly accurate maneuvering 
reentry vehicles with conventional warheads 
and “terminal-sensitive penetrating sub-
munitions” to “destroy the enemy’s carrier-
borne planes, the control tower and other 
easily damaged and vital positions.”42  It is 
also a near certainty that China would mount 
large-scale counterspace operations, perhaps 
even as a precursor to other attacks, in any 
Taiwan scenario.  Chinese counterspace 
operations would likely concentrate on cyber 
and electronic warfare attacks against U.S. 
communications and positioning, navigation 
and timing (PNT) capabilities using terrestrial, 
airborne, seaborne, and perhaps in-space 
jammers or ASAT systems.  In addition, the 
Chinese could use their direct ascent ASAT 
and high-energy lasers to attack U.S. ISR 
assets in LEO and it is unlikely that either 
preemptive or reactive maneuvering of these 
assets would be able to protect them or ensure 
they could collect on assigned targets.43   
 
U.S. and Taiwanese space capabilities and 
counterspace operations are also critically 
important, would be highly stressed in 
defending Taiwan, and would be tested in 
novel ways since the United States has not yet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2009, p. 21; and Michael Richardson, Beijing Takes 
Aim at U.S. Aircraft Carriers, Japan Times, 22 January 
2009.   The quotations cited in the DOD report are from 
an authoritative 2004 article for the second artillery 
corps and the report also notes that this “capability 
would have particular significance, as it would provide 
China with preemptive and coercive options in a 
regional crisis.” 
 
43Brian Weeden, “How China ‘Wins’ a Potential Space 
War,” China Security, vol. 4, no. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 
134-47.  Weeden explains why it is unlikely a U.S. 
LEO ISR satellite can be reactively maneuvered away 
from the direct ascent ASAT after launch and how 
preemptive maneuvering away from known laser or 
ASAT launch sites would be likely to preclude these 
satellites from performing key collection and shorten 
their mission life. 
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fought against a space-enabled, near-peer 
military power.  All U.S. space-enabled force 
enhancement capabilities—ISR, missile 
warning and attack assessment, 
communications, PNT, and environmental 
monitoring—would be challenged in 
attempting just to establish and maintain a kill 
chain for the thousands of fixed and mobile 
targets in the Taiwan theater even without 
enemy countermeasures; in a degraded 
electronic warfare environment and under 
direct attack, their efficacy is likely to be 
significantly reduced.  Under these conditions, 
projecting strike assets into the theater and 
maintaining an effective kill chain, especially 
against the many small and fleeting, mobile 
targets presented by Chinese landing craft and 
aircraft, would be a daunting challenge.  The 
United States would also engage in 
counterspace operations, primarily to disrupt 
PNT and command and control of landing 
forces as well as in attempts to deny Chinese 
ability to track and target carrier battle groups.  
With respect to the latter counterspace 
objective in particular, it is noteworthy that 
O’Hanlon believes the United States could be 
quite hard pressed to disrupt Chinese ability to 
target carriers in a Taiwan scenario without 
ASAT capabilities such as those it 
demonstrated in February 2008 when an Aegis 
Cruiser used a Standard Missile-3 to destroy 
the inoperative USA-193 satellite just prior to 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 44O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars Nor Sanctuary, 
101; Flournoy and Brimley, “The Contested 
Commons.”  On the engagement of USA-193 see, in 
particular, James Oberg, “OPERATION BURNT 
FROST: Five Myths About the Satellite Smashup,” 
NBC News Analysis, 27 February 2008 and James E. 
Oberg, “Down in Flames: Media “Space Experts” Flub 
the Shoot-Down Story,” The New Atlantis, No. 24 
(Spring 2009): 120-29.  The last piece of catalogued 
debris from the destruction of USA-193 reentered on 9 
October 2008.   
Prospective TCBMs 
 
Seemingly new focus and direction in space 
policy initially was provided by a statement on 
the Obama Administration White House 
website that appeared on 20 January 2009: 
“Ensure Freedom of Space: The Obama-Biden 
Administration will restore American 
leadership on space issues, seeking a 
worldwide ban on weapons that interfere with 
military and commercial satellites.”45 The 
language about seeking a worldwide ban on 
space weapons was taken from position papers 
issued during the Obama-Biden campaign but 
was much less detailed and nuanced; it drew 
considerable attention and some criticism.46  
By May 2009 the space part of the Defense 
Issues section on the White House website had 
been changed to read: “Space: The full 
spectrum of U.S. military capabilities depends 
on our space systems. To maintain our 
technological edge and protect assets in this 
domain, we will continue to invest in next-
generation capabilities such as operationally 
responsive space and global positioning 
systems. We will cooperate with our allies and 
the private sector to identify and protect 
against intentional and unintentional threats to 
U.S. and allied space capabilities.”  Ongoing 
space policy reviews including a 
congressionally-directed Space Posture 
Review and Presidential Study Directives on 
National Space Policy are likely to encourage 
policies that are more supportive of pursuing 
TCBMs as well as greater reliance on 
commercial and international partners.47  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45The statement appeared on the Defense Agenda 
section of the White House website, 
www.whitehouse.gov.      
 
46See in particular, the Space News editorial for 2 
February 2009, “Banning Space Weapons—and 
Reality.”   
 
47Section 913 of the Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense 
Authorization Act (P.L. 110-417) directs the Secretary 
of Defense and Director of National Intelligence to 
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Consideration is also being given to the best 
ways to reconcile any new approach with 
fundamental goals in the 2006 U.S. National 
Space Policy to “oppose the development of 
new legal regimes or other restrictions that 
seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use 
of space” while also encouraging 
“international cooperation with foreign 
nations and/or consortia on space activities 
that are of mutual benefit.”48  Indeed, the 
United States can expect that it will continue 
to make the best progress in developing 
effective, sustainable, and cooperative 
approaches to space security by building on 
the ongoing thoughtful dialogue between all 
major space actors in several venues that 
emphasizes a number of primarily 
incremental, pragmatic, technical, and bottom-
up steps.  Prime examples of this approach 
include the February 2008 adoption by the 
United Nations General Assembly of the 
Inter-Agency Debris Committee (IADC) 
voluntary guidelines for mitigating space 
debris and the December 2008 release from 
the Council of the European Union of a draft 
Code of Conduct for outer space activities.49  
A key challenge for Beijing and Washington 
is to find ways to move away from inflexible 
positions and become more involved with and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
submit a Space Posture Review to Congress by 1 
December 2009.  In addition, the Obama 
Administration has ongoing Presidential Study 
Directives that are examining the need for changes to 
current National Space Policy; see Amy Klamper, 
“White House Orders Sweeping U.S. Space Policy 
Review,” Space News, 15 July 2009.   
 
48“U.S. National Space Policy,” (Washington, D.C.: 
The White House, Office of Science and Technology 
Policy, 14 October 2006), p. 2. 
 
49United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/217, 
“International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer 
space,” (New York: UNGA, 1 February 2008) and 
Council of the European Union, “Council conclusions 
and draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activity, 
(Brussels: Council of the European Union, 3 December 
2008).  
leverage these processes in both bilateral and 
multilateral ways. 
History suggests there is a very important role 
for militaries both in setting the stage for the 
emergence of international legal regimes and 
in enforcing the norms of those regimes once 
they emerge.    Development of any rules of 
the road or codes of conduct for space should 
draw closely from the development and 
operation of such measures in other domains 
such as sea or air.  The international 
community should consider the most 
appropriate times and ways to separate 
military activities from civil and commercial 
activities in the building of these measures 
because advocating a single standard for how 
all space activities ought to be regulated may 
be inappropriately ambitious and unhelpful.  
The Department of Defense requires safe and 
responsible operations by warships and 
military aircraft but they do not always follow 
all the same rules as commercial traffic and 
often operate within specially protected zones 
that separate them from other traffic.  Full and 
open vetting of these ideas along with others 
will help develop space rules that draw from 
years of experience in operating in these other 
domains and make the most sense for the 
unique operational characteristics of space.   
 
Another consideration is the historic role of 
the Royal and U.S. Navies in fighting piracy, 
promoting free trade, and enforcing global 
norms against slave trading.  Is there an 
analogous role in space for the U.S. military 
and other military forces today and in the 
future?  What would be the space component 
of the Proliferation Security Initiative and how 
might the United States and others encourage 
like-minded actors to cooperate on such an 
initiative?  Attempts to create regimes or 
enforcement norms that do not specifically 
include and build upon military capabilities 
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are likely to be divorced from pragmatic 
realities and ultimately frustrating efforts.50   
There is much consensus on the general 
direction in which the international space 
community is moving regarding many space 
security issues, but, as in so many other 
critical issue-areas, the devil really is in the 
details concerning how best to proceed.  As 
the most important first step, the United States 
and others should work harder to develop 
more fully and achieve more universal 
adherence to the Outer Space Treaty (OST) 
regime.  It simply does not make sense to 
charge far ahead when this foundational piece 
still has significant gaps in terms of 
compliance with existing rules and norms.  
Particular areas that are underdeveloped 
within the OST regime include the Article VI 
signatory responsibilities for authorization and 
continuing supervision over activities of non-
governmental entities in space and the Article 
IX obligations for signatories to undertake or 
request appropriate international consultations 
before proceeding with any activity or 
experiment that would cause potentially 
harmful interference.   
 
One key way the United States can continue 
supporting these OST obligations is by 
making more progress on sharing space 
situational awareness (SSA) data worldwide 
by building on the Commercial and Foreign 
Entities (CFE) program.  Following the 
February 2009 collision between Iridium and 
Cosmos satellites and increasing motivation to 
improve the program and provide SSA data to 
users in more timely and consistent ways, the 
Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense 
Authorization Act expanded the CFE pilot 
program and gave the Secretary of Defense 
instructions on providing SSA information 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50On the role of militaries in enforcing legal norms and 
analogies between the law of the sea and space law, see 
R. Joseph DeSutter, “Space Control, Diplomacy, and 
Strategic Integration,” Space and Defense vol. 1, no. 1 
(Fall 2006), pp. 29-51.    
and services to non U.S. Government entities.  
One excellent specific goal would be creation 
of a U.S. Government operated data center for 
ephemeris, planned maneuvers, and 
propagation data for all active satellites.  
Users would voluntarily contribute data to this 
center, perhaps through a GPS transponder on 
each satellite, and the data would be 
constantly updated, freely available, and 
readily accessible so that it could be used by 
satellite operators to plan for and avoid 
conjunctions.51  Difficult issues that inhibit 
progress on sharing SSA data include liability 
and proprietary concerns; data formatting 
standards and compatibility between 
propagators and other cataloguing tools, and 
security concerns over exclusion of certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51SSA issues are framed by specialized concepts and 
jargon.  Conjunctions are close approaches, or potential 
collisions, between objects in orbit.  Propagators are 
complex modeling tools used to predict the future 
location of orbital objects.  Satellite operators currently 
use a number of different propagators and have 
different standards for evaluating and potentially 
maneuvering away from conjunctions.  Maneuvering 
requires fuel and shortens the operational life of 
satellites.  Orbital paths are described by a set of 
variables known as ephemeris data; two-line element 
sets (TLEs) are the most commonly used ephemeris 
data.  Much of this data is contained in the form of a 
satellite catalog.  The United States maintains a public 
catalog at www.space-track.org.  Other entities 
maintain their own catalogs.  Orbital paths constantly 
change, or are perturbed, by a number a factors 
including Earth’s inconsistent gravity gradient, solar 
activity, and the gravitational pull of other orbital 
objects.  Perturbations cause propagation of orbital 
paths to become increasingly inaccurate over time; 
beyond approximately four days into the future 
predictions about the location of orbital objects can be 
significantly inaccurate.  For more about SSA concepts 
see Brain Weeden, “The Numbers Game,” The Space 
Review, 13 July 2009; downloaded from 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1417/1.  For 
more details about this approach and other space 
security ideas fostered by meetings between the 
Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space and 
the Chief Executive Officers of commercial satellite 
communications providers see David McGlade, 
“Commentary: Preserving the Orbital Environment,” 
Space News, 19 February 2007, p. 27.  
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satellites from any public data.  Developing 
and institutionalizing better ways to address 
these existing obligations under the OST 
regime could be one of the most direct and 
important steps in dealing with many of the 
most significant current international space 
security concerns.        
 
Beyond the OST, efforts to craft 
comprehensive top-down space arms control 
or regulation with the Chinese bilaterally, or 
among all spacefaring actors, still face all of 
the significant problems that plagued attempts 
to develop such mechanisms in the past.  The 
most serious of these problems include: 
disagreements over the proper scope and 
object of negotiations; basic definitional issues 
about what is a space system and how they 
might be categorized as offensive or defensive 
and stabilizing or destabilizing; and daunting 
questions concerning how any agreement 
might be adequately verified.  These problems 
relate to a number of very thorny specific 
issues such as whether the negotiations should 
be bilateral or multilateral, what satellites and 
other terrestrial systems should be covered, 
and whether the object should be control of 
space weapons or TCBMs for space; questions 
concerning which types of TCBMs such as 
rules of the road or keep out zones, for 
example, might be most useful and how these 
might be reconciled with existing space law 
such as the OST; and verification problems 
such as how to address the latent or residual 
ASAT capabilities possessed by many dual-
use or military systems or deal with the 
significant military potential of even a small 
number of covert ASAT systems.  New space 
system technologies, continuing growth of the 
commercial space sector, and new verification 
technologies interact with these existing 
problems in complex ways.  Some of the 
changes would seem to favor arms control and 
regulation, such as better radars and optical 
systems for improved SSA and verification 
capabilities, technologies for better space 
system diagnostics, and the stabilizing 
potential of microsatellite-based redundant 
and distributed space architectures.  Many 
other trends, however, would seem to make 
space arms control and regulation even more 
difficult.  For example, micro- or 
nanosatellites might be used as virtually 
undetectable active ASATs or passive space 
mines; proliferation of space technology has 
radically increased the number of significant 
space actors to include a number of non-state 
actors that have developed or are developing 
sophisticated dual use technologies such as 
autonomous rendezvous and docking 
capabilities; and growth in the commercial 
space sector raises issues such as how quasi-
military systems could be protected or negated 
and the unclear security implications of global 
markets for dual-use space capabilities and 
products.   
 
The history of top-down approaches to space 
arms control repeatedly has shown they are 
not likely to be the most fruitful ways to 
advance space security, a point strongly 
emphasized by Ambassador Donald Mahley in 
February 2008:  “Since the 1970s, five 
consecutive U.S. administrations have 
concluded it is impossible to achieve an 
effectively verifiable and militarily 
meaningful space arms control agreement.”52  
Nonetheless, in ways that seem both shrewd 
and hypocritical, the Chinese are developing 
significant counterspace capabilities while 
simultaneously advancing various proposals in 
support of prevention of an arms race in outer 
space (PAROS) initiatives and pursuing the 
Chinese-Russian draft treaty on Prevention of 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space 
(PPWT) introduced at the Conference on 
Disarmament in February 2008.  For the 
PPWT in particular, while it goes to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, “Remarks on the 
State of Space Security,” The State of Space Security 
Workshop, Space Policy Institute, George Washington 
University, Washington, 1 February 2008.   
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considerable lengths in attempting to define 
space, space objects, weapons in space, 
placement in space, and the use or threat of 
force, there are still very difficult and unclear 
issues with respect to how specific capabilities 
would be defined.  An even more significant 
problem relates to all the terrestrial 
capabilities that are able to eliminate, damage, 
or disrupt normal function of objects in outer 
space such as the Chinese direct ascent ASAT.  
One must question the utility of an agreement 
that does not address the security implications 
of current space systems to support network 
enabled terrestrial warfare, does not deal with 
dual-use space capabilities, seems to be 
focused on a class of weapons that does not 
exist or at least is not deployed in space, is 
silent about all the terrestrial capabilities that 
are able to produce weapons effects in space, 
and would not ban development and testing of 
space weapons, only their use.53  Given these 
glaring weaknesses in the PPWT it seems 
plausible that it is designed as much to 
continue political pressure on the United 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53Reaching Critical Will, “Preventing the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space: A Backgrounder on the draft 
treaty by Russia and China.    For an outstanding 
analysis of trigger events for space weaponization and 
why space-basing is not necessarily the most important 
consideration, see Barry D. Watts, The Military Use of 
Space: A Diagnostic Assessment (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 
February 2001), pp. 97-106.  Watts argues that:  “There 
are at least two paths by which orbital space might 
become a battleground for human conflict.  One 
consists of dramatic, hard-to-miss trigger events such as 
the use of nuclear weapons to attack orbital assets.  The 
other class involves more gradual changes such as a 
series of small, seemingly innocuous steps over a 
period of years that would, only in hindsight, be 
recognized as having crossed the boundary from force 
enhancement to force application.  For reasons 
stemming from the railroad analogy . . . the slippery 
slope of halting, incremental steps toward force 
application may be the most likely path of the two.”  
Watts discusses high-altitude nuclear detonations, 
failure of nuclear deterrence, and threats to use nuclear 
ballistic missiles during a crisis as the most likely of the 
dramatic trigger events.  
States and derail U.S. missile defense efforts 
as it is to promote sustainable space security. 
 
Other specific Sino-American cooperative 
space ventures or TCBMs that have been 
proposed and are worthy of further 
consideration include: inviting a taikonaut to 
fly on one of the remaining Space Shuttle 
missions and making repeated, specific, and 
public invitations for the Chinese to join the 
ISS program and other major cooperative 
international space efforts.  The United States 
and China could also work towards 
developing non-offensive defenses of the type 
advocated by Philip Baines.54  Kevin Pollpeter 
explains how China and the United States 
could cooperate in promoting the safety of 
human spaceflight and “coordinate space 
science missions to derive scientific benefits 
and to share costs.  Coordinating space 
science missions with separately developed, 
but complementary space assets, removes the 
chance of sensitive technology transfer and 
allows the two countries to combine their 
resources to achieve the same effects as jointly 
developed missions.”55  Michael Pillsbury 
outlined six other areas where U.S. experts 
could profitably exchange views with Chinese 
specialists in a dialogue about space weapons 
issues: “reducing Chinese misperceptions of 
U.S. Space Policy, increasing Chinese 
transparency on space weapons, probing 
Chinese interest in verifiable agreements, 
multilateral versus bilateral approaches, 
economic consequences of use of space 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Philip J. Baines, “The Prospects for ‘Non-Offensive’ 
Defenses in Space,” in James Clay Moltz, ed., New 
Challenges in Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, 
and Space Security (Monterey: Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper no. 12, 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, July  2003), 
pp. 31-48 
 
55 Pollpeter, China’s Progress in Space Technology, pp. 
48-50. 
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weapons, and reconsideration of U.S. high-
tech exports to China.”56 
Bruce MacDonald’s report on China, Space 
Weapons, and U.S. Security for the Council on 
Foreign Relations offers a number of 
noteworthy additional specific 
recommendations for both the United States 
and China including:  For the United States: 
assessing the impact of different U.S. and 
Chinese offensive space postures and policies 
through intensified analysis and “crisis 
games,” in addition to wargames; evaluating 
the desirability of a “no first use” pledge for 
offensive counterspace weapons that have 
irreversible effects; pursuing selected 
offensive capabilities meeting important 
criteria—including effectiveness, reversible 
effects, and survivability—in a deterrence 
context to be able to negate adversary space 
capabilities on a temporary and reversible 
basis, refraining from further direct ascent 
ASAT tests and demonstrations as long as 
China does, unless there is a substantial risk to 
human health and safety from uncontrolled 
space object reentry; and entering negotiations 
on a [kinetic energy] KE-ASAT testing ban.  
MacDonald’s recommendations for China 
include: providing more transparency into its 
military space programs; refraining from 
further direct ascent ASAT tests as long as the 
United States does; establishing a senior 
national security coordinating body, 
equivalent to a Chinese National Security 
Council; strengthening its leadership’s foreign 
policy understanding by increasing the 
international affairs training of senior officer 
candidates and establishing an international 
security affairs office within the PLA; 
providing a clear and credible policy and 
doctrinal context for its 2007 ASAT test and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
56Michael P. Pillsbury, “An Assessment of China’s 
Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs, Policies, 
and Doctrines,” Report prepared for the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 19 
January 2007, 48.   
counterspace programs more generally and 
addressing foreign concerns over China’s 
ASAT test; and offering to engage in dialogue 
with the United States on mutual space 
concerns and become actively involved in 
discussions on establishing international space 
codes of conduct and confidence-building 
measures.57 
 
Finally, Beijing and Washington should 
pursue specific initiatives to follow-up on the 
cooperative dialogue during the visits of 
General Xu Caihou and President Obama as 
well as initiating discussions about recent 
statements by General Xu Qiliang, 
Commander of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), 
that a space arms race is inevitable and the 
PLAAF must develop offensive space 
operations.58  President Hu quickly repudiated 
these statements but the two sides need to find 
a way to initiate and sustain focused 
discussions about the difficult space security 
issues raised by the General’s statements since 
they represent an unprecedented level of 
public transparency on the part of the PLA, 
undoubtedly reflect the position of the PLA 
and other important stakeholders within the 
Chinese government, and represent an 
inherent part of the context for space security 
about which the United States and China must 
develop better shared understanding.  
Counterintuitively, Beijing and Washington 
can lay a stronger foundation for sustainable 
space security through transparent dialogue 
over these most difficult issues rather than by 
trying to avoid them since more diplomatic 
approaches may assuage but cannot eliminate 
the growing strategic and military potential of 
space capabilities.  
       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57Bruce W. MacDonald, China, Space Weapons, and 
U.S. Security (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, September 2008), pp. 34-38.   
58Kathrin Hille, “China General Sees Military Space 
Race,” Financial Times, 3 November 2009.   
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Most importantly, even if these approaches do 
improve space transparency and cooperation 
with China, the United States still bears 
unilateral responsibilities to improve 
sustainable space security by better protecting 
its space capabilities.  It is simply 
irresponsible and untenable for the nation to 
continue building space systems that are 
increasingly important and vulnerable.  The 
United States should improve the protection of 
all space capabilities that support national 
security through a multifaceted political and 
technical approach that includes denial, 
deception, assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, 
changed employment strategies, hosted 
payloads, international coalition architectures, 
technical solutions, and passive and active 
measures.  One of the best technical 
approaches to accomplishing these objectives 
would be for the United States to change the 
space paradigm by emphasizing flexible 
distributed architectures and sparse arrays 
consisting of many networked microsatellites 
in multiple orbits that are able to perform a 
range of missions as well or better than 
missions performed by constellations with 
small numbers of single function satellites 
and, even more importantly, radically reduce 
the vulnerabilities inherent in space systems 
with just a few nodes. Proliferation of the 
wide range of current and projected threats to 
all orbital regimes, combined with the intrinsic 
fragility of space systems and the 
predictability of their operations indicate that 
distributed architectures must at least 
supplement, if not eventually replace, current 
architectures if space systems are to remain 
operationally relevant in an increasingly 
contested domain. 
 
As the most important first steps in 
implementing specific protection measures, 
the United States should ensure critical 
infrastructure protection and continuity of 
operations by eliminating critical single points 
of failure on the ground and hardening LEO 
satellites against total radiation dose failures 
following high altitude nuclear detonations. A 
second essential step is to implement and 
institutionalize the protection standards for all 
future NSS systems called for in the national 
security space (NSS) Protection Strategy 
Framework signed by DOD Executive Agent 
for Space Peter Teets in March 2005. In 
addition, all future national security space 
acquisitions should be required to perform a 
cross-domain analysis of terrestrial 
alternatives and the space portion should 
consider tradeoffs between traditional 
architectures and microsatellite distributed 
architectures as well as explicitly evaluating 
many factors beyond just costs such as 
persistence, survivability, and space industrial 
base considerations.  Increased effort towards 
this goal is urgently need now and it is 
particularly important that the Air Force Space 
and Missile Systems Center (SMC) and the 
NRO adopt this approach but moving these 
organizations toward this approach will be a 
difficult challenge since they are the centers of 
current NSS acquisition efforts that have 
evolved, with good reasons, towards larger 
and more capable but very small numbers of 
satellites in most current architectures.59  
Other important steps towards better 
capability protection that have been initiated 
or should be undertaken include: developing 
responsive space capabilities through the 
Operationally Responsive Space Office that 
was established at Kirtland AFB in May 2007 
and other approaches; funding protection 
efforts commensurate with their importance; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59Outstanding and comprehensive technical evaluations 
of the prospects for moving toward distributed 
architectures are provided in:  Gregory A. Orndorff, 
Bruce F. Zink, and John D. Cosby, “Clustered 
Architecture for Responsive Space,” AIAA-RS5 2007-
1002, (Los Angeles: American Institute for Aeronautics 
and Astronautics, 5th Responsive Space Conference, 23-
26 April 2007), and Mr. Naresh Shah and Dr. Owen C. 
Brown, “Fractionated Satellites: Changing the Future of 
Risk and Opportunity for Space Systems,” High 
Frontier  vol. 5, no. 1 (November 2008), pp. 29-36.  
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development of a comprehensive space 
protection strategy and creation of the joint 
Air Force Space Command-NRO Space 
Protection Program in July 2008; use of 
wargames, “crisis games,” and simulations to 
explore and refine space deterrence concepts 
and develop shared understanding about 
specific “red lines” for deterring potential 
attacks against satellites that support U.S. 
national security; and multifaceted approaches 
to raise awareness about space dependency 
and vulnerabilities as well as adopting a 
“whole of government, whole of nation, and 
whole of coalition” approach to address these 
interdependent issues.60 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60U.S. Representative Terry Everett, “Work Worth 
Doing,” High Frontier vol. 5, no. 1 (November 2008), 
pp. 2-6.   
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As advancing technologies expand the scope 
of human activities in space, the international 
security implications of these activities have 
become increasingly contested.  For the 
United States, military space capabilities now 
serve integral roles in a spectrum of terrestrial 
needs, and sustaining U.S. security interests in 
space has become a key concern for many 
military planners.  Meanwhile, the space 
technologies of many other countries are 
developing rapidly.  Although an outright 
challenge of the U.S. position is not yet 
imminent, some countries already possess 
asymmetric capabilities posing genuine threats 
to U.S. space operations.   
 
The relationship of the United States and 
China with respect to security uses of space 
has emerged as a focal point of these 
concerns.  The advancement of Chinese space 
capabilities was showcased positively by its 
achievement of human orbital flight in 
October 2003 and more negatively by its 
missile destruction of a defunct weather 
satellite in January 2007, demonstrating anti-
satellite (ASAT) capabilities.  The February 
2008 U.S. missile destruction of a failed U.S. 
satellite provided a counterpoint to the 
emerging U.S.-China military rivalry in space.   
The U.S.-China space rivalry is woven 
through the fabric of these countries’ broader 
political relationship, involving nuclear 
deterrence and missile defense, and 
overshadowed by the volatile and enduring 
problem of Taiwan.  Yet that broader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Portions of this work draw on “Canada-China Space 
Engagement:  Opportunities and Prospects, “Canadian 
International Council Canada-China Project, December 
2009. 
relationship also has positive attributes.  
Beyond Taiwan, the U.S. and China have few 
pointed geopolitical conflicts and successfully 
collaborate on some security problems, as for 
example in the Six-Party Talks process aiming 
to de-nuclearize North Korea.  China’s 
economic liberalization saps the ideological 
ferocity that defined U.S.-Soviet relations for 
decades; U.S.-China trade volume is now 
hundreds of billions of dollars annually, and 
engagement of China on international finance, 
climate change, global health, product safety 
and other issues promotes professionalism in 
their interaction.  Due to its far-reaching 
impact, the U.S.-China bilateral relationship is 
increasingly becoming the axis around which 
the rest of the world revolves.    
 
As a case in point, Canada has specific 
interests in many of the issues for which the 
U.S.-China relationship is the central feature, 
and so observes developments in that 
relationship closely.  Canada’s integral ties to 
the U.S. are well known.  Canada also 
maintains unique and familiar ties to China, 
sustained in part by domestic demographics – 
1.3 million Canadians, some four percent of 
the population, are of Chinese origin.2  While 
economic and trade issues are perhaps at the 
forefront, security questions are close at hand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Following the post-1980 wave of immigration, 
Chinese are now the largest visible minority group in 
Canada, with heterogeneity of origin including 
mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong.  See David 
Zweig, “A Limited Engagement: Mainland Returnees 
from Canada,” Research Report, Asia Pacific 
Foundation of Canada, December 19, 2008 
(http://www.asiapacific.ca/research-report/limited-
engagement-mainland-returnees-canada); and Shibao 
Guo and Don J. DeVoretz, “The Changing Face of 
Chinese Immigrants in Canada,” Institute for the Study 
of Labor Discussion Paper No. 3018, August 2007 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=10
12808#).  
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and space security specifically is a key 
concern.   
 
The Canadian government has a longstanding 
and highly refined interest in the future of 
space security (described more fully below).  
Canada has historically been among the 
world’s most active states seeking to prevent 
deployment of weapons in space, operating 
through multilateral forums and other 
diplomatic avenues to address questions of 
definitions, transparency, entry-into-force and 
verification.  At the same time, Canada also 
has a space program of its own– uniquely 
accomplished for a country of its size– and 
has had a cooperative relationship with the 
U.S. on military space uses, such as early 
warning satellite information, since the 
earliest years of the Cold War.  The high level 
of public attention to both sides of Canada’s 
space interests was vividly displayed by the 
contentious and controversial decision of the 
Canadian government in February 2005 not to 
join US continental missile defense 
development efforts, under the auspices of the 
North American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD), largely on the basis of 
concerns over connections to space weapons 
planning.3   
 
These viewpoints reflect two underlying 
tensions that animate Canadian international 
policy-making.  The first tension, distinct to 
countries of modern development levels and 
moderate size, is between conceptions of 
national interest and conceptions of what 
might be termed “international interest.”  This 
follows from the high permeation of and 
sensitivity to global circumstances 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For contrasting assessments see James Fergusson, 
“Shall We Dance? The Missile Defence Decision, 
NORAD Renewal, and the Future of Canada-US 
Defence Relations,” Canadian Military Journal, 
Summer 2005 (http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/ 
vo6/no2/inter-01-eng.asp); and Steven Staples, Missile 
Defence: Round One (Lorimer, Oct 3, 2006; ISBN: 
1550289292). 
characteristic of developed middle powers.  
Thus, there is little parallel in Canada to the 
isolationist streak in U.S. international policy; 
Canadian debates tend to be framed in terms 
of how, rather than whether, to be “in the 
world.”4   
 
The second tension, more unique to Canada, is 
between seeking national objectives, and 
specifically security objectives, either through 
the intimate relationship with the U.S. or 
through broader multilateral structures.  This 
tension often converges with the first but is 
functionally distinct in the sense that either set 
of interests might potentially be pursued 
through either type of relationship.5   
 
These outlooks animate Canadian observation 
of the percolating U.S.-China rivalry in space, 
in terms of both direct impact on Canadian 
national security interests and broader impact 
on international security interests.  Many 
Canadians in and out of government are 
interested in opportunities to contribute 
positively to ameliorating these concerns 
through both multilateral mechanisms and 
through the unique relationship with the 
United States – and, if possible, through direct 
Canada-China engagement as well.  
Facilitating U.S.-China engagement on space 
aiming to resolve tensions and establish an 
environment for secure and peaceful use of 
space contributes directly to addressing core 
Canadian concerns.6   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For a notable exposition see Jennifer Welsh, At Home 
in the World: Canada’s Global Vision for the 21st 
Century (HarperCollins: 2004).  This work was widely 
circulated and discussed in Ottawa, framing then-
current debates over the future of Canada’s 
international role.   
5 These observations are elaborated in the following 
section.   
6 For a recent articulation of Canada’s space interests, 
see Candace Mergle, Representative of Canada to the 
First Committee of the 64th Session of the U.N. 
General Assembly, “Statement on the Prevention of an 
Arms Race in Outer Space,” Permanent Mission of 
Canada to the United Nations New York, October 19, 
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This article considers the question of 
Canadian engagement of the U.S.-China 
relationship on space issues.  The next section 
briefly reviews key elements in the 
development of Canada’s space capabilities, 
interests, and relationships, concluding with a 
skeletal explanation of the sometimes 
contradictory nature of Canadian values and 
objectives with respect to the future uses of 
space.  The following section applies this 
discussion specifically to the question of 
which Canadian roles would be most 
efficacious, and which not, with respect to 
U.S.-China space engagement. 
 
Canada in Space 
	  
As a “moderate” global power, Canada enjoys 
a highly developed industrial/information 
economy and standards of living, but its 
relatively small population limits the absolute 
global impact of its qualitatively high material 
capabilities.  Canada’s space accomplishments 
stand out; but given its smaller absolute size 
and the large scale required for space 
activities, these accomplishments have 
depended upon a continuing secure and 
peaceful space environment. 
 
The cornerstone of Canada’s space activities 
has been effective partnerships, by far most 
importantly with the U.S.7  In the earliest 
period of space exploration, the prospect of 
Canada-U.S. cooperation was much more 
attractive for Canada, which accordingly 
sought to identify activities that would be 
useful for Canada, while eliciting active U.S. 
interest.  Cooperative Arctic defense and 
scientific activities provided an optimal 





7 For one review see Roger Handberg, “Outer Space as 
a Shared Frontier: Canada and the United States, 
Cooperation Between Unequal Partners,” American 
Behavioral Scientist 47:10 (June 2004).  
combination of benefits.  Satellites offered to 
provide vitally needed reliable 
communications among the small and isolated 
populations in the harshest reaches of the 
country as well as a wealth of atmospheric and 
weather data.  Effective communications also 
served the critical shared U.S.-Canada Cold 
War concern to support systems providing 
early warning of Soviet attack.   
 
The first fruit of this cooperation was the 
Alouette-1 satellite.  When launched into low 
Earth orbit (LEO) in September 1962, this 
satellite made Canada the third state to enter 
outer space.  Measuring electron density in the 
ionosphere, the satellite’s mission aimed to 
improve communications for both military and 
civilian purposes.8  This clear dual-use 
function exemplified the equivalent 
importance of social/economic and security 
purposes for Canadian space activities.  The 
equivalent concern for the civil and military 
space sectors became a defining motif of 
Canadian space outlooks. 
 
This early collaboration also expressed what 
grew into two prominent tactical features of 
Canadian space efforts.  One was to 
concentrate on opportunities to cooperate with 
the U.S. that fit an independent national space 
agenda.  The second was to focus not on 
becoming a minimally independent space 
power, but on developing specific roles and 
excelling in “niche” capabilities that would 
entail significant, if selective, technology and 
information flows to and from larger partners.  
Canada sought to use this strategy to take part 
in advanced space achievements, stay at the 
leading edge of space technologies and 
leverage these capabilities for long-term 
national economic competitiveness.9   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 “Alouette I and II,” Canadian Space Agency 
(http://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/satellites/alouette.asp)  
9 Canadian Space Agency, State of the Canadian space 
sector 2000 (Saint-Hubert: Author, 
External Relations Directorate, 2002). 
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The “niche” strategy enabled Canada to offer 
tangible value in cooperation with the U.S. in 
civil activities, as demonstrated by the next 
major opportunity: Canada’s role as the 
developer of remote manipulator arm, the 
“Canadarm,” for the U.S. Space Shuttle 
program.  The Canadarm provided a visibility 
previously lacking for Canada’s space 
program and facilitated Canadian astronauts 
reaching space for the first time.  U.S.-
Canadian space cooperation deepened further 
with the International Space Station (ISS) 
program: Canada’s eventual development of 
the two manipulator units was the first time 
the U.S. approved a Canadian role in a 
“critical pathway”− activities or actions that 
absolutely must be accomplished for the 
program to succeed.   
 
At the same time, Canada increasingly 
pursued national capabilities in commercial 
areas.  The 1972 launch of the first Anik 
satellite created a national Comsat system, 
Telesat Canada, independent of the then U.S.-
dominated Intelsat.  Continuing efforts in this 
vein led to Radarsat-1, a remote sensing 
satellite, launched from the Space Shuttle in 
1995, capable of producing military-quality, 
all-weather radar images across the globe.  As 
Canada’s commercial interests and 
achievements grew, however, they also 
generated friction, as the U.S. resisted 
providing launch services for commercial 
competitors to U.S. satellites.   
 
Meanwhile, in the late 1990s, notorious 
worries over increasing Chinese efforts to 
surreptitiously obtain U.S. high technology 
capabilities was a factor leading to a 
tightening of U.S. export control mechanisms, 
including return of U.S. export control 
authority on dual-use space technologies from 
the Commerce Department to the State 
Department.  In 1999, the U.S. withdrew its 
exemption for Canada, and other US allies, to 
the restrictions of the U.S. International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 
significantly limiting Canadian technology 
exchanges with the U.S.  Canada was able to 
partially restore these exchanges through 
implementation of parallel export controls 
under its Controlled Goods Program (CGP), 
however, those controls impinged on 
technology cooperation with non-U.S. 
partners.10 
 
These types of factors decisively constrained 
Canada’s development of the successor 
Radarsat-2.  The new ITAR restrictions, 
which encompassed concerns over Canada’s 
intentions to make high quality Radarsat 
imagery commercially available, forced 
Radarsat-2’s Canadian contractor, 
MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates (MDA), 
to sever its contract with Orbital Sciences’ 
space systems group to provide the primary 
satellite platform. By this time, however, 
Canada had other partnership opportunities; 
Radarsat-2 was instead developed with 
European collaboration (Italy’s Alenia Spazio 
provided the platform) and launched by 
Russia in Kazakhstan.11  Canada subsequently 
adopted legislation specifically seeking to 
assuage US concerns over access to Radarsat-
2’s advanced remote sensing capabilities.12 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Eric Choi and Sorin Nicelescu, “The Impact of US 
Export Controls on the Canadian Space Industry,” 
Space Policy 22 (2006), pp. 29-34. 
11 Canadian Space Agency, Radarsat, Annual Review 
1998/99 (Saint-Hubert: Author, 1999); cf. Dave 
Caddey, “Radarsat-2: A cautionary tale,” Aerospace 
America, January 2001 
(http://www.aiaa.org/Aerospace/Article.cfm?issuetocid
=45&ArchiveIssueID=9); J. Bates, “Canadian Military 
Mulls Tandem Radarsat Mission,” Space News, May 
13, 2002. 
12 “Bill C-25: An Act Governing the Operation of 
Remote Sensing Space Systems,” prepared by Lalita 
Acharya, Science and Technology Division, Library of 
Parliament, Government of Canada, December 20, 
2004 (http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/Bills_ls.asp? 
Parl=38&Ses=1&ls=C25). 
W. Huntley, Engaging China on Space:  Implications for Canada 
 
 45 
The conflict over Radarsat illustrates how, as 
Canada’s space activities developed, tensions 
emerged between predominant U.S. security 
concerns and Canada’s emphasis on 
commercial opportunities and reliance on a 
peaceful space environment.  As U.S. military 
space activities were kept obscured and 
cooperation with Canada was increasingly 
channeled through NASA, military space 
activities for Canada either declined in relative 
importance or were pursued more 
independently. For example, Canada will soon 
have its first dedicated military satellite.13  
Meanwhile, its expanding civil activities 
fueled interest in securing peaceful use of 
space through international cooperation.  
Canada became a leader of efforts to construct 
a space legal regime, joining in drafting the 
first international space treaties at the United 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), and has also 
pressed at the UN Conference on 
Disarmament for work to proceed on a 
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space 
(PAROS) treaty, sometimes collaborating with 
China and Russia.14  Many in Canada 
perceived that, in light of its otherwise close 
relationship, demonstrating a measure of 
independence from the U.S. military space 
ambitions enabled Canada to more easily take 
advantage of opportunities for cooperation 
with other states.  At the same time, Canada 
continued to face the same dilemma of many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Chris Wattie, “Canada will launch own spy satellite: 
Project Sapphire,” National Post, November 14, 2006, 
p.A6; “MDA Awarded Definition Phase Contract For 
Canadian Space Surveillance System,” Press Release 
(http://www.mda.ca/corporate/news/pr/pr2005011101.h
tml). See also Paul Maskell & Lorne Oram, “Sapphire: 
Canada’s Answer to Space-Based Surveillance of 
Orbital Objects,” Canadian Forces Surveillance of 
Space Project, n.d. [2008] (http://appspacesol.com/pdf 
/sapphire.pdf). 
14 “Space Security,” Canadian Department of Foreign 




other countries in enhancing its security 
through both independent uses of space and 
multilateral arms control.   
 
Radarsat became an issue again in 2008 with 
the announcement that MDA, by then 
Canada’s largest space technology firm, had 
agreed to sell its space division, including 
rights to the data from the just-launched 
Radarsat-2, to U.S.-based Alliant 
Techsystems.  The proposed sale generated 
immediate controversy on several fronts.  
Many viewed the turnover of Canada’s 
showcase independent space achievement as 
tantamount to selling off the family 
heirlooms– all the more galling given the 
degree of taxpayer investment in development 
of the satellite.  Others connected the sale to 
Canadian resistance to U.S. military space 
planning, noting the role of Alliant as a U.S. 
defense contractor and the high quality of 
Radarsat-2’s imaging data.  Some long-time 
observers of Canadian space activities 
lamented less the immediate loss of control 
over Radarsat-2 than the longer-term impact 
that the loss of the space division as a whole 
represented for Canada’s future space 
technology development capacities.  
Coalescing politically, these concerns 
impelled the government in May 2008 to 
invoke the Investment Canada Act to block 
the sale on national interest grounds – the first 
such veto after some 1600 reviews of over 
10,000 foreign takeovers.15  The episode once 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Andrew Mayeda and David Akin, “Ottawa blocks 
sale of space agency to U.S. firm,” Canwest News 
Service, April 10, 2008 (http://www2.canada.com/ 
montrealgazette/ news/story.html?id=6426dd8d-ab10-
426b-9f60-358c1fea7b9b&k=35463); “Govt. confirms 
decision to block sale of MDA space division,” CBC 
News, May 9, 2008 (http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/ 
2008/05/09/alliant-sale.html). See also Jessica West, 
“Radarsat-2: Launched and lost?,” The Ploughshares 
Monitor 29:1, Spring 2008 
(http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/monm08
d.pdf); and Michael Byers, “For Sale: Arctic 
Sovereignty?” The Walrus June 2008 
(http://www.walrusmagazine.com/articles/2008.06-
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again highlighted the tension between intimate 
cooperation with the U.S. and maintaining 
independent capabilities and policies that has 
defined Canadian space activities for decades.   
 
Presently, Canadian space activities have 
reached a crossroads.  Many past projects are 
now concluding with commitments to future 
projects indeterminate, particularly in light of 
limited budgets for new initiatives.  
Additionally, the tensions among Canada’s 
disparate space activities reflect divisions 
among internal bureaucratic orientations, 
exacerbating the challenges of coherent 
national planning.  Much current debate now 
centers on whether Canada needs a single 
national space policy, what that policy would 
be, and how it would function as to organize 
the disparate agencies and private actors 
currently pursuing their own space-related 
agendas.16   
 
To many US analysts, the tension inherent in 
the Canadian position appears puzzling, if not 
contradictory.  But there is a consistency 
underlying Canada’s seemingly “zig-zag” 
course on space activities, stemming from its 
interests and capabilities as a “moderate” 
power.  Given the high costs of entry, military 
space, like nuclear deterrence, is a realm of 
principally the great powers, underscoring the 
salience of military uses of space and 
reinforcing these states’ competitive and self-
reliant nature in it.17  Other states, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
technology-for-sale-arctic-sovereignty-radarsat-mda-
michael-byers/).  
16 Author’s observations drawn from participation in 
several forums on these topics.   
17 For a thorough overview, see Barry D. Watts, “The 
Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment,” 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 
February 2001 (http://www.csbaonline.org/ 
4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20010201.The_Military_U
se_o/R.20010201.The_Military_Use_o.pdf). With 
respect to this generalization, Israel’s independent 
space capabilities represent in some respects the 
exception that proves the rule, while in other respects – 
the relatively small scale of its military program and its 
disempowered in military space, tend to 
regard it as a realm of lawlessness where 
potential conflict could easily spill over to 
impact their own interests.  Instead, moderate 
powers prioritize civil space, a realm where 
potential collaborations and niche roles offer 
opportunities of access and advancement of 
interests.  Conversely, great powers are more 
prone to subsume civil space activities to 
military space concerns – security issues take 
priority, with civilian capabilities becoming 
national “assets.”18   
 
This disposition toward civil space activities 
does not mean moderate powers are 
unconcerned about space security issues.   In 
fact, the opposite often holds: as common 
consumers of space-based communications 
and imaging products, moderate powers tend 
to perceive a keen interest in activities there, 
and sensitivity to their own vulnerabilities 
regarding those activities.  But moderate 
powers tend to lack the capabilities to 
influence events in space, particularly in 
conflictual situations.  This gap between 
interests and capabilities magnifies the 
predisposition of moderate powers to develop 
other means of securing their security 
interests.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
longstanding reliance on U.S. support – not an 
exception at all.   
18 While in the U.S. there is political and programmatic 
demarcation between civil and military space activities, 
there is also spillover between the sectors and the 
generally perceived security interest flowing from any 
perceived threats to vital commercial capabilities. U.S. 
military reliance on commercial communication 
bandwidth in certain circumstances is a poignant 
example; for assessments see Patrick Rayermann, 
“Exploiting Commercial SATCOM: A Better Way,” 
Parameters, Winter 2003-04, pp. 54-66 
(http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03wint
er/rayerman.htm); Benjamin D.Forest, “An Analysis of 
Military Use of Commercial Satellite 
Communications,” Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, September 2008 (http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/ 
oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=
ADA488621). 
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The search for security through novel means 
characterizes moderate power behavior more 
generally.  Great powers tend to focus on 
securing their interests with indigenous 
resources.   Moderate powers, however, must 
be concerned not only for the great powers’ 
disposition – friend or foe – but also their 
attention: a principal objective is to prevent 
the greater powers from impinging on 
interests merely out of ignorance or apathy.  
Hence, moderate powers focus on developing 
relationships.  Such relationships may take the 
form of a bilateral collaboration with a greater 
power or multilateral participation in a global 
regime.  Both alliances and treaties can help 
assure moderate powers that their interests 
will be acknowledged and recognized over 
time.   
 
Herein is found the common core of the 
Canada’s otherwise divergent behavior on 
space activities.  Canada’s collaborations with 
the U.S. on space-related efforts and its active 
pursuit of an international agreement to 
prevent weaponization of space both reflect 
the pursuit of security interests through 
relationship formation.  Both efforts seek to 
advance the view that a peaceful space 
environment is a prerequisite to securing the 
full range of Canada’s space-related 
activities.19 
 
Canada, China and Space 
	  
Today, China is in many respects emerging as 
a “great power” in the space domain.  The 
U.S.-China interaction on space activities 
expresses many typical features of a great 
power rivalry, though one more akin to the 
managed European rivalries of the nineteenth 
century than the ideologically oriented 
superpower rivalry that defined the twentieth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 For an elaboration of these observations see Wade L. 
Huntley, “Smaller State Perspectives on the Future of 
Space Governance,” Astropolitics 5:3 (Fall 2007), 
pp.237-71, at pp.252-7. 
century.  Canada, conversely, brings a quite 
different moderate power perspective to space 
development generally, and to the emerging 
U.S.-China relationship in space particularly.  
Canada’s intimate familiarity with the United 
States and, to a lesser extent, China, enriches 
this perspective.  In some respects, Canada 
can see both these countries in ways they 
cannot see themselves or each other.  As the 
United States and China seek to manage their 
relationship, they may find considerable value 
in the unique and informed perspectives that 
Canada’s government, commercial enterprises 
and expert communities can offer.  Canada, 
for its part, can find new opportunities to 
maintain its own interests through such roles. 
Possible future Canadian initiatives with 
respect to the United States, China, and space 
divide into two categories.  The first 
comprises the bilateral Canada-China 
relationship on space, and how development 
of that relationship would bear on U.S.-China 
engagement.  The second category focuses on 
whether and how Canada could help facilitate 
the U.S.-China relationship directly.   
 
Across both these categories, Canada can 
draw on and enhance its previous relationships 
with these two countries.  As noted above, 
Canada’s cooperation with the U.S. in space 
has a long history.  Canada today also has 
productive collaborative relationships with 
ESA and other partners, such as Japan.20  
Canadian ties on space with China are less 
developed, but their prior engagement on 
promoting multilateral regime solutions to 
military and civil space challenges provides a 
foundation for growing Canada’s role.     
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Lydia Dotto, Canada and the European Space 
Agency: Three Decades of Cooperation. (Norodwijk, 
Netherlands: European Space Agency Publications 
Division, 2002); Daniel Sorid, “Japan to Sign Space 
Accord with Canada,” Space.com News, September 10, 
1999 (http://www.space.com/news/japan_canada.html). 
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One big obstacle to advancing Canada-China 
space cooperation concerns restrictions on 
transfers of technology and information with 
security-related applications.  This obstacle 
traces back directly to ITAR-related 
constraints given by the importance of the 
Canada-U.S. relationship and continuing 
Canadian concerns over Chinese industrial 
intelligence interests.  For Canadian private 
firms and civil agencies interested in 
developing new initiatives with China, these 
restrictions loom large.  Many commercial 
enterprises perceive that the restrictions are 
excessively cumbersome, with numerous 
prohibited exports listed unnecessarily.  
Limited resources restrain organizations from 
hacking through the restrictions to determine 
their precise limitations.  The reputation of 
ubiquitous difficulties garnered by 
contemporary export controls dampens 
interest in investing in relationships where 
fulfillment is uncertain or pursuing potentially 
problematic partnerships, sometimes beyond 
what the actual restrictions would require.  
China in particular is in a “category of its 
own” with respect to restrictions, exacerbating 
these difficulties.   
 
New initiatives in China-Canada engagement 
can focus on overcoming such obstacles.  For 
example, there are entire categories of 
potential cooperation, not involving 
technology exchanges, which might be 
fruitfully pursued.  One possibility is to focus 
on joint utilization of information already 
being generated from existing space-based 
systems rather than on the joint development 
of new systems.  This could include creating a 
common collection system and database for 
information on environmental monitoring and 
ocean research and convening joint scientific 
panels to generate new ideas for collaboration.  
Initiatives could also focus on identifying 
collaborations leveraging comparative 
advantages, such as combining Canada’s 
experience in deep space exploration and 
China’s launching capabilities to develop a 
partnership in a relatively non-controversial 
area.   
 
Of course, any Canada-China cooperative 
effort in space would need to serve the aims of 
each country’s own programs.  But building 
cooperative linkages on space, either 
bilaterally or in a multilateral institutional 
context, would also serve to bolster the 
broader bilateral relationship, which is itself 
an inducement complementing specific project 
benefits.  Expanding space cooperation 
between these two countries could also 
produce benefits for Chinese engagement on 
space with the United States and other 
countries.   
 
One area offering potentially broadly 
applicable benefits is the issue of 
transparency.  Many observers experience 
frustration over China’s reticence to release 
information concerning its military and 
security capabilities and behavior, notably in 
the area of space activities.  This opacity is 
particularly perplexing when the information 
in question is relatively innocuous and/or 
already in the public domain through non-
Chinese sources, and even cited by Chinese 
analysts themselves.  In such cases, some 
suggest, China’s unwillingness to validate 
and/or clarify information serves no strategic 
purpose and fuels an atmosphere of suspicion.  
Defenders of China have offered a number of 
answers to these contentions: China does not 
want to confirm information that might still be 
uncertain or that would be embarrassing 
domestically; China sometimes sees the call to 
“transparency” as a guise for intrusiveness or 
espionage; and, in any event, China is slowly 
getting better.   
 
The focus on information, however, obscures 
a potentially more fruitful dimension for 
promoting transparency – people.  Learning 
more accurately how Chinese space activities 
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are bureaucratically organized and identifying 
key decision-makers, both formal and 
informal, can enhance transparency as much 
or more than sharing detailed technical data or 
sensitive policy directions.  Focusing 
transparency-oriented initiatives on “who” 
rather than “what” would also facilitate the 
development of personal relationships in 
specific sectors.  A deeper Canada-China 
relationship on space activities would 
doubtlessly expand linkages in civil and 
commercial sectors, but would likely also 
facilitate exchanges on security matters, 
increasing knowledge of Chinese actors and 
perspectives in that area as well.   
 
Attention to this interpersonal dimension of 
building a better understanding of China’s 
space interests and behavior reflects the 
penchant for relationship development that 
typifies moderate powers’ approaches to 
international relations.  In other words, the 
proclivity for relationship-building of 
moderate powers, such as Canada, can be an 
important asset to successfully engaging 
China on space issues in ways that not only 
realize the specific interests of the two 
countries directly, but also yield benefits 
valuable more generally, such as enhancing 
Chinese transparency and indirectly 
facilitating U.S.-China engagement.   
Beyond pursuing the prospects of developing 
its own relationship with China on space 
matters, the role that Canada might play in 
directly facilitating the U.S.-China 
relationship on space is ambiguous.  If the 
U.S.-China relationship is increasingly the 
central axis of space security relationships, the 
purposes that would be served by a direct 
Canadian link to that relationship are unclear.  
Nor does Canada typically seek a “seat at the 
table” in circumstances where such a role 
would not be efficacious.   
 
Instead, Canada might contribute more 
productively to support positive directions in 
the U.S.-China relationship in a facilitative 
role.  Such a role would take into account both 
the distinct advantages and unalterable 
limitations given by its unique relationship to 
the United States, characterized by a history of 
both intimate civil and military cooperation 
and adamant defiance on certain key security 
policy questions. This history leaves Canada 
at once familiar and independent.  The 
independence provides a certain level of 
credibility with China, with which Canada 
shares the goal of a legally binding treaty 
restraining the military uses of space, and has 
at times collaborated in promoting such a 
treaty (as noted above).  In short, Canada has 
demonstrated that it is independent, but not 
neutral, and able to speak and act on its own 
behalf on all matters of space activities.   
 
In such a facilitative role, Canada could 
productively operate in two modes: as a 
convening force and an innovation source.  To 
operate as a convening force means to provide 
the venue and forum within which the 
principal agents may better advance their 
engagement.  It does not mean to be a 
“mediator,” which would be a direct rather 
than facilitative role.  It may mean providing a 
nurturing environment for low-key meetings 
or other expert exchanges at either official or 
track-2 diplomatic levels, particularly where 
key participants find it problematic to travel 
into either the United States or China.21  But 
operating as a convening force can be less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 One example is the 2008 workshop, convened under 
this author’s direction by the Simons Centre at the 
University of British Columbia, exploring specifically 
what initiatives Canada could undertake to facilitate 
positive growth in the U.S.-China relationship on space.  
This workshop, gathering government, industry and 
academic representatives, was linked to the annual 
“China, Space, and Strategy” workshops convened by 
the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, 
U.S. Air Force Academy.  See “Engaging China on 
Space: Implications for Canada,” Report of the 
Conference, Liu Institute, University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver, September 5, 2008 
(http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/page244.htm). 
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direct as well. For example, in pursuing 
project cooperation with China, Canada might 
prioritize initiatives that would also enable a 
U.S. role (perhaps more remotely, perhaps not 
immediately) or at least have Canada-U.S. 
counterpart initiatives.  Such a focus would be 
especially useful in areas in which direct U.S.-
China engagement is most problematic, such 
as in inter-military contacts or analysis of 
longer-term prospects for military uses of 
space.    
 
Canada can be an innovation source with 
respect to facilitating the U.S.-China 
relationship in a number of ways.  Initiatives 
could begin by synthesizing the perspectives 
garnered through a host of small-scale close 
encounters with both countries into a dynamic 
third-party assessment of the ongoing state of 
the U.S.-China relationship.  Developing a 
process to draw on civil, commercial, military, 
and diplomatic contacts, this analysis could 
generate perspectives less evident to the U.S. 
and China themselves.  This analysis would 
then draw on Canada’s own unique attributes 
– some specific to a particular sector or issue, 
others more general to Canada’s national 
position as a moderate power – to develop 
specific proposals for enhancing U.S.-China 
space engagement.  These proposals could 
again be specific to a particular sector or issue, 
or general and long-term.  One focus might be 
on enhancing incipient U.S.-China work on 
erecting confidence-building measures 
(CBM).  Efforts to develop innovations to 
help advance the U.S.-China relationship 
would take place in a host of civil, 
commercial, and academic settings; they 
would not necessarily carry an official 
imprimatur, but could be promoted as a clear 
objective in Canadian space policy.   
Canada’s success in serving this facilitative 
role, in either of these modes, would depend 
in part on the United States and China 
positively reinforcing that role.  But such a 
role could be fulfilled through the 
accumulated activities of a host of agents – 
such as companies, universities and NGOs – 
operating in independent capacities.  Positive 
reinforcement would come more in the 
aggregate of these activities than from a 
singular Canadian government posture.  Many 
forums and innovations could also have 
independent impact, while sensitivity to the 
feedback from the efforts would be further 
data to the ongoing analysis of the U.S.-China 




Debate concerning the overarching prospects 
for the future of the U.S.-China relationship 
on space activities – and for that matter the 
U.S.-China relationship as a whole – often 
tends to resolve into two basic concerns, 
yielding two very different implications.   
The first concern is that the U.S. and China 
face a sharp security dilemma with respect to 
their encounters on military uses of space.  
Flowing from the basic postulates of “realist” 
international theory, this means that both 
countries find themselves with postures and 
interests compelling them to suspect the worst 
of each other.22  Even if each side were to 
pursue only its most vital interests in the most 
innocuous means possible, nevertheless those 
activities would still be threatening to the 
other, and perceived as such.  Though neither 
side wishes conflict, each finds it exceedingly 
difficult to forsake defensive measures that 
would increase vulnerability in the absence of 
an impossibly complete confidence of 
reciprocation.  This is the key feature of the 
security dilemma: it is a real dilemma, leaving 
the parties inescapably victims of 
circumstance.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For a classic conception see Kenneth N. Waltz, 
Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley, 1979); for a recent comprehensive 
treatment, see Ken Booth and Nicolas J. Wheeler, The 
Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in 
World Politics (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2008). 




The second concern is that the U.S. and China 
sometimes dangerously misunderstand each 
others’ intentions and fail to communicate 
effectively.  International relations theory has 
long recognized the fundamental role of 
perception in shaping state relationships and 
global outcomes.23   Misunderstandings 
flowing from differences of language and 
strategic culture pose significant obstacles.  
Misperceptions of true intentions aggravate 
reactions to otherwise innocent actions and 
events.  Domestic political dynamics on both 
sides produce mixed and/or opaque signals.  
In this context, gaps in understandings and 
expectations for future conduct invite 
unnecessary conflict; as if the parties willfully 
discarded the map before entering the 
minefield.  In this view, there is no 
fundamental conflict beyond overcoming 
these communications challenges; in principle 
the U.S. and China could build a peaceful 
security partnership that would be self-
sustainable into the indefinite future.   
In reality, the dynamics of the U.S.-China 
relationship probably comprise a combination 
of both concerns, though in varying degrees 
across issues and time.  Moreover, the 
concerns are mutually reinforcing and the 
threshold between them is opaque.  Hence, 
degradation of relations and crises involve 
both real conflicts of interest and intensifying 
mistrust; stabilization of relations and 
constructive engagement entail both improved 
understanding and practical reconciliations.  
But the distinction between these two types of 
concern is vital because the types of 
prescriptions for dealing with each concern 
are very different.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For classic treatments see Robert Jervis, Perception 
and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press: 1976) and Graham 
Allison and P. Zelikow, Essence of Decision: 
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: 
Longman, 1999). 
To the extent the security dilemma 
predominates, conflict of interest, though not 
necessarily combat of forces, is inevitable.  
The best that can be hoped for is to manage 
the relationship by thinking enough moves 
ahead to avoid a reciprocal spiral into 
violence.  To the extent instead that 
miscommunication predominates, the 
possibilities for genuine resolution of interests 
are more promising.  Diligent efforts to 
advance mutual understanding will inevitably 
ameliorate the dangers of military violence.   
Focusing only on one or the other concern 
carries considerable risks.  The risk of 
presuming only a security dilemma is to miss 
opportunities to develop a more 
transformative relationship; to the extent that 
the security dilemma is not current reality, it 
instead becomes self-fulfilling prophecy. The 
risk of presuming only misperceptions and 
miscommunications, however, is to depend 
too much on political accommodation for 
security and fail to close vulnerabilities that 
the other side might someday exploit – indeed, 
that might tempt the other side to cast off 
political restraints for that very purpose.   
 
Hence, the future of the U.S.-China 
relationship depends upon the wisdom of 
policy-makers and analysts not to follow a 
predisposition to conclude that either one of 
these concerns defines alone the core 
challenge of the relationship.  Success will lie 
in realizing the reality of both concerns and 
undertaking diligent efforts to untangle their 
manifestations in the issues of the day.  Nor is 
this simply a matter of distinguishing the 
military/security and civil/commercial sides of 
space activity; both areas manifest both 
genuine conflict and communication 
deficiencies.   
 
Finding this wisdom will be difficult for 
policy-makers in the U.S. and China to do on 
their own.  Both countries approach their 
encounters with one another with the 
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disposition of great powers, established in the 
one case, rising in the other.  These 
dispositions incline them to approach their 
relationship as independent and self-sufficient 
agents. 
 
Here is where the contribution of moderate 
powers, such as Canada, can be most 
contributory.  Moderate powers are as well 
acquainted with managing security dilemmas 
as with overcoming communication obstacles.  
More experienced with having the vicissitudes 
of international power thrust upon them, they 
are more attuned to the value of well-formed 
relationships to survival in an anarchic world.   
The U.S.-China relationship is more than ever 
a central feature in the Canadian conception of 
its own dealings with China.24  If the U.S.-
China relationship is the axis for the future of 
space security, Canada orbits it closely, and is 
suited to help the world understand and even 
stabilize how that axis spins.  As the human 
presence in space develops into an integral 
aspect of global life, stabilizing that space axis 
may prove to be the center of gravity of a 
stable future for life on Earth as well. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For a recent discussion, see Yuen Pau Woo and 
Wang Huiyao, “The Fortune in our Future,” Editorial, 
Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, June 23, 2009 
(http://www.asiapacific.ca/editorials/canada-asia-
viewpoints/editorials/fortune-our-future).  
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In 2006, I published an article entitled 
“Strategic Communication with China: 
What Message About Space?”1 The article 
pointed out that difficulties encountered in 
trying to convey its message regarding the 
Global War on Terror to a global audience 
had convinced the United States, or at least 
the Defense Science Board, that it needed to 
use strategic communications more 
effectively. From there I extrapolated, “If 
one believes that big problems are best 
tackled in small bites, ‘space’ perhaps offers 
an area where the United States can begin to 
understand and tackle some of the strategic 
communication issues it faces.”2 
Communication mishaps encountered in the 
space policy field, especially between the 
United States and China, made it ripe for 
improvement. Unfortunately, a review of 
both words and actions since 2006 reveals 
little headway has been made toward 
bettering U.S.-Sino communications on 
space related matters, and in fact in some 
ways the problem has worsened through 
second order unintended consequences.  
 
Communication issues were a thread 
running through discussions at the October 
2008 China, Space and Strategy Workshop 
sponsored by the Eisenhower Center in 
Vancouver.3  From the Chinese professing 
translation issues with such U.S. concepts as 
transparency, dual use, offense and defense, 
to a lack of official channels of 
communication existing between the U.S 
and China on the subject of space, 
communications clearly emerged as an issue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006), pp. 37-57. 
2 Ibid, p. 37. 
3 China, Space & Strategy, Workshop held October 
2008, Vancouver, Canada, sponsored by the 
Eisenhower Center for Space annd Defense Studies. 
meriting further consideration. In some 
instances, addressing conceptual confusion 
and linguistic imprecision may be primarily 
a matter of making the other party aware of 
the issue, and that is an effort well worth 
making. Other issues, such as sorting out 
which Chinese publications are reliable 
sources versus internal propaganda rags, will 
just take time. In some cases, such as setting 
up effective communications channels and 
mechanisms between China and the United 
States, it will be a matter of political will on 
both sides. Perhaps the most difficult areas 
to effectively address will be sensationalism 
and political spin for partisan or ideological 
goals, overcoming bureaucratic barriers, and 
policy inertia. Nevertheless, it will be in the 
best interests of the United States to 
recognize and deal with all of them.  
 
This article focuses on communication 
issues regarding U.S. assessments of 
Chinese space activities stemming from two 
general areas:  scholarly error, through 
either misinterpretation or “over-translation” 
of Chinese documents or just plain 
inaccuracy, and the continued sensationalist 
“spinning” of Chinese actions and events. 
The dangers of both were stated in the 2006 
article: “Why is it important that U.S. 
reports regarding China’s space program, 
capabilities and intentions be scrupulously 
researched and documented? First, analysis 
researched in support of a preordained 
conclusion is not analysis and is not useful 
to security planners. In fact, it can lead to 
dangerous miscalculations. Second, if a 
report is 98 percent valid and 2 percent 
based on erroneous interpretations or 
questionable sources, the credibility of the 
entire report is open to question. Credibility 
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is critical in communications.”4 I would now 
add a third reason to those -- potentially 
influencing analysts and policy-makers in 
other countries toward paths of action 
neither in their interests nor U.S. interests. 
The Obama administration requires sound 
information to make sound decisions. 
Further, restoring trust in America’s 
message will be a critical part of reviving 
America’s “brand” throughout the world, as 
the Obama administration has pledged to do.  
A recent U.S. government publication and 




U.S. China Commission on 
Economics and Security (UCSS) 
 
 
Research on the Chinese space program is 
difficult to say the least, and the Chinese 
make no effort to make it any less difficult 
for Westerners. Quite the contrary; a 
combination of a lack of openness to their 
own people in general, a policy process that 
outsiders, as well as insiders, cannot see or 
easily access, and a system of bureaucratic 
stovepipes narrowly restricting what 
individuals actually deal with makes silence 
the prudent path for individuals and 
organizations. In other words – it’s an 
authoritarian government and it’s hard to see 
inside. Add that to the inherent complexities 
of language translation and the situation for 
even experienced researchers is a 
challenging one at best. Nevertheless, the 
Internet and the multitude of new 
publication outlets offer Westerners access 
to far more information than in the past. In 
fact, part of the challenge now is not just 
getting information and trying to put it into 
some kind of usable context, long a 
problem, but sorting through information for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006), p. 43. 
 
what is useful and what is not. Some of the 
dangers of that problem and proclivities to 
ignore it were pointed out in the 2006 
article.  
 
Government documents such as the 
Department of Defense (DOD) Annual 
Report on the Military Power of the 
People’s Republic of China and the annual 
report of the U.S. – China Economic 
Security and Review Commission (USCC) 
are generally considered authoritative U.S. 
government sources. Neither, however, has 
been immune to difficulties regarding telling 
fact from fiction, or at least discrepancies 
regarding Chinese space activities. Both the 
fiscal year 2003 and 2004 Department of 
Defense (DOD) Annual Reports on the 
Military Power of the People’s Republic of 
China, for example, contained references to 
Chinese “parasite” satellites for potential use 
as ASATs that were later debunked.5  
 
The USCC is chartered by Congress to 
"monitor, investigate, and submit to 
Congress an annual report on the national 
security implications of the bilateral trade 
and economic relationship between the 
United States and the People's Republic of 
China, and to provide recommendations, 
where appropriate, to Congress for 
legislative and administrative action." It 
holds hearings and takes testimony from 
expert witnesses from which they base their 
report. These reports become cited as 
authoritative documents and are heavily 
relied upon by policy-makers to set future 
courses of action. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 David Wright and Gregory Kulacki, “A Military 
Intelligence Failure: The Case of the Parasite 
Satellite,” Union of Concerned Scientists, August 16, 
2004. 
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/parasi
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On May 20, 2008 the USCC held a hearing 
entitled "China's Proliferation Practices and 
the Development of its Cyber and Space 
Warfare Capabilities." In reviewing the 
testimony, Union of Concerned Scientists 
China Project Manager Gregory Kulacki, 
who was also instrumental in debunking the 
earlier parasite satellite claims, discovered 
three significant factual errors in the written 
testimony of one of the panelists. Because of 
the weight given this report by Congress, a 
memo was submitted to UCSS detailing 
those factual errors, along with references to 
sites and documentation where correct 
information could be found.6  
 
The first error referenced the Chinese 
Commission of Science, Technology and 
Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) 
as sitting “at the apex of China’s defense-
industrial complex.”  While COSTIND was 
undeniably an organization of considerable 
importance for Chinese military 
modernization in the past, it was officially 
dissolved in March 2008 by the People’s 
Congress, an event widely publicized in 
China. While other organizations will 
undoubtedly take up many COSTIND 
responsibilities, the point is the change 
should have been noted and explained in 
more detail. Further, the apex of China’s 
aerospace policy has always been the 
interagency “special committee” set up 
under the State Council, chaired by the 
Premier, which has been in place since the 
late 1950’s.  Understanding the 
organizational charts of China’s aerospace 
and policy structures has been and remains 
an important but often elusive goal for 
Western analysts, which makes it even more 
imperative that careful attention be made to 
assertions about them before groups like the 
USCC. 





The second error concerned a statement 
regarding “the recent demonstration of a 
mobile launch capability exemplified by the 
Pioneer rocket.” While there have been two 
attempted launches of the Pioneer rocket, 
one in both 2002 and 2003, neither has been 
successful.  In fact, it appears the program 
has been returned to the research and 
development phase because of the continued 
difficulties. If the Pioneer rocket tests had 
been successful that would certainly be 
worth noting to the USCC, but the fact 
remains that they were not, which is a matter 
of equal value for their considerations as 
well.  
 
It is likely the testimony statement was 
based on Western press reports such as one 
widely circulated from Agence France-
Presse, “China Develops its First Solid-Fuel 
Rocket.”7 Press reports called it successful 
and got away with it because they didn’t 
define success. The report only said “China 
has successfully test-fired its first four-stage 
solid-fuel rocket capable of putting small 
satellites into space on short notice, the 
Xinhua news agency reported Wednesday.”  
The test did not, however, produce a 
working missile. An article in the Chinese 
publication Engineering Science by Long 
Lehao (senior author) contains a critical 
passage clearly indicating China does not, at 
least as of 2006, have a Pioneer-like solid-
fueled carrier rocket for small, micro sat 
payloads to low earth orbit or medium earth 
orbit.8   
 
In all fairness, errors based on “what defines 
success” are common in many areas of 
space technology development assessment.  
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carried in REDORBIT NEWS 25 September 2003. 
http://www.redorbit.com/news/display/?id=8282  
8 Engineering Science, Vol 8 Number 11, November 
2006, p. 27. 
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A December 2008 U.S. missile defense test 
was widely billed by the Pentagon as 
“successful,” supposedly the seventh 
successful test from a total of twelve. Other 
analysts, however, have pointed out what 
constitutes “success” in missile defense tests 
seems to depend on what is counted.9 For 
example, whereas the Pentagon does not 
count tests where the interceptor fails to 
launch as tests, others argue it should – 
apparently feeling such a failure would 
“count” in an operational situation -  though 
that brings the percentage of “successful” 
tests down considerably. Also, while test 
parameters are set prior, not meeting those 
parameters does not necessarily mean the 
test will not be counted as successful. In the 
December 2008 test, “countermeasures”--a 
key element of the very complex missile 
defense system--were to be included. These 
countermeasures are defenses that an 
opponent would almost certainly employ to 
confuse the U.S. system. The 
countermeasures, however, failed to deploy, 
thereby negating at least part of the intended 
results of the test, and illustrating how 
“success” can sometimes be in the eye of the 
beholder, the sponsoring agency, or the 
press. 
 
Finally, the third error in the UCS testimony 
was found in the statement “Beijing still 
appears to lack a dedicated data relay 
satellite.”  Quite the contrary: Beijing had 
launched its first data relay satellite, the 
Tianlian 1, in April 2008 and it was placed 
in it final orbit several weeks before the 
testimony was given. Both the launch and its 
being successfully placed in its final orbit 
were widely reported in China. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Victoria Samson, “Missile Defense Success, a 





The difficulties for analysts in keeping up 
with Chinese space activities, organizational 
changes (especially since the basic Chinese 
organizational and policy structure is only 
nominally understood by Western analysts) 
and finding reliable sources and solid 
translations of Chinese sources should not 
be underestimated. It is very difficult. But 
that makes it even more important for 
government organizations issuing reports 
widely read by policy makers to be 
scrupulous in their interpreting and analysis.  
 
However, on page 158 of the USCC 2008 
Annual Report10 it states that “China’s 
Pioneer rocket has demonstrated a mobile 
launch capability” in turn citing the May 
2008 testimony, which the Commission had 
been notified was in error. It is always 
possible the Commission had different – and 
more accurate – sources, but none were 
cited. On the same page, however, the 
Commission does say that China had 
“launched its first data relay and tracking 
satellite in April 2008” thereby correcting 
one of the other errors. COSTIND is not 
mentioned in the report. Again, not only is it 
not useful to policy makers to be working 
from erroneous information, but the 
credibility of the entire report becomes 
questionable when clearly identified errors 
are reported as fact. 
 
The USCC report also reaches the 
conclusion that “Some experts in China are 
attempting to assert a view that China is 
entitled to sovereignty over outer space 
above its territory, contrary to international 
practice.”11 This conclusion might be 
considered an “over-interpretation” of 
Chinese documents – that is, reaching 
unwarranted conclusions based on dubious 
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foundations. The conclusion appears to be 
based on the writings of one People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) officer, Cai 
Fengzhen. According to the Commission 
report “…Cai Fengzhen contends that ‘the 
area above the ground, airspace and outer 
space are inseparable and integrated. They 
are the strategic commanding height of 
modern informationalized warfare.’ He 
admits, however, that ‘…there is no clear 
standard in international law as to the 
altitude to which territorial airspace 
extends.’”12  The report goes on to state that 
“If Cai Fengzhen’s interpretation represents 
the common view of the Chinese 
government and military officials, it differs 
dramatically from the U.S. position and 
interpretation of Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, also called the Outer Space Treaty 
of 1967.” The report does not, however, 
offer any evidence that Cai Fengzhen’s 
views do in fact represent those of the 
Chinese government.  It also provides no 
evidence that the Chinese reference to air 
and space being “inseparable and 
integrated” has sovereignty implications.  
Finally, China’s view of space sovereignty 
has not been challenged as inconsistent with 
those of other space powers based on any 
prior documents or articles, and this one 
article hardly seems conclusive of a policy 
change. 
 
The Commission raising concerns of China 
potentially impinging on the principles of 
the Outer Space Treaty regarding 
sovereignty could also be seen as 
hypocritical.  The United States has made it 
clear for years that it has no use for any kind 
of space treaty which restricts its use of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, 2008, 110th Congress, November 2008,  
p. 147. 
space, has not even been interested in 
revisiting ambiguous portions of the Outer 
Space Treaty for clarification (lest it result 
in more restrictions on the United States) 
and promulgated a National Space Policy in 
2006 that the Times of London called 
“…comically proprietary in tone about the 
U.S.’s right to control access to the rest of 
the solar system.” The Times further stated 
that, according to the 2006 National Space 
Policy, space was no longer the final 
frontier, but the fifty-first state of the United 
States. 13  Cai Fengzhen’s statement about 
the potential integration of ground, air and 
outer space seems to be the basis for raising 
the Commission raising the sovereignty 
issue, but that is curious as well. 
 
According to the Fact Sheet on the internet 
for the U.S. Air Force Warfare Center at 
Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, one of its 
specific tasks is to “Integrate air, space, and 
cyberspace capabilities, systems, forces and 
operations, in and through all domains, to 
deliver precise effects for the Joint Force 
Commander across the full range of military 
operations.” Could that be similarly over-
interpreted in China to mean that the U.S. 
Air Force, or the U.S, considers the area 
above the ground to be inseparable and 
integrated? Or what about the following? 
“Meanwhile, the Air Force has recently 
refocused on the concept of aerospace – a 
concept that defines air and space as a 
seamless operational medium and that 
strongly implies two things: the Air Force 
should be the lead service in this operational 
medium, and it should seek to control and 
apply force from this medium.”14 While it 
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the Universe, and Everything.” 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,30809-
2410592,00.html. 
14 Lt. Col. Peter Hays, USAF, Dr. Karl Mueller, 
“Going Boldly – Where? Aerospace Integration, the 
Space Commission, and the Air Force’s Vision for 
Space, Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 2001, p. 35. 
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could be argued that this statement refers to 
operational definitions only, according to the 
endnote in the USCC report, Cai Fengzhen’s 
quote was from book concerning integrated 
space operations as well.15 The point is, it is 
quite a leap from one quote to a conclusion 
that at least tacitly leads readers to believe 
that China may be seeking to claim space as 
part of its sovereign territory. Given the 
nebulous foundation for the USCC 
assertions regarding China’s position on 
space sovereignty – a statement regarding 
integration with other domains for 
operational purposes --  especially 
considering the U.S. position on the same 
issue, could raise questions as to the reason 
for raising the sovereignty issue at all. 
 
Similarly, the report links its concerns about 
Chinese views on sovereignty as they relate 
to space with concerns about China’s 
interpretation of the use of space for 
“peaceful purposes” as the Outer Space 
Treaty dictates. The concerns seem to focus 
on whether China considers “peaceful use” 
to mean “non-aggressive” or “non-military.” 
The debate on the meaning of “peaceful 
use” has a long tradition, with a variety of 
positions stated by numerous scholars in 
multiple countries, including both the United 
States and China. The Report goes on to say 
that “the majority of parties to the treaty 
interpret that language as meaning ‘non-
aggressive’ and not as a prohibition on 
military activities in space. According to the 
U.S. interpretation of this clause, ‘peaceful 
purposes’ allows defense and intelligence-
related activities conducted in the pursuit of 
national interests. China’s interpretation of 
the peaceful use of space seems inconsistent 
with its development of PLA space weapons 
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[Integrated Aerospace Operations] (PLA Press, 
Beijing: 2006) pp. 90-91 
programs.”16 This passage oversimplifies a 
topic which has kept scores of lawyers 
occupied for decades to an unbelievable 
degree.  
 
First, with 95% or more of space technology 
dual use – being of use to both the military 
and civilian communities, and within the 
military applications, having both offensive 
and defense uses – how does one define 
non-aggressive? And how does one define 
national interests? Traditionally, national 
interests are anything the defining country 
says they are. Those countries that defined 
“peaceful” as non-military in policy or 
legislation, such as Japan, have subsequently 
had to amend that policy or legislation, as a 
strict interpretation would mean that 
Japanese Defense Forces could not use 
satellites for communications. In 2008, the 
Japanese parliament approved legislation 
officially lifting a 1969 ban on the military 
use of outer space. Previously, Japanese 
Defense Forces had to creatively circumvent 
the prohibition through programs like 
Japan’s Information Gathering Satellites 
(IGS), exploiting the dual-use nature of the 
technology.17 Therefore, it is unlikely China 
would take such a literal stance. The leap 
from accepting “peaceful purposes” as a 
principle to be upheld from the Outer Space 
Treaty, however defined, to inconsistency 
between that principle and Chinese 
development of a space weapons program is 
puzzling at best. The United States has 
argued for years that it is impossible to 
define a space weapons, hence there can be 
no treaty to prohibit them, because the 
technology and its intended use – offense or 
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defense -- is too ambiguous. If one assumes 
that the space weapons program being 
referenced is the ASAT program 
demonstrated in 2007, then the United States 
possesses similar technology, as 
demonstrated in 2008 with the deliberate 
destruction of US-193, and it has no 
professed space weapons program either.  
All in all, the scholarly premises backing the 
2008 USCC Report, at least in some areas 
regarding space, seem less than rigorous and 
potentially even misleading. 
 
 




In September 2008 China, only the third 
country to obtain a human spaceflight 
capability, added more accolades to its 
roster of space accomplishments by 
successfully completing its first extra 
vehicular activity (EVA), or spacewalk. 
Taikonaut Zhai Zigang, wearing a Chinese 
developed spacesuit (as opposed to Russian 
made spacesuits worn on previous Shenzhou 
missions) waved the Chinese flag during his 
twenty minute spacewalk at about 845 
(GMT) on September 27, timed at least 
partially for good lighting to accommodate 
the carefully placed television cameras 
broadcasting the event live to an interested 
Chinese public.  Shortly after Zhai reentered 
the orbital module and the hatch was sealed, 
the miniaturized satellite BanXing 1, or 
CampanionSat, was released. The small 
cube, 16 inches on each side, carried two 
cameras and boost devices for maneuvering.  
Officially, the satellite's tasks included 
testing the mini-satellite technology, 
observing, monitoring and photographing 
the Shenzhou spacecraft, and testing the 
tracking and approaching technology 
required for future space rendezvous and 
docking missions. China has already 
announced plans for a space lab and space 
station, both of which would require 
rendezvous and docking technology, 
perhaps as early as Shenzhou 8.  
 
On October 31, Richard Fisher, Jr. published 
an editorial in the Asian Wall Street Journal 
entitled “China's Close Call”18 where Fisher 
raised the idea that BanXing’s mission was 
actually far more dangerous, and nefarious. 
An excerpt from the editorial is worth 
reproducing at some length, as it illustrates 
the kinds of problems being discussed: 
 
With minimal publicity -- let alone 
notice to any other government --  
Beijing's space ship passed unusually 
close to the International Space 
Station soon after the spacewalk. The 
event may offer a window into both 
China's space-based military 
aspirations and its willingness to be a 
good orbital citizen. On September 
27 at 3:07 p.m. Greenwich Mean 
Time, the Shenzhou-7 ship passed 
within 45 kilometers of the 
International Space Station, 
according to the U.S. Strategic 
Command. While the respective 
orbits ensured they would not 
collide, there was little margin for 
error. At that level of low-earth orbit 
objects travel at about 7.7 kilometers 
per second, and at that speed an 
object as small as five millimeters in 
diameter can inflict serious damage 
on the $100 billion space station, 
which at the time had two Russians 
and one American aboard. No one 
has offered a full explanation for 
why Beijing would do this. But 
China's track record of using all of 
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its Shenzhou missions since 1999 for 
dual military-civil missions justifies 
speculation that it might have been 
part of a test of a new antisatellite 
missile technology… [T]he launch of 
the BX-1 so near to the space station 
also could be considered a test of  
‘co-orbital’ antisatellite interception 
technology…The problem here is not 
that China is testing this kind of 
system per se.  Rather, it’s the 
irresponsible way in which it is 
doing so, if indeed this recent space 
mission was such a test. Chinese 
state television reported on October 
2 that “after the satellite was released 
by the Shenzhou-7 last weekend, it 
quickly started drifting away from its 
intended trajectory.” NASA has not 
responded to questions about the 
BX-1 ventured closer to the space 
station than the Shenzhou incident. 
Neither has Washington. 
 
Beyond his comment that the Shenzhou 
mission and BX launch were done “with 
little publicity”--a curious claim given 
extensive Chinese media coverage of the 
event for six months prior, including far 
more detail than ever provided before, there 
are at least four puzzling implications drawn 
in the full text of editorial, and previewed 
here: 1) Beijing lost control of its satellite 
upon release; 2) BX-1 intentionally came 
dangerously and irresponsibly close to the 
International Space Station (ISS); 3) BX-1 
was deliberately launched near the ISS as an 
antisatellite test and 4) NASA or 
Washington-at-large not commenting on 
these conjectures makes an (apparently) 
already suspicious event appear even more 
likely sinister. Ironically, the author also 
implies – says – that if this was an 
antisatellite test, that is not the problem, per 
se. But if it was an ASAT test, it is indeed a 
problem. Each of the implications deserves 
further attention. 
 
Mr. Fisher, an analyst for the International 
Assessment and Strategy Center, appears to 
conclude that Beijing lost control of the 
satellite after its release from a single CCTV 
International English-language broadcast 
where it was mentioned that controllers 
brought the BX-1 back under “active 
control.”  However, comparing the language 
of that broadcast with more extensive and 
detailed Chinese language media accounts, 
such as the September 25 television 
interviews with Shen Xuemin, the head of 
the institute that designed the BX-1 and Zhu 
Zhencai, the chief designer of the satellite, it 
becomes clear that China never lost control 
or communication with the BX-1. Brian 
Weeden, a technical consultant for the 
Secure World Foundation and a former Air 
Force officer with a background in space 
surveillance and ICBM operations, explains. 
“The BX-1 microsatellite was released from 
its resting position on top of the Shenzhou 7 
module.  This release was done via a spring, 
which is a very common method of 
deploying microsatellites due to its 
reliability and simplicity. At this point the 
BX-1 was not under active control and 
drifted away from the SH-7 to a maximum 
distance of around 100-200 kilometers after 
a few days…After the taikonauts had 
returned to Earth, the BX-1 was placed 
under active control and commanded back 
towards the orbital module, which had been 
left in orbit.  This period of drift followed by 
active control was part of the mission plan 
all along…unguided space release is a 
standard method of deployment for 
microsatellites used by many countries”19 
Hence the perils and potential of 
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misinterpreting the content of an ambiguous 
translation on a technical issue by a non-
technical analyst become evident. 
 
With regard to BX-1 coming intentionally 
and recklessly close to the ISS, again, 
technical experts and those who carefully 
followed the Chinese language information, 
seem to disagree with Mr. Fisher’s 
assessment.20 BX-1 came within around 25 
kilometers of the International Space 
Station, and the SH-7 came within 36 
kilometers of the ISS. But when thinking 
about spacecraft in orbits, there is more to 
consider than just distances.   The Shenzhou 
spacecraft and BX-1 were in orbits with a 
42.5 degree inclination, whereas the ISS 
orbit is at a 51.6 degree inclination. “This 
means that not only were they at different 
altitudes, but their orbits intersected at about 
a 10-degree angle. There was no danger of 
collision.”21 Furthermore, the Chinese have 
used 42 degree inclinations for past 
Shenzhou flights so unless they have been 
planning an ASAT test rendezvous with ISS 
for some time, Shenzhou’s orbit cannot 
really be considered evidence of anything 
unusual being intended. 
 
The third conjecture, that BX-1 was actually 
an ASAT test, also appears technically-
challenged. The ability to maneuver a 
spacecraft is certainly an enabling 
technology toward development of a co-
orbital antisatellite technology, where one 
spacecraft targets another for collision. But 
the lack of technical sophistication of the 
BX-1, such as an on-board guidance 
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21 Brian Weeden, “China’s BX-1 microsatellite: a 
litmus test for space weaponization,” The Space 
Review, 20 October 2008. 
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capability,22 seems to make BX-1 no more, 
in fact much less, an ASAT test than 
maneuvering demonstrations done by U.S. 
spacecraft such as the XSS-11 or the 
Demonstration for Autonomous Rendezvous 
Technology (DART). Given that China has 
already tested ground-based, kinetic-kill 
ASAT technology in 2006 – and found itself 
faced with international condemnation -- if 
BX-1 were a second test, the roar from 
Washington and other capitals would have 
been deafening, and rightfully so. 
 
Which leads to the last conjecture of 
concern: that NASA and Washington not 
commenting on technically challengeable 
conjectures implies that somebody is hiding 
something. That seems to be the political 
equivalent of asking someone if it’s true 
they don’t beat their wife. Regardless of the 
answer given, a disreputable implication has 
been raised likely to create a prism through 
which future events or characterizations are 
viewed, or worse yet, from which 
extrapolations will be made and potentially 
extended from speculation to urban legend 
to fact. Should the world draw any nefarious 
conclusions from the United States not 
commenting on the drifting of an apparently 
failed U.S. military satellite, believed to be 
Defense Support Program (DSP) 23, even 
when it approached other satellites?23 There 
are mechanisms in place to allow warnings 
to be provided to satellite operators if a 
collision between spacecraft appears likely, 
and if none were issued either when 
Shenzhou and ISS were close, or when the 
errant U.S. satellite was in the vicinity of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See:  David Wright and Gregory Kulacki, “Chinese 




23 Leonard David, “Russians Track Troubled U.S. 
Spy Satellite,” SPACE.com, December 2, 2008. 
http://www.space.com/news/081202-miitary-
satellite-drift.html 
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European Eumetsat weather satellite – then 
in both cases it must be assumed that 
nobody was worried. 
 
Additionally, whether there was an 
exchange of technical information between 
Washington and Beijing regarding the 
Shenzhou and ISS is unknown. There might 
have been. As pointed out, NASA does 
provide information to other countries 
regarding spacecrafts in orbit, and debris in 
orbit near spacecrafts.  China, however, has 
been known to be dubious about U.S. 
motives regarding past offers for data 
sharing and hence reluctant to ask or accept 
it. For example, just before the launch of 
Shenzhou 5, the first Chinese manned 
launch, NASA apparently offered data to 
Shenzhou officials.  At least some Chinese 
officials believed the late offer was made 
with the intent of delaying the launch data. 
Further, the Chinese have their own limited 
tracking capabilities which they continue to 
improve on – much to U.S. consternation, as 
those tracking facilities provide utility on a 
broader basis, potentially to the military as 
well, so they are not reliant on data from the 
United States. 
 
It is unfortunate that the degree of mistrust 
that exists between China and the United 
States on space issues. Certainly China 
needs to act as a responsible power in space, 
and the United States needs to do all it can 
to encourage such behavior, including 
stringently pointing out foolish and reckless 
acts, such as the creation of massive 
amounts of debris with the 2007 ASAT test. 
The U.S. also needs to note the development 
of new space technologies with potential 
military applications – such as the camera 
used on BX-1 to take imagery of the 
Shenzhou craft.  But analysts need to act 
with due diligence as well. The 1999 Cox 
Committee Report did lingering damage to 
U.S.-China relations through its stringing 
together of “revelations” regarding China 
and the U.S. aerospace industry: satellite 
manufacturers want their satellites to be 
launched successfully; rockets and missiles 
share technologies; and China was engaged 
in espionage.24 From those conclusions, 
apparently shocking to the Members of 
Congress and the Commission staff, 
including Richard Fisher, a panoply of new 
rules and regulations were set into place to 
prevent the transfer of sensitive technology 
to other countries, rules which continue to 
hinder the U.S. aerospace industry to no 
demonstrable benefit because customers 
simply buy it elsewhere, and U.S.-China 
relations were severed damaged. The Cox 
Report experience should be one we should 
all learn from: drawing dubious conclusions 
on weak evidence can lead to 
counterproductive results. Unfortunately, 
that lesson seems to remain elusive. 
 
On November 2, 2008, Indian analyst 
Sanjay Kumar, a Research Assistant at the 
Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation 
in New Delhi, published an editorial in the 
India Post entitled “China a threat to space 
assets of other nations,”25 which picks up 
on, and extends, Fisher’s conjectures. “The 
release of the micro-satellite from 
Shenzhou-7 and the unintended trajectory it 
gained immediately after its release but it 
was finally brought under control – have 
since left many unanswered questions with 
rising fears whether China could have done 
this with the intention of testing capabilities 
required to develop a co-orbital anti-satellite 
weapon.”26 Here is where doubtful 
conjecture can become very harmful. Kumar 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, 
Columbia University Press, 2007,  p. 156.  
25 Sanjay Kumar, “China a threat to space assets of 
other nations,” India Post, 2 November 2008. 
http://www.indiapost/article/perspective/4334  
26 Sanjay Kumar, “China a threat to space assets of 
other nations,” India Post, 2 November 2008. 
http://www.indiapost/article/perspective/4334 
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goes on to say that, “As China and India are 
engaged in strategic competition with each 
other, it is essential that India closely 
monitors China’s every move in space.” He 
also notes that Indian military has already 
created an Integrated Space Cell, which 
takes it one step closer to active rather than 
passive military space systems, possibly as a 
reaction to the Chinese 2007 ASAT test. 
While certainly prudence is in order on the 
part of the Indian government, does anybody 
think encouraging India to move toward 
active rather than passive military space 
systems is a good idea?  As the Mumbai 
tragedy just demonstrated, that part of the 
world is volatile enough, without potentially 






In November 2009, just prior to President 
Obama’s trip to China, Chinese air 
commander Xu Qiliang made public 
statements about the weaponization of 
space.  Since then, his comments have been 
subject to reinterpretation along both 
objective and subjective lines.  What did he 
actually say?  What did he actually mean?  
For those hoping that space cooperation with 
China would be a topic for high-level 
discussion, Xu’s statements certainly 
complicated any intended agenda.  
Deciphering intent is hardest when language 
is the only evidence to go on. 
 
Analysis of technically ambiguous dual-use 
technology, based on information obtained 
from ambiguous sources and reliant upon 
complicated, subjective translation is also 
difficult.  Mistakes happen to everyone and 
analysis is always subjective.  Both, 
however, make it imperative that analysts 
and institutions strive to assure that the 
public and decision-makers are provided 
with the most accurate and most objective 
information and analysis possible.  Some 
political analysts view technology 
development as inherently nefarious.  Others 
allow for perhaps too-benign interpretations.  
Clearly, however, engineers and scientists 
are best able to make the technical 
assessments from which political analyses 
should be based, to minimize both 
overreaction and underestimation of a 
potential threat.  Sound technical 
assessments and concise translations, taken 
within their intended context and with the 
source considered, provide the foundation 
for credible and hence useful political 
analyses.  Especially at a time when the 
Obama Administration is striving to rebrand 
America, having the world comfortable 
again with America’s assessments of others 
as fair and balanced will go a long way 
toward restoring trust.  As the India example 
points out as well, there can be dangerous 
unintended consequences to exaggerations 
and speculation that are not in the interests 
of the United States.  It is our common 
interest, and our common responsibility, to 
minimize such opportunities for 
misunderstanding.  
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A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE ON CHINA-UNITED STATES COOPERATION IN SPACE 
   
DINGLI SHEN 
 
This article describes the arrival of new space 
actors from Asia, with particular focus on 
China. It analyzes the lack of cooperation in 
civilian space programs between China and 
the United States (U.S.), and the possible 
negative consequence of this. The paper 
suggests that the principles of non-diversion 
and reciprocity in accession as the foundation 
for China-U.S. collaboration in the civilian 
sector of space collaboration. This paper 
addresses the ongoing defense program with 
space application by the two countries, 
suggesting an overall program for China and 
the U.S. to have dialogue,1 as well as 
collaboration in space areas, promoting 
mutual trust and confidence.2 
 
China as an Asian Actor 
 
Space programs are traditionally the realm of 
the two superpowers, the United States and 
the former Soviet Union, and Russia as its sole 
legal successor. These powers have dominated 
space exploration so far. Both of them have 
developed significant space programs and 
assets, and have endeavored great manned 
space exploration. The U.S. and Russian space 
programs have developed certain space 
stations, distinctive launch vehicles, and 
global position and navigation systems, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The then NASA Administrator Michael Griffin visited 
China in September 2006 and the two sides agreed to 
launch their first meeting for China-U.S. space 
cooperation. It was postponed to July 2008 in Beijing 
for China’s ASAT test, mainly to exchange information 
of respective space programs and to discuss future 
cooperation. The second meeting was scheduled to take 
place in Washington, DC, but China suspended all 
defense talks in November 2008 to protest U.S. 
weapons sale to Taiwan. 
2Theresa Hitchens and David Chen have analyzed the 
same issue. See “Forging a Sino-U.S. ‘grand bargain’ in 
space,” Space Policy 24: 3 (2008), pp. 128-131. 
name a few. Comparatively speaking, the 
American program is more advanced, for its 
success of the lunar landings, which Russians 
have not attained, and for its deep space 
exploration programs and advanced space 
telescope probing technologies. They are also 
two powers that have carried out military 
activities in space. 
 
In comparison, Europe is the other established 
space power, with the European Space 
Agency (ESA) having developed a number of 
space launchers, probes, vehicles, and the 
Galileo position and navigation system 
(pending further progress). Though space 
research has been long dominated by the 
aforementioned three players, more countries 
have lately joined civilian space exploration.3 
Asian states have been recently intensely 
engaging in space competition.4 
 
In particular, Japan, China, and India are the 
three key Asian states. Japan started its lunar 
journey by sending spacecraft Hiten in 1991, 
though without great success. However, after 
experiencing a series of setbacks in testing its 
rockets, Japan successfully launched its 
Kaguya lunar explorer on 14 September 2007, 
ahead of China and India in sending their own 
moon orbiters. 
 
China started its civilian space program in 
1956 and accelerated its pace since entering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Marc Kaufman, “U.S. Finds It's Getting Crowded Out 
There; Dominance in Space Slips as Other Nations Step 
Up Efforts,” Washington Post (8 July 2008). 
4Shen Dingli, “One Small Step for China…,” 
ChinaStakes.com (30 November 2008), 
www.chinastakes.com/story.aspx?id=74 (accessed 2 
February 2009); and Trefor Moss, “The Asian space 
race”, Jane’s Defense Weekly (24 October 2008), 
http://www.janes.com/news/defence/systems/jdw/jdw0
81024_1_n.shtml (accessed 2 February 2009). 
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the 1990s. Since 1999, China has successfully 
launched seven Shenzhou spacecrafts, with 
manned space missions and China’s 
taikonauts conducting extravehicular activities 
(EVA). On 24 February 2007, China launched 
its first lunar orbiter, Chang’e-1 (phase one of 
Chang’e project). It is understood that China 
has planned to send its first space station– 
Tiangong-1 (Sky Palace)– in 2010, and fulfill 
its own manned landing on the Moon, 
possibly by 2024, during the fourth stage of 
Chang’e project. 
 
India has robust rocket industry and missile 
programs. Though India’s space program 
started late, it is accelerating its pace. On 22 
October 2008, India successfully shot its first 
lunar orbiter Chandrayaan-1 into space. India 
has planned to execute its first manned Moon 
landing by 2020, four years ahead of reported 
Chinese plan. 
 
Obviously there emerges a space race among 
the three Asian states. Among them, China 
seemed to have started the earliest, while 
Japan and India are following closely. So far, 
they have demonstrated different features in 
terms of their space programs and 
achievements. Roughly within a year, all of 
them launched their respective first lunar 
orbiter successfully, with each possessing 
quite advanced launch capability for space 
vehicles. 
 
Comparing the three Asian space powers, 
China is the only country that has commanded 
human spaceflight through Shenzhou 
spacecrafts, demonstrating both EVAs and 
remarkable retrieval technology of spacecraft. 
China has the best record of successful launch 
of spacecrafts and possesses a young 
generation of engineers engaged in research 
and development (R&D) and commanding 
space program implementation. Japan is 
relatively advanced in its overall science and 
technology strength. Though Japan’s launch 
record is unimpressive as of yet, it has 
comparatively good technology of satellite 
and probing devices. As far as India is 
concerned, it has a strong national consensus 
in pushing lunar probes forward. India’s space 
program is the most cost-effective compared 
to China and Japan. 
 
The rapid advancement of civilian space 
programs of the aforementioned Asian states 
is enabled by some international cooperation. 
Japan’s space program has received assistance 
from the U.S., while Russia helped China and 
India to some extent. More recently, the U.S. 
is interested in working with the Indians to 
promote their civil space program.5 The 
Chinese have sought cooperation with 
America on civilian space exploration, but the 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) has not responded 
positively so far.6 
 
The U.S. unwillingness or indecision to 
cooperate with China in civil space enhances, 
rather than reduces, China’s apprehensions of 
American distancing, if not isolating, China’s 
civilian space program. It has also been 
observed by China that the Bush 
Administration pushed hard to cooperate with 
India on civilian nuclear cooperation, by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5Dwayne A. Day, “The new path to space: India and 
China enter the game”, Space Review (13 October 
2008), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1231/1 
(accessed 2 February 2009). 
6It is understood that NASA has tried, but failed to 
obtain, Bush Administration approval of an overture to 
China for a cooperative U.S.-China space mission, 
according to NASA Administrator Michael Griffin. The 
White House believed that a higher level of cooperation 
is too great a reward to China for its human rights and 
arms export behavior. See Craig Covault, “Bush 
Administration Nixed NASA's U.S.-China Cooperation 
Idea,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (21 
December 2008), http://www.nasa.gov/about/highlights 
/griffin_bio.html (accessed 2 February 2009). Also, see 
Marc Kaufman, “NASA’s Star Is Fading, Its Chief 
Says; In Leaked E-Mail, He Rails About Budgetary 
Tensions and Feared Rise of China,” Washington Post 
(14 September 2008). 
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withdrawing a longstanding code of non-
cooperation with any non- Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) state− a principle 
to establish Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG) in 
the aftermath of India’s nuclear test in 1974. 
U.S. collaboration with India on nuclear and 
space programs is in sharp contrast to the 
“cool” U.S. stance with China. 
 
The U.S. orientation to India is understood in 
China as a means to leverage U.S.-India 
cooperation to counterbalance China’s rise as 
a space and military power. While U.S.-India 
space cooperation may render a certain edge 
to India in the trilateral space competition in 
Asia, China is not idle. In the race of 
unmanned lunar orbiters, China lost to Japan 
to be first. It is hard to imagine that China is 
willing to be behind India’s human spaceflight 
ambitions. Further, it is foreseeable that the 
Asian space race could only be more intense 
in the next decade, and China would adjust its 
schedule to keep its overall lead in civil space, 
especially in relation to India.7 
 
Consequence of Non-Cooperation 
 
The U.S. is unwilling to collaborate with 
China on civilian space exploration, most 
likely to protect its dual-use space technology 
and for fear of China’s space development for 
military ends.8 China’s success of an anti-
satellite (ASAT) test on 11 January 2007 
exacerbates the U.S. Department of Defense 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7See Peter Brown, Asia Times Online (12 November 
2008) “China needs sharper eyes in space,” 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JJ16Ad02.html 
(accessed 2 February 2009), and “China fears India-
Japan space alliance,” (12 November 2008), 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JK12Df02.h
tml (accessed 2 February 2009). 
8So far, America has maintained a significant lead in 
space science and technology.  It has sent twelve 
astronauts to the Moon. 
(DOD) concern of a Chinese space weapons 
program.9 
 
China and the U.S. have had a complex 
relationship. Even in the least sensitive areas, 
such as economics and trade, the large amount 
of two-way trade volume has been developed 
to suit the needs of the two countries. China’s 
economic opening has increased its 
dependence upon the world that promotes 
mutual stake-holding between China and the 
rest of the world. The U.S. has been 
cooperating at the strategic level, promoting 
mutual understanding to lessen the likelihood 
of confrontation across the Pacific, and at 
business level, promoting economic common 
goods for the benefit of the two sides plus the 
Asia-Pacific community. 
 
American businesses have been investing in 
China for the last three decades, given 
Chinese governmental protection of foreign 
investment and inexpensive labor force and 
various investment incentives. This cuts the 
investment costs and brings more competitive 
strength to U.S. companies. While American 
investors benefit, U.S. laborers do lose jobs 
due to manufacturing outsourcing. 
 
Therefore, cooperation and competition go in 
parallel. This applies to not only economy, but 
also to the security area, defense sector, and 
dual-use field where civilian and military 
application of the same technology could be 
intertwined given the nature of the 
technology– for instance, space technology is 
such an example. 
 
To protect the U.S. civilian space technology 
from being diverted through cooperation, 
America could pay a cost of distancing China 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9Shen Dingli, “China’s Defensive Military Strategy: the 
Space Question,” Survival 50: 1 (2008), pp. 170-176; 
and David Sands, “China, India Hasten arms race in 
space: U.S. dominance challenged,” Washington Times 
(25 July 2008). 
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and forcing China to develop some similar 
technology relatively independently, while 
sustaining mutual suspicion in respective 
intentions in space exploration. The U.S. runs 
the risk that there will be less of a possibility 
to negotiate an internationally acceptable 
norm of conduct to control the spread of 
military space technology in the world. 
 
Even without American cooperation, China 
has sent seven Shenzhou spacecrafts already to 
the space, and it is aspiring to send Chinese 
taikonauts to the Moon. Although China has 
to experience a technically difficult path, it is 
still something independently doable for 
China. The outcome of lack of space 
cooperation could only lead to a slower pace 
of program progress, but not fundamentally an 
inability to move forward for a country like 
China that trains millions of new scientists and 
engineers a year. 
 
For instance, during the Cold War, the U.S. 
never assisted China in China’s civilian and 
military nuclear programs, but China 
independently attained both technologies. The 
Soviet Union used to assist China in acquiring 
nuclear weapons technology, but China has 
mastered it mainly through its own efforts. At 
one point, China did request technology of 
Permissive Action Links (PALs) from 
America in the 1990s, but the U.S. did not 
permit. Eventually, China could have received 
it from Russia.10 
 
China is a resourceful country. With a base 
population at 1.3 billion in the mainland, the 
country generates over 6 million university 
graduates a year at present. Given proper 
policy guidance and resource allocation, the 
country could have unlimited talents to tap, 
which promises success in these high-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10“China's Nuclear Imports and Assistance From 
Abroad,” http://www.nti.org/db/china/nimport.htm 
(accessed 2 February 2009). 
technology programs with or without 
international cooperation. 
 
At the same time, even if America is unwilling 
to cooperate with China, this does not close 
China’s opportunities to access to other 
channels for international cooperation.11 In 
1950s, the Soviet Union used to supply China 
with technologies of nuclear weapons and 
advanced conventional weapons, and train 
Chinese military scientists. Presently, Russia 
is supplying China with advanced weaponry, 
plus space aviation technology, and trains 
Chinese technical personnel as well.12 This 
builds Sino-Russian strategic trust and helps 
release strategic resources that China would 
otherwise reserve to counter threats from the 
former Soviet Union. 
 
While the non-cooperation of America on 
civilian space technology could potentially 
slow the pace of Chinese space exploration, 
American strategic interests in securing 
Chinese understanding and willingness to 
assist in global security and regional stability 
could also be met less readily. As long as the 
U.S. hedges against China on civilian high-
technology cooperation, America is prompting 
China that the US is not China’s close friend, 
and does not deserve China’s assistance 
wholeheartedly. 
 
Terrorism has constituted the paramount threat 
to America in the past decade, but this is 
apparently not the case for China. China is 
certainly threatened by terrorism, but this 
threat is far less comparing with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11China has maintained international cooperation 
programs in civil space programs. A recent conference 
in Vancouver, Canada discussed China’s space strategy 
and the need and possibility of Canada’s space 
cooperation with China. See, “Engaging China on 
Space: Implication for Canada” in this issue of Space 
and Defense. 
12It is understood that Russia has supplied nine 
spacesuits to China, and provided full technical support 
to China’s first space walk. 
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magnitude of the threat to America. In a 
similar vein, the level of perceived threat to 
China and America, due to nuclear 
development of North Korea and Iran, is quite 
different. North Korea and Iran are friendly to 
China and they do not intend to threaten China 
with their nuclear capacity. It is China that can 
harm its relationship with them through the 
argument and practice of nonproliferation. So, 
Chinese strategists could decide to which level 
China could render security to America in 
terms of nonproliferation, depending upon 
how the U.S. treats China’s interests in 
promoting its civilian high technologies, 
including civilian space technology. 
 
Under the Bush Administration, the U.S. 
government identified major threats to 
America in the following sequence: 
international terrorism; proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and 
delivery means; regional instability; and the 
emergence of new powers such as India, 
Russia, and China.13 The Bush Administration 
did not view the rise of China as the arch 
threat to America, and in fact China and the 
U.S. share interests in defeating the first three 
categories of threat− terrorism, proliferation, 
and instability. However, in terms of 
magnitude of such threats to China and the 
U.S., their levels of intensity are quite 
different. It would be quite unnatural that the 
U.S. shall expect China’s security 
cooperation, while China would not be 
satisfied with American cooperation in other 
areas, including the willingness that America 
has demonstrated in bringing civilian nuclear 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13White House, The National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America, September 2002; and White 
House, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, March 2006. 
Collaboration with Confidence 
 
The U.S. might not be totally unwilling to 
collaborate with China on civilian space 
cooperation, provided that dual-use space 
technology would not be diverted through 
cooperation, and that reciprocity of 
cooperation will be ensured so as to promote 
transparency of respective program.14 This is 
directly related to the assumption that U.S.-
China cooperation will not be harmful to 
America. While honesty is at stake when the 
collaborators may assure each other, it is even 
more crucial to have a system in place that 
would lead the least to be diverted in a 
harmful manner. 
 
Therefore, to attain bilateral cooperation of 
civilian space program, the principles of non-
diversion and reciprocity ought to be imposed. 
Accordingly, designing a regime of such 
cooperation will be highly desirable. Short of 
this, such cooperation will lead to nowhere 
and could only be viewed as a liability to each 
other. The Cox Report of 1999 issued by the 
U.S. Congress served such an example in the 
sense that: sensitive cooperation between the 
two countries in dual-use technology areas 
ought to be properly evaluated and approved; 
and there existed cases where Chinese side 
was alleged to have diverted dual-use 
technology imported from America for 
defense purpose other than what was initially 
applied for.15 
 
The issue of concern herein in this paper is not 
to deliberate about the events described by the 
Cox Report, but rather discuss how to design a 
system in which the alleged diversion of dual-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14Jürgen Scheffran, “Dual-Use in a New Security 
Environment: The Case of Missiles and Space,” 
INESAP Information Bulletin 26 (June 2006), pp. 48-
53. 
15U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial 
Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Select 
Committee, United States House of Representative, 
Washington, D.C., 1999. 
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use technology could not take place 
physically. As far as dual-use items are 
transferred, it is not difficult to deter a 
diversion. This can be accomplished by post-
transfer visiting, by posting personnel 
regularly or irregularly on site, and/or by long-
distance monitoring through camera, or a 
combination of all these schemes. 
 
For civilian space cooperation, what could 
then be the potential area of cooperation? 
Potential areas could include, among others, 
joint endeavors in design, training, flight and 
programs, and more general technology 





For the next 10 to 15 years, China’s civilian 
space program will focus on both lunar 
exploration and space station development and 
systems, and China would welcome American 
cooperation in assisting China’s design of 
these systems. In terms of manned Moon 
landings, that would entail advanced 
technology in soft landing and taking-off from 
the Moon. For space station, it will involve 
chamber design, life sustenance, space 
connecting, Earth-space shuttling. The U.S. 
has accumulated significant experiences in all 
these areas. 
 
It is likely that the U.S. needs to protect its 
launch, energy, sensing, space communication 
technologies, and software for space 
programs. In this case, China has accumulated 
some experiences already in these critical 
technologies, and shall work on them more or 
less independently. For areas as energy thrust, 
remote sensing, and telecommunication, 
where duality of technologies is apparent, both 
sides shall make it clear that neither side 
might have chance to access to the details of 
each other’s technologies or know-how. For 
technologies less sensitive, the U.S. may shed 
some light to the Chinese on the principle of 
reciprocity of understanding the 




China has already built its training academy 
and facilities, so this may not be a highly 
sensitive area for cooperation. However, to 
have astronauts to participate in the training 
program of each other could help build mutual 
understanding of training systems and culture, 
hence increasing trust building and familiarity 
with each other’s system. This shall be helpful 
in future development and maintenance of 
joint programs, such as a possible joint space 
station. Such cooperation might be conducted 
in mock space capsules as well, leading each 
other to understand some design philosophy, 





When reaching proper level of political trust 
between China and the U.S., the two countries 
may aspire to set up joint crew on-board each 
other’s spacecraft, or invite the other to a 
multilateral flight setting. This would assure 
even wider understanding of space operation 
culture of each other, and build great team 
work of astronauts of the two countries. More 
importantly, such missions carry significant 
political message of more genuine Sino-U.S. 
political and scientific cooperation. Certainly 
critical technologies will be less able to be 
protected during the operation, but exact 




Joint programs could involve a combined 
space station, or joint venture of such from the 
beginning. Even joint space exploration could 
be contemplated, given the availability of 
respective financial and technical resources. 
Space and Defense, Winter 2009 
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Space scientists could develop many ideas of 
innovative experiments in the space, and 
execute various missions of different 
purposes. Given the rapid progress of space 
programs of Japan and India, these Asian 
countries could envisage Asian cooperation in 
joint space exploratory missions, and America 
could develop wider space cooperation with 




An even longer list of potential cooperation 
could be developed. The U.S. needs not 
necessarily be afraid of seeing technology 
flowing to China. Given China’s growth of 
domestic technology in the next decade, 
America can benefit from such cooperation 
with China that promises to emerge as a new 
major power generating indigenous advanced 
technology. After all, the build-up of political 
trust and scientific exchange will help build a 
new type of cooperative partnership between 
China and the U.S. 
 
Defense Component:  
The Deterrence Context 
 
While China-U.S. cooperation on civilian 
space programs is desirable to generate 
peaceful common goods collaboratively, and 
to help nurture political trust, it is also an 
imperative that the two countries avoid a 
defensive, or offensive, race that will extend 
to outer space. China’s ASAT test in January 
2007 demonstrated the extent of distrust that 
exists presently between the two states.16 
 
This entails careful scrutinizing in terms of its 
strategic context. While China has been under 
pressure for its ASAT test, it has its own logic 
in conducting this experiment. From a Chinese 
perspective, it is an important step to preserve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “China Tests 
Anti-Satellite Weapon, Unnerving U.S.,” New York 
Times (18 January 2007). 
its critical strategic deterrence at a time of 
American quest for space monopoly. 
 
In China’s view, it is the U.S. drive of space 
weaponization that is troubling. On the surface 
of the Earth, the balance of international 
relations is presently preserved by a certain 
delicate balance of strategic deterrence 
amongst major powers. Such balance has been 
established among the U.S., Russia, and 
China. Even though China has a rather small 
nuclear deterrent comparing with that of the 
U.S., China’s deterrence is effective– with 
China’s dispersive basing mode− and without 
a version of America’s national missile 
defense or space-based missile defense.  This, 
in turn, reassures China its ultimate security in 
the context of U.S.-China relations. 
 
In history, China used not to be advocates of 
pursuing nuclear weapons. Chinese leadership 
had termed nuclear bombs as “paper tigers,” 
despite the devastating power the American 
atomic bombs had demonstrated against 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, when the 
U.S. openly challenged China’s security in 
1950s, China made its mind to go nuclear in 
January 1955. These events had prompted 
China to bid for nuclear weapons– the U.S. 
threatened to bomb China with American 
nuclear bombs during the Korean War, during 
artillery shell exchange between Amoy and 
Kinmon/Matsu islands, and during China’s 
assistance to Vietcong’s Battle of Dien Bien 
Phu.17 In less than 10 years, China secured its 
initial atomic weapons; in October 1964, 
China tested its first bomb in Gobi Desert 
successfully. 
 
Though America may not be interested in 
accepting Chinese nuclear weapons status, the 
fact that China has established a small 
strategic deterrent has helped stabilize China-
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U.S. relations. This has restrained American 
freedom of action vis-à-vis China. The U.S. 
has to ponder now the military and political 
consequences of waging a war with China, 
given the possibility that China developed an 
effective countervalue retaliatory capacity. 
 
This is particularly relevant in the context of 
the Taiwan issue. China considers Taiwan a 
historical part of it and views that it has the 
sovereign right to handle it with whatever 
means. Presently, the U.S. is committed to the 
defense of Taiwan. Hence, there exists a vast 
difference in Chinese and American positions 
on Taiwan. After China obtained nuclear 
weapons in 1964, the U.S. has not publicly 
threatened China with nuclear bombs anymore 
to China’s satisfaction. 
 
China has purposefully chosen a minimum 
deterrence strategy, to attain the effect of 
deterrence, while least affecting the status 
quo. Initially, China opted for this path due to 
economic strain and moral concern. Over 
time, China has still adhered to it despite its 
improvement of economy.18 It might be true 
that China is modernizing its strategic forces 
by introducing certain new launch platforms, 
and even experiencing its own version of 
science-based stewardship program of nuclear 
warhead modernization under the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
regime, but it has officially refrained from 
pursuing a massive nuclear modernization. 
 
China’s self-restrain vindicates its belief in the 
limited political utility of nuclear weapons. 
China believes that it can handle international 
relations primarily with overall national 
strength, with nuclear weapons only serving to 
deter their first use by another party. Though 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18Information Office of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China, “China's National Defense in 
2008,” January 2009, Beijing. The White Paper has 
reiterated China’s no-first-use policy of nuclear 
weapons. 
such nuclear first attack could never be 
excluded, its real chance of first use is highly 
improbable. As long as China does not aspire 
to pursue an aggressive global policy, it is 
unnecessary to build a full-scale counterforce 
capability and a limited deterrence strategy is 
sufficient. 
 
Space: New Balance of Power 
 
There exists an unsymmetrical balance of 
nuclear deterrence between China and the 
U.S. over the past half a century. On the one 
hand, with the fast process of globalization as 
well as China-U.S. economic integration, the 
worst-case scenario of a nuclear confrontation 
between the two countries is very remote. On 
the other hand, in a realistic world where the 
nation-state is still the dominant unit to 
account for interstate relations, the nuclear 
power is far from being eliminated from 
international politics. It is against this 
backdrop, and given the push of the Clinton 
Administration for national missile defense 
and the Bush Administration effort of space 
weaponization, that China views the 
effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence eroding 
since the 1990s. 
 
America’s logic of building missile defense is 
the expanding threat of missile proliferation. 
Indeed, there is a phenomenon of missile 
proliferation around the world. America and 
other Western countries used to share missiles 
among their friends. Given the spread of 
missiles in the developing world, the West has 
spearheaded international control of missile 
transfer, making various codes of conducts, 
such as Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR). 
 
In this regard, China and the U.S. have 
developed a complex relationship. China used 
to export conventional missiles to states in 
Middle East and South Asia, including Sandi 
Arabia and Pakistan. Under U.S. pressures and 
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sanctions, China has modified its behavior 
throughout the 1990s, making more stringent 
commitment to refraining from such transfers. 
 
In the meantime, the U.S. has continued 
weapons sale to Taiwan, which is viewed by 
China as provocative. Ideological differences 
aside, the thorny issue of Taiwan’s quest for 
independence, China’s vow to thwart a de jure 
independence by Taiwan, as well as 
America’s threat through intervention in 
accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, all 
bode ill for a physical confrontation between 
China and the U.S. China therefore deems an 
effective nuclear deterrence, despite its 
moderate size, necessary to keep America 
more cautious. Nevertheless, national missile 
defense, as well as ambitious space 
militarization by the U.S. DOD, serves to 
neutralize the effectiveness of China’s 
deterrence. 
 
China has raised, time and again, the 
seriousness of such development, in violation 
of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and 
other international treaties to ban space 
weaponization.  For much of the 1990s, China 
had been working in the United Nations-based 
Conference on Disarmament, to propose to set 
up an ad hoc committee negotiating an 
international instrument on the “prevention of 
arms race in outer space” (PAROS), and even 
has attempted to link this to the American 
initiative to negotiate a separate international 
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).19 
Under the Bush Administration, in particular, 
China’s efforts were in vain– America 
abrogated the ABM, embarked on an 
aggressive space weapons program, and 
opposed PAROS. This may change with the 
Obama Administration in the U.S. that has 
called for “a worldwide ban on weapons that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See, “Chinese CD PAROS Working Paper”, February 
8, 2000, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No.43, 
January-February 2000, http://www.acronym.org.uk/ 
dd/dd43/43paros.htm. 
interfere with military and commercial 
satellites.”20 
 
International politics have prompted China to 
take realistic responses in kind, to attain 
“mutually assured space vulnerability.”21 
Though China has voiced opposition to space 
weapons, it is understood that it might have 
kept its own R&D program of such. In regard 
to the January 2007 ASAT test, which created 
international repercussions, China has 
promised not to repeat tests.22 However, this 
may not allay concerns over China’s 
continuing effort to build a space-based 
defense capability to offset American 
unilateral superiority that threats the 
effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.23 
 
If the history of nuclear proliferation serves 
any lessons, the current initiation of a space 
race of a military nature ought to be avoided 
as early as possible. America’s pursuit of 
absolute security through dominating space 
will only pressure other countries, China and 
India, for instance, to join this expensive 
competition. Will the U.S. Government realize 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20See http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/defense 
(accessed 2 February 2009). “The Obama-Biden 
Administration will restore American leadership on 
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interfere with military and commercial satellites. They 
will thoroughly assess possible threats to U.S. space 
assets and the best options, military and diplomatic, for 
countering them, establishing contingency plans to 
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21Eric Hagt, “Mutually Assured Space Vulnerability”, 
China Security 2: 2 (2006), pp.  84-106. 
22“Chinese authority promised to the U.S. that it would 
not test missile against satellite again,” China Times (in 
Chinese), Taipei, 27 October 2008. 
23For more description from a Western perspective, see 
Ashley J. Tellis, “China’s Military Space Strategy,” 
Survival 49: 3 (2007): 41–72, and “Punching the U.S. 
Military’s ‘Soft Ribs’: China’s Anti-satellite Weapon 
Test in Strategic Perspective,” Policy Brief 51, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
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D. Shen, A Chinese Perspective on China-US Cooperation in Space 
 
 73 
that it is highly undesirable to quest for space 
monopoly through building a military capacity 
vis-à-vis space? 
 
Recommendations: Packaged Program 
of Cooperation 
 
It is highly undesirable and unhelpful if China 
and the U.S. would enter a military space race, 
while being unable to collaborate in civilian 
space cooperation.24 In fact, the more they 
hedge against militarily, the less likely the two 
countries will endeavor to undertake civilian 
cooperation as it intrinsically carries a 
possibility of dual-use diversion. Reversely, 
the build-up of political and military trust shall 
help nurture cooperation in civilian and dual-
use space programs. 
 
To this end, China and the U.S. ought to 
address their political objectives and security 
concerns frankly and aspire to collaborate 
strategically. The change of the international 
political and economic climate– President 
Obama’s distancing to missile defense and 
support to prevent space weaponization, 
global call to nuclear zero (an elimination of 
nuclear arms), improvement of political ties 
across the Taiwan straits after Ma Ying-jeou’s 
coming into power, and ongoing global 
financial crisis and subsequent need for 
cooperation– sheds some hope for a better 
China-U.S. space relationship. 
 
In fact, President Obama’s political view of 
missile defense is quite different from his 
predecessor, but echoed President Clinton.25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24Bruce W. MacDonald, “China, Space Weapons, and 
U.S. Security,” Council on Foreign Relations Special 
Report 38, New York, September 2008; and Peter 
Brown, “A fresh start or a protracted showdown?” Asia 
Times Online (3 December 2008), 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JL03Ad01.html 
(accessed 2 February 2009). 
25William Walker, “President-elect Obama and Nuclear 
Disarmament: between Elimination and Restrain,” IFRI 
Security Studies Paper, Winter 2009. 
During his presidential campaign, Obama had 
voiced distance with missile defense.26 As 
President, he has asked for prudence in regard 
to the current program, somehow relieving 
tensions with Russia. Obama may have not 
expected that his cautious position could 
soften China’s strategic suspicion of the U.S. 
as well, and, in turn, can make America safer 
if he can help foreclose Chinese development. 
 
In fact, Obama could decide not only to hold-
off on further American missile defense and 
space weapons programs, but also lead an 
effort to global nuclear disarmament effort. 
Though it is still distant to foresee a nuclear 
weapons free world, a world with thousands 
of deployed U.S. strategic weapons could only 
harm America− there is no enemy at that 
magnitude to check and too many nuclear 
weapons only make America less able to 
demand that North Korea and Iran abandon 
their nuclear aspirations.27 
 
President Obama could lead to both curtail 
American nuclear defense and offense, but 
still enhance America security significantly. 
The U.S. freeze of strategic defense shall help 
speak to China to suspend Chinese programs 
and ambitions of a similar nature. China has 
appreciated the Bush Administration’s 
distancing of Chen Shui-bian government in 
Taiwan in 2008, when the political campaign 
eventually led to the change of leadership to 
Ma Ying-jeou. The U.S. political gesture helps 
assure China that America has no strategic 
intention to confront China. It will be 
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has to be proven to work before being deployed, and 
the system in Europe has to be supported by allies. See, 
“Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q&A: 
President-elect Barack Obama,” Arms Control Today, 
December 2008. 
27See, George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. 
Kissinger, and Sam Nunn，“A World Free of Nuclear 
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desirable if the Obama Administration will 
carry this momentum to build a cooperative 
partnership with China, including 
collaboration with the current financial crisis 
and strategic space exploration. 
 
China-U.S. talks on space relations could 
possibly include three elements that are 
highlighted below. 
 
1. At political level, China and the U.S. 
should re-affirm that space will be 
preserved only for peaceful purpose of all 
mankind. At present, both sides shall 
freeze space weapons programs at current 
levels in a transparent way. Such a 
commitment would not cut U.S space 
defense programs and would help assure 
that China would not make progress in this 
regard. The U.S. has been worrying that 
China could challenge America’s space 
dominance by laser blinding of space 
sensors, disrupting space-based 
communications, and launching ASAT 
weapons to destroy orbital satellites. China 
shall benefit in a similar fashion. 
 
President Obama would run a major risk in 
his Presidency if he would push American 
missile defense and space weapons 
programs forward. In doing so, Obama 
could pressure countries like China to 
respond in kind and they could afford such 
response financially and technically. 
Eventually, America would not end with a 
safer world, but open up outer space as a 
new frontier to militarily compete. This 
would be a strategic mistake as America 
might not be able to sustain its space 
dominance in the new century anymore. 
 
2. The U.S. and China shall address threats 
of mutual and common concern in a 
collaborative way, especially to tackle 
missile proliferation in the context of 
building trust for space cooperation. The 
rise of China with an ever apparent global 
presence is increasingly exposed to an 
international environment of missile 
threats. As such, China and the U.S. shall 
define more common interests in dealing 
with missile threats together, and be able 
to understand and accept some kind of 
point or area missile defense. Over time, 
the Bush Administration’s Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) may be more 
acceptable in building security cooperation 
and trust, while catering to China’s 
concern of PSI’s compatibility with 
existing international legal system and 
practice, especially in the context of North 
Korea. China and the U.S. may find a way 
to constructively address their respective 
national security in dealing with the level 
of acceptability of mutual missile 
vulnerability. 
 
3. China and the U.S. could set moderate 
goals in civil space cooperation, on the 
aforementioned two principles of non-
diversion and reciprocity. Initial stages of 
civil space cooperation could include joint 
academic endeavors to address civil space 
objectives, space personnel safety, space 
debris, and space science and medicine. 
Various space education efforts, such as to 
launch joint student summer camps for 
space science, space modeling, and space 
vehicle design could be considered. 
 
The two countries could design some civil 
space exchange programs that would lead 
to least disclosure of space technology, but 
maximum build-up of trust and 
confidence. An incremental program, to 
add to step-by-step, could be conceived to 
exchange information on crew training and 
lunar topography at this stage. When 
China is to launch its space station, the 
two countries shall work more closely to 
build their systems with compatibility, so 
as to maximize their chance to collaborate 
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in the future, for space transportation or 
rescue missions. 
 
It is necessary as well to envisage the legal 
dimension.28 As legal instruments are 
necessary on the Earth to avoid conflict on the 
high seas and in the air, a space engagement 
code globally is necessary as well. The U.S. 
and China could take the lead to start their 
talks on making such an international law on 
space affairs. 
 
This convention or code for space will address 
the identification and protection of national 
assets in the space, and non-intrusion of each 
other’s assets. It shall establish the code of 
conduct of astronauts and taikonauts to engage 
in space through procedures and courtesy. The 
International Institute of Space Law (IISL) is 
important to this purpose, but as an 
international non-governmental organization, 
it is not in a position to efficiently make an 
all-encompassing international law to regulate 
human behavior in space. Similarly, the 
International Astronautical Federation (IAF) 
shall not be enough to administer an 
international law regulating all human 
behavior in space. It is necessary that state 
governments associate themselves in 
conducting their programs in space, or to 
entrust their national space agencies to form 
an international organization with government 
authority for this matter. 
 
In the spirit of Sino-U.S. cooperation, China 
and the U.S. could engage in drafting such a 
code of promoting international civil space 
exchange and collaboration, as well as to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28Regina Hagen and Jüergen Scheffran, “International 
Space Law and Space Security– Expectations and 
Criteria for a Sustainable and Peaceful Use of Outer 
Space,” in M. Benko and K.-U. Schrogl, eds., Space 
Law: Current Problems for Future Regulations (Eleven 
International Publishing: The Netherlands, 2005): 273-
301; and Nancy Gallagher and John D. Steinbruner, 
“Reconsidering the Rules for Space Security,” 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. 
freeze, and to ban eventually, space 
weaponization activities for their bilateral 
interests and global benefits.29 It is not 
difficult to realize that they are the two most 
important states in the world for the 21st 
century. So, they bear the responsibility of 
mutual respect and accommodation of each 
other’s interests, as well as to lead the world 
into a more secure order. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29The Council of European Union already approved a 
“Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,” 8-
9 December 2008, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/ 
pdf/en /08/st17/st17175.en08.pdf (accessed 2 February 
2009). 
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